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Abstract 
This thesis studies the British colonial response to Jewish refugees between 1938 
and 1943. By assessing Britain’s ‘bystander’ response through the lens of the 
empire, this study expands on existing historiography and seeks not just to detail 
Britain’s limited action but also explain it. In this thesis, the concepts of liberalism, 
race and humanitarianism are used as analytical frameworks through which to 
examine British colonial policy. Specifically, in the interwar years, the scope of 
British (in)action was defined by liberal views on assimilation and the rights of 
individuals versus groups. Rather than antisemitism, a strict racial hierarchical and 
paternal system was used to justify British power and to protect British interests in 
the making of refugee policy. Finally, international humanitarianism was at a 
particular moment of development in the interwar years, both in terms of the 
intergovernmental system through which humanitarian action was channelled and 
in the socio-political expectation on governments to act. This was expressed in a 
conflict of short-term emergency aid and long-term developmental aid. The result 
was a colonial policy of compromise that saw officials try to connect the skills and 
financial assets of refugees with their overriding priority of colonial development 
and welfare. Through the use of official documents and refugee testimony, this 
study provides an account of the making and impact of colonial refugee policy and 
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Responding to the Holocaust: Bystanders, Colonialism and Conflicting 
Priorities  
 
In 1939, Norman Angell and Dorothy Frances Buxton published a book entitled You 
and the Refugee: The Morals and Economics of the Problem. Having explained that 
Jewish refugees ‘now knock at the doors of the greatest Empire in the world’, they 
asked, ‘Shall those doors be closed against them?’1 Angell and Buxton, Nobel Peace 
Prize winner and co-founder of ‘Save the Children’ respectively, raised a 
fundamental question, and one that was also being asked by others in the late 
1930s and 1940s. The British Empire, at its largest ever extent, offered potential 
areas of settlement for desperate Jewish refugees seeking safety from Nazi 
persecution; would refugees be permitted entry? Given the infamous, complex and 
difficult history of Palestine, it is perhaps easy to assume that the answer was 
simply ‘no’. Moreover, the numbers of refugees who found safety in other parts of 
empire only totalled about 9,400.2 Nonetheless, the story of the empire’s response 
to the interwar refugee crisis forms an important but largely untold story of the 
British response to the Holocaust. 
Colonialism offers a new and uniquely informative context for expanding the 
historiography beyond details of bystander responses towards explanations for 
those responses. Not only does the colonial context highlight the juxtaposition of 
three dominant conceptual schemata in liberal democracies during the interwar 
period – liberalism, race and humanitarianism – but more significantly, it provides a 
point where all three ideologies clearly met. This affords the opportunity to analyse 
more specifically the subtleties and complexities of the reasons behind Allied 
inaction and thereby move to a fuller understanding of Britain’s and the US’s 
responses. Indeed, in the very displacement of the refugee problem to colonial 
areas, we can see most clearly the way that these issues were prioritised and acted 
upon (or not) by British and American officials. Although the thesis primarily focuses 
                                                          
1
 Quoted in: Martin Gilbert, Kristallnacht: Prelude to Destruction (London, 2006), p 136. 
2
 This figure was made up of various refugee movements, including 7,600 to South Africa, 1,000 to 
Australia and 800 to ‘other Commonwealth countries’ (Simone Gigliotti, ‘“Acapulco in the Atlantic”: 
Revisiting Sosúa, a Jewish Refugee Colony in the Caribbean’, Immigrants and Minorities, 24/1 (2006), 
p. 24). 
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on Britain, which is reflected in the archival material used, the US remains an 
illuminating comparator at various points, for example: in American interest in 
large-scale settlement and colonisation schemes; in the context of race relations 
(particularly in the historiography of whiteness); in the context of humanitarian 
responses to refugees (particularly the SS St Louis); and in the interest in 
development.  
This thesis explores this largely untold colonial story more fully. It develops 
the existing literature on bystander responses beyond outlining British inaction and 
instead seeks to explain why there was a limited British response. The empire – part 
of, but other to – the British Isles is an ideal context in which to ask big questions 
about the ideological influences on and nature of British policy. In this thesis, the 
concepts of liberalism, race and humanitarianism are used as lenses through which 
to examine British action. It argues that the limits imposed by liberal thinking on 
assimilation and group versus individual rights interacted with racial perceptions of 
Jews (as well as of colonial groups and white Britishness) to create a policy limited 
in nature.  
In the empire, these ideas were complicated further by a tension between 
different types of humanitarianisms as well as the perceived British responsibility to 
colonial populations and a persecuted minority which was adding to international 
tensions. This clash of humanitarianisms and the priority given to colonial and 
developmental manifestations of it led to the adoption of a specific and deliberate 
colonial refugee policy. Although this policy had important precedents in other 
areas of colonial policy, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Malcolm 
MacDonald, attempted in the late 1930s to utilise refugee skills and settlement to 
the specific benefit of the empire.  
BRITAIN AND THE JEWISH REFUGEE PROBLEM 
Between 1933 and 1941, Nazi policy sought to make Germany ‘judenrein’ (meaning 
an area ‘cleansed’ of Jews). The initial Nazi strategy was emigration. However, the 
increasing number of those seeking to leave Germany created a putative problem 
for the international community, which had to help accommodate the growing 
number of refugees. As A.J. Sherman observes, these refugees, the majority of 
whom were Jewish, ‘embodie[d] a stubbornly intractable problem which subjected 
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both Ministers and civil servants to a cross-fire of intensely uncomfortable political 
pressures’.3 This was a problem that only continued to grow in scale and complexity 
during the later years of the interwar period and into the war itself.  
Although the impact of the Jewish identity of refugees will be discussed more 
fully in chapter three in the context of an examination of antisemitism, it is 
important to note here that, as Sherman observes, the Jewishness of refugees 
mattered because of a long-standing, specifically British attitude towards Jews. 
Although British anti-Jewish attitudes, in comparison to European (particularly 
German) antisemitism, are sometimes described as rather benign, Jewish Studies 
scholars have increasingly identified a more active antisemitism (ranging from 
‘Fascist violence’ to ambivalent ‘pressure on Anglo-Jewry both to assimilate and to 
remain apart from British society’).4 Bill Williams argues, specifically  in relation to 
the emancipation contract between Manchester’s nineteenth-century middle class 
and the city’s Jewish population, that emancipation was superficial and functional, 
rather than offering Anglo-Jewry any genuine tolerance or acceptance. He 
concludes that ‘Jews were validated not on the grounds of their Jewish identity, but 
on the basis of their conformity to the values and manners of bourgeois English 
society’.5 This ambivalent place of Jews in British society, as Bryan Cheyette argues, 
was also fluid, as writers and politicians alike ‘do not passively draw on eternal 
myths of “the Jew” but actively construct them in relation to their own literary and 
political concerns’.6  
David Feldman summarises these studies, arguing that they have shown that 
‘liberalism in Britain, far from offering a benign solution to “the Jewish question”, 
was one of the principal sources of oppression and antisemitism emanating from 
                                                          
3
 A.J. Sherman, Island Refuge: Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich 1933-1939 (London, 1973), 
p. 13. 
4
 Tony Kushner, ‘The Impact of British Anti-semitism, 1918-1945’, in: David Cesarani (ed.), The 
Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry (Oxford, 1990), pp. 191, 207. See also Tony Kushner, ‘Comparing 
Antisemitisms: A Useful Exercise?’, in: Michael Brenner, Rainer Liedtke and David Rechter (eds), Two 
Nations: British and German Jews in Comparative Perspective (Tübingen, 1999).  
5
 Bill Williams, ‘The Anti-Semitism of Tolerance: Middle-Class Manchester and the Jews 1870-1900’, 
in: Alan J. Kidd and K.W. Roberts, City, Class and Culture: Studies of Social Policy and Cultural 
Production in Victorian Manchester (Manchester, 1985), pp. 78, 94. 
6
  Bryan Cheyette, Constructions of ‘the Jew’ in English Literature and Society: Racial Representations, 
1875-1945 (Cambridge, 1995), p. 268. For a fuller exploration of these issues in relation to the 
subjects of this thesis, see Cheyette, chapters 3 (empire) and 5 (liberalism). 
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the Gentile world’.7 This all suggests (with relevance to this study) that Britain’s 
history of a particular kind of antisemitism, in which Jews had to conform to a 
specific (and far from static) ‘Englishness’, was the context in which refugee 
questions were approached in the 1930s.  
Following Hitler’s rise to power, the Nazis implemented a policy that 
systematically excluded Jewish people from German public life. Jewish businesses 
were attacked with economic boycotts. The Law for the Restoration of the 
Professional Civil Service legally excluded nearly all ‘non-Aryans’ from public life.8 
This was followed in 1935 by the Nuremberg Laws, which formally codified many of 
the anti-Jewish ideas of the Nazi Party. Based on racial categories (as defined by the 
party) rather than religious practices, it excluded people of Jewish heritage from 
citizenship in Germany and outlined laws forbidding sexual relations and marriage 
between Jews and non-Jews. Although there was some respite in anti-Jewish 
measures at the time of the Berlin Summer Olympics in 1936, persecution increased 
after international eyes turned away. In the process of ‘Aryanization’, Jewish people 
were forced to register property and businesses, many of which were confiscated 
and given to non-Jewish people. As a result, the roughly 600,000 people who made 
up Germany’s Jewish population were at best encouraged and at worst violently 
coerced to leave Germany and make new lives somewhere else during the 1930s. 
These discriminatory policies not only created large numbers of refugees but 
also increasingly impoverished those seeking to leave Germany by confiscating 
greater and greater proportions of their capital and property. While many of the 
first refugees were from the wealthy, educated and assimilated elite and were 
therefore more acceptable to British authorities, as time went on those seeking 
entry into Britain (and other countries) lacked funds and resources and thus 
threatened to become dependent on government resources or charity. 
Furthermore, even some of the first wave of refugees were considered to be 
undesirable as an ‘overwhelming proportion’ of these ‘belonged to the professional 
or business classes’ rather than sought-after occupations such as labourers, 
                                                          
7
 David Feldman, ‘Jews and the State in Britain’, in: Michael Brenner, Rainer Liedtke and David 
Rechter (eds), Two Nations: British and German Jews in Comparative Perspective (Tübingen, 1999), p. 
142. 
8
 David S. Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938-1941 (New York, 1985), p. 28. 
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technicians and agricultural workers. Even if these emigrants were prepared to take 
other jobs, Britain was unwilling in the middle of an economic depression to take 
impoverished refugees with uncertain earning potential.9 Poor refugees were as 
unwelcome as the stereotyped ‘foreign’, ‘subversive’ and ‘dangerous’ Jew, often 
applied to those from Eastern Europe, especially Poland and Galicia.10 
By 1938, about 150,000 German Jews – one in four – had already left 
Germany. However, 1938 saw the refugee problem turn into a crisis. In March 1938, 
Germany marched into Austria, claiming Anschluss. German territorial expansion 
into Austria not only represented a clear violation of the Treaty of Versailles but 
also brought some additional 185,000 Jews under Nazi rule.11 The antisemitic 
measures which had taken nearly five years to develop in Germany were unleashed 
at once in Austria, causing desperate situations for Jews and triggering a significant 
number of Jewish suicides and another exodus of Jewish people.12 
In the autumn, tensions over Czechoslovakia meant that Europe looked set for 
war, which the Munich Agreement in September managed to avoid. However, as a 
result, the refugee crisis worsened. In the agreement, negotiated by British Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain, the Sudeten areas of Czechoslovakia were ceded to 
Germany. After the official German take-over on 1 October, it soon became clear 
that the Czech government was unable to deal with the social and economic costs 
of the refugees created by the territorial changes endorsed by the agreement. This 
resulted in minority groups, particularly Jews, not receiving the nationality rights 
afforded to them in the Munich Agreement. Complicated by its own role in the 
agreement, Britain’s action was based on financial aid rather than increased Jewish 
refugee entry to Britain. A fund of £10 million was sent to the Czech government, of 
which £4 million was designated for use in the relief and re-settlement of refugees. 
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 Sherman, Island Refuge, pp. 23-24. 
10
 Tony Kushner, ‘Beyond the Pale? British Reactions to Nazi Antisemitism, 1933-1939’, in: Tony 
Kushner and Kenneth Lunn (eds), The Politics of Marginality: Race, the Radical Right and Minorities 
in Twentieth Century Britain (London, 1990), pp. 145-146. 
11
 USHMM, ‘Emigration and the Évian Conference’, USHMM Holocaust Encyclopedia, 
<http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005520>, accessed March 2015. Pamela 
Shatzkes puts Jewish emigration from Germany between 1933 and 1937 at 131,000 (Holocaust and 
Rescue: Impotent or Indifferent? Anglo Jewry 1938-1945 (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 46-47).  
12
 Wyman, Paper Walls, pp. 29-30. The suicides of those in Austria are part of a bigger pattern of 
such action in Nazi Germany. For a history of suicide in Weimar and Nazi Germany, see Christian 
Goeschel, Suicide in Nazi Germany (Oxford, 2009). 
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However, as Louise London concludes, ‘Britain had obtained the peace it craved – 
refugees had paid the price’.13 None more so than Jewish refugees, who remained 
the hardest to re-settle and often received the least help.  
The peace of Munich, however, was shattered by the events of 9-10 
November 1938. The violent pogroms that erupted in Germany came to be known 
as Kristallnacht and shocked the world. The persecution of Jews in Europe reached 
new, violent heights, and the night ended with ninety-one deaths and the arrest of 
some 20,000 Jewish men.14 In the aftermath, there was a dramatic increase in the 
numbers of those who sought to leave Nazi-controlled territories. Bystander 
countries, shocked by the new level of violent persecution, sought relatively more 
generous responses to refugees seeking safety. Nonetheless, Kristallnacht did not 
witness a major reassessment of long-standing restrictive policies, and the small 
policy changes pursued were often too late and were then all but halted as Europe 
moved ever closer to war. 
The outbreak of the Second World War on 1 September 1939 caused further 
restrictions in government responses to Jewish refugees. At this point, plans that 
were underway to help refugees were terminated, as the Allies started to focus all 
their resources on winning the war. Although the primary aim of the Allied war 
effort was not to save the Jews being persecuted by Nazi Germany, when pressure 
was exerted for efforts to be made to this end, officials often claimed that winning 
the war was the best way of solving the problem of Jewish persecution. Moreover, 
in the context of war, refugees who had sought safety outside of the expanding 
German Reich were now in countries where their foreign identity meant they were 
considered, first and foremost, to be ‘enemy aliens’ rather than refugees seeking 
safety. As a result, many refugees endured internment in countries including Britain 
and its imperial territories. 
With the onset of war and the increasingly genocidal nature of Nazi policy, 
those Jews still in German-controlled Europe were increasingly caught in a web of 
destruction that would lead to the death of some six million Jews in events that 
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 Louise London, Whitehall and the Jews 1938-1948: British Immigration Policy and the Holocaust 
(Cambridge, 2001), pp. 14, 142, 145. 
14
 Sherman, Island Refuge, p. 167. 
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have subsequently became known as the Holocaust. As scholarly study of these 
events has developed over the last seventy years, Holocaust historiography has 
broadly fallen into the study of three main categories: perpetrator, victim and 
bystander – a triangularisation adopted by Raul Hilberg in his 1992 book, 
Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe 1933-1945.15 It is the last 
of these categories, that of the bystander, that this thesis explores more fully. 
More specifically, this thesis investigates further the British response to the 
Jewish refugee crisis between 1938 and 1943. These dates cover most of the period 
of the fiercest persecution of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe and the fullest extent of 
the associated refugee crisis. Broadly demarcated by Anschluss in March 1938 and 
the Bermuda Conference in April 1943, these five years included major acts of Nazi 
persecution and aggression, British and American attempts to respond to the 
refugee crisis and the outbreak of war, including the early years of the conflict when 
the ultimate victory of Allied forces was unknown. After 1943, post-war planning 
started in earnest, but as this thesis is concerned with the role of certain conceptual 
schemes in the interwar years, these discussions are of less importance to the 
study.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
To date, the historiography of the Allied response has agreed that Britain and the 
US – or as Tony Kushner has labelled them, ‘liberal democracies’ – failed to produce 
an effective response to the Holocaust. Into the mid-2000s, reviews of the literature 
on the British and American responses, led mainly by Kushner, still contended that 
more nuance was needed.16 
Bystander studies developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with work on 
the US generally flourishing before that on Britain. However, the earliest work on 
Allied knowledge and action, Andrew Sharf’s The British Press and Jews under Nazi 
                                                          
15
 Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe 1933-1945 (New York, 
1993). 
16
 Tony Kushner, ‘Britain, the United States and the Holocaust: In Search of a Historiography’, in: Dan 
Stone (ed.), The Historiography of the Holocaust (New York, 2005); Tony Kushner, ‘“Pissing in the 
Wind”? The Search for Nuance in the Study of Holocaust “Bystanders”’, Holocaust Studies: A Journal 
of Culture and History, 9/2-3 (2000); Donald Bloxham and Tony Kushner, The Holocaust: Critical 
Historical Approaches (Manchester, 2005). 
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Rule (1964), did in fact deal with the British response.17 While it did not generate 
much further debate in Britain for some time, it marked a starting point for an 
emerging American historiography. The first of these works, Arthur D. Morse’s 
While Six Million Died (1967) and David S. Wyman’s Paper Walls: America and the 
Refugee Crisis 1938-1941 (1968), published in the US, were highly critical of 
American action, arguing that because Nazi extermination policy was known to the 
American government, more should have been done to help Europe’s Jewry. To 
highlight this, Morse sought to establish the extent of American knowledge of Nazi 
plans for Jewish extermination. Drawing similar conclusions, Wyman identified 
three main reasons for American inaction: unemployment, nativistic nationalism 
and antisemitism.18 
The publication of these works coincided with a growing interest among the 
American public in the Holocaust. Indeed, the late 1960s and early 1970s marked 
the start of a new focus on the issue, particularly, regarding its victims. 
Undoubtedly, this broader social and cultural interest in the Holocaust, along with 
‘a growing ethnic pride and self-confidence on behalf of American Jewry’,19 made it 
possible for historians to argue that more should have been done by the American 
government in response to the specifically Jewish tragedy. 
Other important works on the American response soon followed, including 
Henry Feingold’s The Politics of Rescue (1970) and Saul Friedman’s No Haven for the 
Oppressed (1973).20 Sherman’s British-focused Island Rescue, published in 1973, 
was the first assessment of British policy since Sharf. Sherman, an American Jew, 
concluded his work with the now infamous ‘Balance Sheet’ of British action, arguing 
that British policy was ‘comparatively compassionate, even generous’, particularly 
in comparison to the US.21 In a later work, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 
(1979), Bernard Wasserstein made a more negative assessment of British action, 
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 Andrew Sharf, The British Press and Jews under Nazi Rule (Oxford, 1964). 
18
 Arthur D. Morse, While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy (London, 1968); Wyman, 
Paper Walls. 
19
 Bloxham and Kushner, The Holocaust, p. 187. 
20
 Saul Friedman, No Haven for the Oppressed: United States Policy toward Jewish Refugees, 1938-
1945 (Detroit, MI, 1973); Henry L. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and 
the Holocaust, 1938-45 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1970). 
21
 Sherman, Island Refuge, p. 267. 
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arguing that ‘there is little to celebrate in the account of British policy towards the 
Jews of Europe between 1939 and 1945’.22 
In 1997, William Rubinstein’s book The Myth of Rescue sought to challenge 
this largely critical historiography. Controversially, Rubinstein systematically 
dismantled the established perspective on Allied action, arguing that no Jews could 
have been saved by the combined forces of Britain and the US. Although a re-
evaluation was needed, his work focused on the assumption that German Jews 
(other European Jews were not included in his assessment) were ‘prisoners’ rather 
than ‘refugees’, and therefore there was no option of ‘rescue’ by the Allies.23 
Certainly, recognition that Nazi policy prohibited Jewish movement after October 
1941 is necessary. However, as David Cesarani asserts, Rubinstein’s ‘analysis 
contradicts all recent scholarship and defies the evidence’.24 Moreover, such 
deterministic conclusions limit discussion of the reasons for Allied inaction by 
simply claiming that Britain and the US had no choice in how they responded to the 
unfolding events of the Holocaust. It is this aspect which accounts for the popular 
success of Rubinstein’s book. In fact, Kushner has contended that the work appeals 
to those ‘anxious about the moral integrity of the British and American war 
memory’, because Rubinstein’s work ‘lets the reader off from any consideration of 
the dilemmas facing bystanders’.25 
This swing back and forth between adamant criticism and more defensive 
works has been, to some degree, successfully bypassed in other scholarship which 
seeks to explain Allied actions by contextualising the period and policy decisions of 
the US and Britain. Richard Breitman and Alan Kraut, in American Refugee Policy 
and European Jewry, 1933-1945 (1987), assert the importance of assessing Allied 
action in its ‘historical and political context’, in order to understand ‘the real 
constraints and trade-offs faced by government officials’.26 Louise London, in 
Whitehall and the Jews 1933-1948 (2003), the principal and most recent account of 
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 Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 (Oxford, 1979), p. 345. 
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 William D. Rubinstein, The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More Jews 
from the Nazis (London, 1997). 
24
 David Cesarani, ‘Review of The Myth of Rescue’, The English Historical Review, 113/454 (1998), p. 
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 Kushner, ‘Pissing in the Wind’, p. 71. 
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 Richard Breitman and Alan M Kraut, American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945 
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10 
British policy, outlines the bureaucratic and wider political parameters in which 
British policy was formed. London utilised material including Home Office, Foreign 
Office and Treasury files to build a detailed picture of the internal politics and 
bureaucracy of Whitehall that dictated British refugee policy. The result is a more 
complete, albeit still critical, assessment of the British response.27 
Moving away from these more narrative surveys, Kushner, in The Holocaust 
and the Liberal Imagination (1994), explored ‘the reactions of liberal societies when 
confronted with an illiberal phenomenon’, the Holocaust. Rather than assessing 
state responses or the high-level diplomacy of Jewish agencies, Kushner focuses on 
the role of popular opinion. His findings show that although liberal ideology was 
closely connected with tolerance, the reaction of the Western Allies to the highly 
intolerant Nazi regime was not straightforward condemnation. Rather, the strength 
of liberalism, with its belief in assimilation, led many people to see refugees as 
essentially problematic. Indeed, in the context of a refugee crisis caused by Nazi 
antisemitism, the Jewishness of the refugees mattered. Kushner concludes that 
‘[o]utright hostility (or more rarely, sympathy) is easier to chart than what is the 
more normal and complicated response, ambivalence and ambiguity’.28 It is these 
complexities that this thesis seeks to engage with more fully. Rather than simply 
documenting the ways Britain restricted immigration and refugee entry, the ideas 
underpinning restriction need to be assessed, taking into account the influence of 
not just liberalism but also other conceptual frameworks including race and 
humanitarianism. 
While the existing historiography suggests that political and social ideologies 
were important in the formation of policy, this has yet to be detailed or sustained in 
relation to Jewish refugees in the 1930s and 1940s.29 An important exception to this 
is the work carried out by David Cesarani on the importance of anti-alienism in the 
UK. His work identifies anti-alienism as a discourse which included socio-biological 
                                                          
27
 London, Whitehall. 
28
 Tony Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination: A Social and Cultural History (Oxford, 
1994), pp. 17-18. 
29
 Work by Gavin Schaffer on the role of race and liberalism in Britain’s response to minorities in the 
interwar and war years are exceptions to this. See: Gavin Schaffer, ‘Assets or “Aliens”? Race Science 
and the Analysis of Jewish Intelligence in Inter-war Britain’, Patterns of Prejudice, 42/2 (2008); ‘Re-
thinking the History of Blame: Britain and Minorities during the Second World War’, National 
Identities, 8/4 (2006), pp. 401-419. 
11 
vocabulary to describe the ‘other’ as well as the wavering nature of humanitarian 
concern to provide asylum.30 Cesarani’s work also addresses some of the important 
dominant ideological influences, particularly race. However, more work on these 
ideological foundations, specifically analysing together the influence of liberalism, 
race and humanitarianism, would help develop the historiography and our 
understanding of British policy.  
As stated at the outset of this introduction, this thesis explores the 
frameworks in which policy was formulated by looking at the issues in a colonial 
context. Britain’s colonial response to the refugee crisis is most closely associated 
with the history of the British mandate rule of Palestine, the 1939 White Paper 
which limited Jewish refugee entry, and the creation of Israel in 1948. Scholarly 
work on Palestine has to navigate, in turn, the intensely personal and political 
nature of this complicated subject. However, there is a broader British colonial 
response that not only offers context to the question of Palestine but also provides 
a new angle from which to examine British responses.  
This thesis argues that it is within the British tropical empire and Dominions 
(as well as the American Commonwealth) where we can see most clearly the 
ideological building blocks of the British and American response. A brief review of 
research in these areas helps identify important questions in the assessment of 
colonial refugee policy and of bystander studies more broadly. 
First, scholarship on the British Dominion response to the Jewish refugee crisis 
has highlighted the limited nature of Australia’s, Canada’s and South Africa’s 
refugee and immigration policies and the importance of racial thinking in the 
construction of these limitations. The Dominions, designated ‘white settler 
colonies’, wanted to control the racial make-up of their populations, and as such, 
racial discrimination had long been at the centre of their immigration practices.31 
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Conceptions of ‘otherness’ were based on more than just colour and involved 
liberal concern over assimilation. This was particularly the case in relation to Jewish 
refugees who, although ‘white’, were feared because of their perceived inability to 
assimilate into the social and economic structures of the Dominions. Therefore, 
Dominion refugee and immigration policies were not just an expression of race or 
antisemitism, but rather the natural response in a world where liberalism, race and 
humanitarianism helped shape action (see chapter two).32 
While the Dominion historiography has established the limits set by liberalism, 
race, and humanitarianism within a British-specific system, other imperial contexts 
develop how these ideological frameworks interacted with practical challenges of 
settlement in tropical climates. Specifically, the Philippines (a US Commonwealth 
between 1935 and 1946), the Dominican Republic (part of the US’s sphere of 
influence in Latin America) and Shanghai (an international settlement until 1941, 
where Britain had vested and arguably colonial interests) have drawn some 
scholarly attention.  
Recent scholarship on the Philippines as a site of significant settlement for the 
Jewish diaspora provides information about some of the restrictions and priorities 
that influenced refugee settlement in the territory and colonial space more 
generally.33 The Philippines offers examples of two kinds of settlement plans. First, 
the controlled entry of limited, individually-selected refugees was relatively 
successful. This was based on a number of factors. The established Jewish 
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community in the Philippines accepted this refugee settlement, as those entering 
were deemed to be the ‘right kind’ of refugees, largely based on their employment, 
e.g. as medical workers but also mechanics, farmers, barbers and accountants.34 
Indeed, the President of the Philippines, Manuel L. Quezon, ‘was interested in 
bolstering the island nation economically by admitting skilled Jewish workers’.35 
This also suited ‘liberal’ views on race and assimilability. Although the US was more 
open to ‘ethnic pluralism’ than Britain, it still preferred assimilation of refugees and 
immigrants,36 even in its Commonwealth territory. 
Furthermore, the success of the scheme highlighted the importance of the 
positive working relationship established between Paul V. McNutt (the American 
High Commissioner), Jewish representatives and Philippine officials in the pursuit of 
securing Jewish settlement. McNutt was unusual in his support for Jewish entry, but 
as a pro-Zionist, anti-racist and largely tolerant man, he truly believed that 
liberalism was the antithesis of the fascism sweeping across Europe. The way that 
McNutt conceptualised the issues shared many similarities with British colonial 
officials. For example, his desire to respond to the abhorrent Nazi persecution of 
Jews, working within the law and the preference for certain kinds of Jews all 
reflected ideas evident in British policy-making discussions.37  
The second type of plan was large-scale settlement, and this was far less 
successful. Specifically, the Mandiano Plan aimed to colonise part of the Philippines 
with 10,000 agricultural settlers. Quezon hoped to use Jewish settlers to help 
‘drown’ out the large number of Muslim Moros and to neutralize the influence of 
Japanese immigrations who inhabited the island.38 Although initially popular with 
the US State Department, enthusiasm waned as war approached and difficulties 
emerged, especially in regard to local Filipino opposition. The plan ultimately failed. 
Ephraim argues that the large-scale settlement of a ‘racially and religiously 
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different’ group was ‘fraught with difficulties’.39 The failure of the Mandiano Plan 
demonstrated the difficulties inherent in using refugee colonisation for programmes 
of social engineering and state formation. Liberal and humanitarian agendas only 
stretched so far, and as a result, large-scale agricultural and development 
colonisation schemes, which went against these strongly held liberal principles, 
were largely unsuccessful. 
Nonetheless, large-scale Jewish colonisation was also attempted in the 
Dominican Republic and with relatively greater success. Historical assessments of 
the venture have highlighted the practical difficulties that settlement schemes faced 
in tropical territories. Marion A. Kaplan outlined the settler response in her work, 
Dominican Haven: The Jewish Refugee Settlement in Sosúa 1940-1945 (2008). Allen 
Wells (the child of Sosúa settler, Heinrich Wasservogel) wrote Tropical Zion: General 
Trujilo, FDR, and the Jews of Sosúa (2009), in which he contextualised the 
settlement in terms of the local (i.e. General Trujilo and the Dominican Republic) 
and geopolitical (i.e. American refugee and rescue policy action) realities.40 
Jewish settlement in the Dominican Republic is estimated to have saved about 
3,000 lives, taking into account the settlers in the capital, the specific settlement of 
Sosúa and the visas given to potential refugees. As countries around the world were 
adopting increasingly restrictive immigration legislation, the Dominican Republic 
was unique in actively encouraging Jewish refugee settlement. It was the only 
country in attendance at the Évian Conference (1938) that offered any settlement 
opportunities, offering entry for up to 100,000 Jewish refugees. While other 
countries refused refugee entry because of concerns regarding what large-scale 
entry would do to their population demographics, the Dominican Republic wanted 
to encourage white settlement, particularly Jewish settlement, as a way of 
combating their own perceived racial crisis. In fact, Dominican ‘leaders attributed 
European bourgeois values, that they themselves shared, to Jews, including thrift, 
hard work, urbanity, cosmopolitanism, and business skills, and hoped to bring Jews 
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to their developing nation’.41 Ironically, the President of the Dominican Republic, 
Rafael Trujillo, while offering safety to persecuted Jews, had overseen the massacre 
of several thousand Haitians at the border, in the attempt to reduce the 
Caribbean/African population.42 
Despite the complicated origins, the Dominican Republic settlement 
eventually saw about 500 refugees settle in Sosúa (with an additional 200 passing 
through). Although the Sosúa settlement received local and international support 
(and finance), it never flourished. Importantly, the settlement did not suffer 
because of negative racial perceptions of Jewish settlers. Rather, the failure can be 
attributed to practical reasons. For example, the US, despite its initial support, 
eventually restricted the issuing of transit visas necessary to reach the Dominican 
Republic. Jewish attitudes to the difficulties of settlement also limited Sosúa’s 
success. The farming enterprises were challenging, and these difficulties were often 
compounded by some settlers who were not necessarily practically equipped or 
mentally adjusted to the hard life of physical labour the project required. Moreover, 
disparities between the numbers of single Jewish men and women were a source of 
tension that could not be redressed. Cultural differences between Eastern and 
Western Jews also caused problems that limited the success of the settlement.43 
Studies of settlement in the Dominican Republic show how important the 
refugee experience was in colonisation schemes. While optimistic policy-makers 
might have assumed that an alternative place of settlement to Palestine would have 
alleviated the refugee crisis, the reality was much more complex. Although lives 
might have been saved, had broader and more generous settlement plans been 
pursued, this perspective treats Jewish refugees as passive actors who were simply 
at the whim of colonial and social planners. The inclusion of the refugee perspective 
in this study (details of which will be outlined below) allows historians to see the 
complexity of colonial expectations of assimilation and ‘successful’ settlers, and 
moreover, emphasises how far these were sometimes detached from the human 
reality, not only of the refugee experience but also of colonial social planning. Not 
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on the scale originally offered, the settlement scheme was a well-researched 
project, led by Jewish agencies with the tacit support of the Dominican and 
American governments and became an important example of the success but also 
the inherent limitations of agricultural European settlement in a tropical climate. 
Practical challenges were also evident in the case of Jewish settlement in 
Shanghai. In the 1930s, Shanghai was an ‘open port’, which meant that no visa was 
required for entry. As immigration restrictions increased across the world, many 
European Jews sought safety there. In the end, approximately 17,000 Jewish 
refugees entered Shanghai, mostly settling in the Hongkew district of the 
international settlement.44 In 1941, as war spread to the Pacific theatre, Jewish 
refugees found themselves under Japanese rule (as did those Jews who had settled 
in the Philippines). 
Scholarly work on Jewish settlement in Shanghai started with David Kranzler’s 
Japanese, Nazis and Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai, 1938-1945 
(1976) in which he argued that rather than mirroring Nazi Jewish policy, the 
Japanese sought to utilise alleged Jewish power and money for Japan’s benefit.45 
Later work by Pamela Rotner Sakamoto placed Japanese action towards Jewish 
refugees in a diplomatic context.46 Gao Bei, in Shanghai Sanctuary (2013), has taken 
up the story from Chinese and Japanese perspectives, emphasising the importance 
of perceptions of Jews in policy formation.47 Other work, such as Marcia Reynders 
Ristaino’s, Port of Last Resort, shifts the focus to the refugee communities 
themselves and examines the Slavic and Jewish refugees who settled in Shanghai in 
the 1920s.48 These works serve to highlight the importance of racial identity in 
refugee policy. Of particular importance, Gao emphasises the influence of politics in 
Great Power policy towards Shanghai, arguing that it reveals ‘much about their 
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national priorities, their international agendas, and their perceptions of the global 
balance of power’.49 
The work carried out on the Dominions, the Philippines, the Dominican 
Republic and Shanghai suggest that ideas about race, liberalism and 
humanitarianism interacted over refugee settlement in colonial contexts. In the 
context of British tropical colonial territory, these issues are brought into even 
starker relief, but this remains largely absent from the historiography.50 While 
schemes of settlement discussed for various colonial territories have been 
acknowledged by some historians, they have not been fully studied. Indeed, 
Wasserstein pays little attention to colonial settlement plans, arguing that they 
were soon ‘consigned to the oblivion of the archives’, never being transformed into 
active policy.51 However, by removing these schemes from the ‘oblivion of the 
archives’, the complexities and priorities of liberal democratic policy-makers in 
response to the Holocaust come into sharper focus.  
Refugees themselves have also made some attempt to prevent the stories and 
experiences of those who found safety in more unusual places from being lost. 
Ephraim, who experienced exile in the Philippines, has published his own memoirs 
as well as scholarly work on the Jewish experience in the Far East. Likewise, several 
memoirs on life in the Shanghai have also appeared.52 Fewer published sources 
exist on refugee experience in Africa or the West Indies. Notable exceptions on the 
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former include Stefanie Zweig’s Nowhere in Africa (2004). Although a fictionalised 
autobiography, it speaks to the general experience of life for refugees in British 
territory in Africa.53 A collection of letters by Helga Voigt, a German who was Jewish 
by Nazi standards, is presented in Letters from Helga 1934-1937 (2008). Although 
slightly earlier than the focus of this study, Helga’s experiences in Tanganyika 
provide another example of refugee testimony of exile experience in Africa.54 Other 
records of refugee experience in colonies such as Kenya, Cyprus and the West Indies 
do exist but remain unpublished in archives such as the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum (USHMM) in Washington.55 
This thesis makes key interventions into two distinct historiographies. Firstly, 
as the literature review has made clear, it adds to studies of Britain and the 
Holocaust and bystander studies more broadly. However, in setting the problem in 
the colonial context, it also reveals new material about interwar imperial policy on 
issues such as multiculturalism, race (particularly ‘whiteness’) and development. As 
the literature on this field is vast and disparate and as the focus of this particular 
study requires an inter-disciplinary approach, it has been decided to place the 
relevant reviews of specific literatures in an opening, contextual section at the start 
of each chapter that will also deal with how my research engages with the topic. 
Broadly though, this thesis argues that the distinct nature of the interwar empire 
was a constant guiding principle for officials, and therefore the changing attitudes 
towards the nature, if not the fact, of British imperial rule are central to 
understanding colonial refugee policy.  
In the interwar period, Britain’s position of influence and control over 
colonised nations (whether formally or informally) was affected by particular ideas 
and understandings of Britain’s colonial role. In the case of Britain’s tropical 
colonies, theories of trusteeship and paternalism were of paramount importance. 
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These principles were largely taken from Lord Lugard’s influential work The Dual 
Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1922). He explained that: 
Let it be admitted from the outset that European brains, capital, and 
energy have not been, and never will be, expended in developing the 
resources of Africa from motives of pure philanthropy; that Europe is in 
Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes and of the 
native races in their progress to a higher plane; that the benefit can be 
made reciprocal and that it is the aim and desire of civilized 
administration to fulfil this dual mandates.56 
 
From this, and based on his experiences in Nigeria, ‘Lugard constructed a 
specific political doctrine for colonial administration in Africa’, in which he argued 
that ‘Britain had a double obligation to develop the colonies economically to 
produce for the outside world while preserving African culture and protecting 
Africans from exploitation by governing through “traditional” African leaders and 
institutions’.57 There was some move toward a more developmental perspective, 
highlighted by the adoption of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940, 
but this did not remove completely the idea that the people in Britain’s colonies 
were the charge of His Majesty’s Government until they had been ‘civilised’ and 
were able to take their own lead in development and democracy.58 These themes 
will be expanded more fully in chapter two and picked up again in the various case-
studies used in the thesis.  
STRUCTURE 
The thesis has been structured thematically rather than chronologically for several 
reasons. Adopting a chronological approach across the numerous colonies 
investigated would have cluttered the thesis with a repetitive narrative with little 
analytical benefit. Indeed, a chronological narrative, while showing that, like British 
domestic policy, colonial policy towards Jewish refugees was limited, would have 
simply perpetuated the existing tendency in the historiography to outline a 
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restrictive policy agenda without developing this to a study of the reasons for such a 
policy. That is not to say there is no value in such studies. The core findings of 
Louise London’s excellent work are borne out by this study too. The bureaucratic 
nature of the British government and the limits this produced are relevant to the 
Colonial Office. However, the Colonial Office functioned very differently to other 
departments. As Ronald Hyam suggests, in contrast to the Colonial office, the 
Foreign Office ‘was radically different, its main interest being in diplomatic 
accommodations without the responsibility of actually running any territories’. The 
departments were also different in practice. While Foreign Office record-keeping 
was ‘sparser, less reflective’, Colonial Office policy-making took place through an 
‘hierarchical’, ‘extensive and meticulous’ process of minuting. As such, a record has 
been left of ‘the reasoning behind decisions’.59 Studies of the ‘Foreign Office mind’ 
have shown the value of investigating the ‘core belief system’, ‘set of values and 
ideas’, accepted understandings, and ‘unspoken assumptions’. This thesis 
investigates some of these aspects in relation to the Colonial Office and refugees 
and, as such, a new window from which to look at the wider ideological and 
intellectual influences on policy.60 
The selection of liberalism, race and humanitarianism in part stems from the 
work of others. Most obviously, and as the second chapter details, my study of 
liberalism is indebted to, but also builds on, the work of Kushner. The other themes 
explored here are those that emerged most strongly from the source material 
studied. Questions of race and the tension between various humanitarianisms 
seemed to be at the root of the examples that appeared in government files. Other 
intellectual schemas such as class or gender could have been included and are 
intimately linked to the themes that are studied here, but the frameworks of class 
and gender did not emerge as often as explicit explanatory themes for the historical 
actors involved. That is not to say they were not important or that they were not 
referenced. However, class, for example, seemed to connect so closely with race in 
the colonial setting – racial hierarchies mirrored class divisions; the fear of the black 
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majority in the colonies was similar to the fear of the growing working-class in 
Britain; entry into the colonies was based, in part, on financial assets – that it was 
the former that I decided to investigate more fully. Likewise, while gender roles and 
identities were important – the ‘right kind’ of settlers were understood to be men; 
fear of the ‘other’ was often linked to their real or imagined relationship to white 
women – this was also more overtly discussed in racial terms, meaning that the 
focus of this study was once more directed there. Ultimately, the selection of the 
themes of liberalism, race and humanitarianism aims not necessarily to discount 
other frameworks of analysis but to elucidate the contemporary preoccupations 
and influences that were most evident in my study of the primary material. 
Chapter one examines the context of the refugee problem and the colonial 
response in more detail and establishes the practical realities with which the 
intellectual schemas of liberalism, race and humanitarianism interacted. Ideas do 
not develop in a vacuum, and the challenges of international relations in the 
interwar years, the changing and developing colonial context as well as the 
unprecedented and unpredictable ways in which the refugee crisis developed were 
responded to by officials without the benefit of hindsight. Mapping these conflicting 
and changing real-world developments at the outset of this study provides a 
tangible basis on which to overlay ideological concerns in order to see how they 
evolved into the policy of linking colonial development with refugees. Therefore, 
this chapter establishes important information on: (1) the international context, 
including the League of Nations, Palestine, appeasement and Anglo-American 
relations; (2) colonial perspectives on new approaches to colonial policy as well as 
departmental differences and the way in which refugee agencies and advocates 
interacted with ideas of colonial settlement; and (3) the development of the 
refugee crisis with particular focus on turning points, such as the Évian Conference, 
Kristallnacht, war and internment, and the Bermuda Conference. 
The second chapter examines the impact that liberalism had on the British 
response to the refugee crisis. This is done, firstly, by establishing the ways in which 
liberalism impacted refugee entry into Britain and into the British Dominions. Next, 
specific colonial examples, including plans for large- and small-scale settlement in 
Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and Cyprus, evidenced by both official files and refugee 
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testimony, highlight the tensions inherent in liberalism over individual and group 
rights. They further show that questions of group versus individual rights and 
assimilation went to the heart of the restrictive policy Britain adopted both 
domestically and in the colonies. For policy-makers, ‘successful’ assimilation 
involved limiting local opposition (i.e. political problems), maintaining colonial social 
order (i.e. racial hierarchies) and the assumption by refugees of certain occupations 
such as farming (i.e. protection of local economies). More broadly, it is argued that 
it was the contradictions and complexities the tensions created that allowed room 
for the development of a specific colonial refugee policy agenda that focused on 
colonial development.  
The third chapter examines the role of race on refugee policy. As many 
historians have agreed, antisemitism is not a sufficient explanation for Britain’s 
restrictive policy, although the Jewish identity of the refugees clearly mattered. By 
examining the question in the colonial setting, the complexities of this issue are 
more starkly exposed, and what emerges is the fact that race mattered in specific 
ways but often in relation to other races as well as to policy-makers’ identities as 
white and British. This chapter will show how Colonial Office perceptions of race 
impacted their attitudes towards refugees and the resulting policy initiatives. Firstly, 
the contemporary understanding of racial groups – specifically, Jewish, black, Indian 
and white – will be explored. These attitudes will then be analysed within the 
context of specific case-studies: land settlement policy in Kenya; internment of 
enemy aliens in the colonies; and refugee attitudes towards race.  
The fourth chapter will outline the tensions in British policy over various kinds 
of humanitarianisms. The question of refugee entry into the colonies brought the 
immediate need of refugee relief into direct conflict with developmental forms of 
humanitarianism that were increasingly central to British colonial policy. This 
conflict will be assessed through the study of British colonial policy towards two 
case-studies: refugee boats and internment. Chapter four will also unpack the 
assumption that a nation-state could and should have acted against perceived 
national interest in response to humanitarian need. It will do so by assessing the 
history of humanitarianism, the connections between humanitarianism and empire 
and the ways these impacted Britain’s role in the international humanitarian 
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response to the Jewish refugee crisis of the 1930s. Understanding the clash of these 
two humanitarianisms is the final stepping stone to understanding the policy of 
compromise that emerged among colonial officials – that of linking refugees to 
colonial development – which is the subject of the final chapter. 
The final chapter draws the core argument of this thesis together by 
examining the way in which the three frameworks of liberalism, race and 
humanitarianism helped shape a specific policy of compromise that linked refugee 
entry with colonial development. This policy of compromise sought to harness: the 
limits of liberalism in terms of immigration, the views on the ways that different 
races interacted, and the benefits of developmental humanitarianism with the 
needs of the colonies. The chapter will establish the history of colonial 
development, outline the role of Malcolm MacDonald (the Colonial Secretary for 
much of the period when these plans were under discussion) in linking refugees and 
development and then examine two case-studies. First, the use of refugee doctors 
to help develop the colonies’ social and welfare infrastructure will be considered. 
This was an area of growing interest, and questions of population and the 
development of social planning became central to policy-making. Race and 
liberalism featured highly in the Colonial Office’s preference for this idea. Second, 
the focus on large-scale refugee re-settlement as a method of developing a colony 
will be assessed through the example of British Guiana. Liberalism, race and a hope 
to unite two competing forms of humanitarianism were the reasons behind both 
support of this idea and its ultimate failure. In fact, it is in the support for and 
resistance to these potential plans that the place of the intellectual schemas 
analysed in this thesis become clear.  
SOURCES 
Three types of primary documents form the basis of this research. First and 
foremost, this is a project detailing government policy. Therefore the main type of 
evidence used is Colonial Office files found at the UK National Archives in Kew. 
Colonial Office files include a range of topic specific files (immigration, refugees, 
internment) and are geographically diverse. These issues have not left a material 
record across all colonies. This is primarily because the refugee question concerned 
some territories more than others. Colonies such as Kenya and Cyprus were heavily 
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preoccupied with the issue, and an abundance of material remains as evidence of 
this. Other territories where large-scale settlement was not actively considered or 
was not deemed to be likely, such as territories in Asia, are therefore largely absent 
from the story. That is not to say they did not feature in the story at all. For 
example, Hong Kong, located in the heart of the British Asian empire was a place of 
transit for many Jewish refugees, especially those heading to Shanghai or the 
Philippines. However, the issue has not left large amounts of physical evidence and 
therefore appears little in this study.  
While the Colonial Office formed just one part of the British government, the 
selection of evidence has been limited to Colonial Office files as domestic records 
including those of the Foreign and Home Offices as well as the Treasury have been 
used extensively by scholars, including, most recently and significantly, Louise 
London. Instead, this study aims to tell an untold perspective of the same story. The 
works of those historians that have focused on the domestic and foreign policy 
aspects of the refugee crisis are utilised to help recount the domestic context, and 
their findings are expanded by looking at the questions from a new angle.  
Official policy documents are also contextualised and supplemented by the 
use of private papers of officials, most significantly Malcolm MacDonald, as well as 
newspaper reports and editorials. Many clippings of newspaper articles from Britain 
and the colonies were attached to the official files relating to issues discussed in this 
thesis. Moreover, these clippings were then also referred to in minutes and policy 
discussions. The use of the press a gauge for popular opinion is of course 
problematic. Nonetheless, the content of these articles was, at times, a clear source 
of preoccupation among policy-making officials. Therefore, newspapers are 
referenced when they appeared in the files, and The Times, a paper many officials 
would have read, is used to flesh out some of the issues and debates that were 
engaging the political and educated elite at this time.61  
Finally, this thesis also makes use of refugee testimony. This project was 
initially conceived as a more traditional policy study. However, the policy files 
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themselves included hints at the personal stories behind policy-making and its 
impact. Many refugees or their advocates wrote directly to the Colonial Office 
asking for entry and help. They sometimes included details of refugee qualifications 
and work experience, photographs and letters of recommendation. The discussions 
these prompted came alive when they were associated with specific people. In 
order to pursue this further, the testimony of refugees has been selected to 
illuminate further the findings of this research. Five refugee families’ stories form 
the core of the refugee testimony used (and will be introduced fully below). In 
addition, snippets of recollections from other refugees appear where relevant. 
Refugee experiences are not included in a traditional linear narrative and 
therefore do not appear altogether or in chronological order. Rather, relevant 
testimony is placed in the context of the subject of each chapter to further illustrate 
the way that official policy was experienced by refugees. This structure was adopted 
for two main reasons, although they are connected. The first is that colonial policy 
was made in the abstract, rarely in relation to individuals (although occasions when 
this was the case are also included). Therefore, to present the refugee testimony in 
a standard narrative form gives their experiences a coherence their lives evidently 
did not have during this time.62 
Second, just as colonial policy was not necessarily made in relation to 
individual refugees, it was also often generated in such general terms that it was 
also detached from reality. As discussed, official expectations and responses to 
assimilation, conceptions of ‘successful’ settlers or the realities of internment show 
how far policy was sometimes detached from the human reality not only of the 
refugee experience, but also colonial social planning and policy objectives. 
Therefore, the real, lived experiences of refugees, placed alongside policy 
implementation are a powerful counter to large, policy-driven histories that often 
neaten narratives of official history. As this thesis shows, although guided by 
general principles of restriction and protection, policy was not fixed, but rather 
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shifted and developed in response to numerous external and ideological factors. 
Below, brief biographical information is given on each of the refugees who feature 
in the thesis. 
Walter, Jettel and Stefanie Zweig found refuge in Kenya for the duration of 
the war. Walter Zweig, a Jewish legal professional from Breslau (now Wrocław) 
arrived in Kenya in early 1938. With the help of the local Jewish community, he 
managed to afford the £50 per person entry deposit required for his wife and 
daughter, Jettel and Stefanie, who arrived in Mombasa in July 1938 on the SS 
Adolph Woermann.63 The family struggled through wartime Kenya as Walter had 
little skill for the agricultural work to which he was set. Most of Zweig’s immediate 
family (both sets of grandparents and her aunts and uncles) died in the Holocaust. 
At the end of the war, Zweig’s father was keen to return to Germany and took up a 
judicial role in Frankfurt. Zweig’s autobiographical novel Nowhere in Africa 
(Nirgendwo in Afrika) recounts her childhood in Kenya and was made into an Oscar-
winning German-language film in 2002. Zweig’s recollections are used to highlight 
several key aspects of British immigration and refugee policy, particularly the way 
liberal ideas impacted immigration practices and the importance of race in imperial 
refugee experiences.  
The Berg family also found refuge in Kenya. In May 1939, Jill Pauly (née Gisella 
Berg) and Inge Katzenstein (née Berg), two Jewish sisters from just outside Cologne 
fled Nazi-controlled Europe for Kenya. Jill was six years old, and Inge was 10. The 
Berg’s close-knit, observant Jewish family managed to escape almost intact; 
seventeen members of the extended family found refuge in Kenya.64 There they 
established a relatively successful cattle farming business and stayed until after the 
war when they departed again for America. Jill and Inge both married other 
Holocaust survivors and now live in the Washington DC area and volunteer at the 
USHMM. The sisters’ experiences help illuminate the way refuge in the colonies 
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raised questions about the racial identity of refugees themselves and others as well 
as their perspective on internment. 
Heinz Bauer and his family also found safety in Kenya. Bauer was a young 
Austrian Jew who was studying medicine at the University of Vienna at the time of 
the Anschluss, after which his family immediately decided to leave. Despite much 
difficulty, Heinz and his brother made their way to Kenya via Paris and London. The 
family were eventually reunited in Kenya, where they enjoyed a relatively settled 
life, with Heinz taking work as a farmer, his brother, as a dentist and his mother 
teaching piano. After the war, the whole family settled in the US, where Heinz 
became a professor of pathology. Bauer’s journey to Kenya and experiences there 
were shaped by his age and a good deal of luck, and he provides a different 
perspective to Zweig and the Bergs on issues including immigration policies and 
internment.65 
Moving away from the African refugee experience, Frederick Wohl eventually 
found refuge in colonial Cyprus. As a young man from Baden-Baden in Germany, his 
opportunities were eventually so limited by Nazi anti-Jewish restrictions that he 
opted to go to Greece in 1936 to continue his studies. By 1938, his parents and 
sister were also living in Greece, but when the Greek government refused to renew 
their permits of residence, they sought safety elsewhere. After attempting many 
different destinations, the Wohl family, in part due to personal connections, 
eventually found safety in Cyprus. Wohl’s experiences help illuminate both 
immigration practices and the refugee experience of internment.  
Finally, the experiences of Arthur Silbiger move the story to the West Indies. 
Silbiger, a Dutch Jew, escaped his home in The Hague in April 1942 with his parents, 
and brother Herman. The family’s journey to the West Indies was not planned and 
took over a year. Brief stays in Antwerp and Brussels followed, before the family 
reached Paris. In June 1942, the Silbigers travelled south, leaving Vichy France. 
Bureaucratic problems and health concerns kept the Silbigers in the south of France 
for some months. In October 1942, the family received visas for the Dutch West 
                                                          
65
 Heinz Bauer, memoir (unpublished, 1940), RG-02.083, USHMM Permanent Collection; Walter 
Lacquer, Generation Exodus: The Fate of Young Jewish Refugees from Nazi Germany (Hanover, NH, 
2001), p. 14. 
28 
Indies and began to prepare for their departure. More delays in France finally saw 
the Silbigers cross into Spain where they boarded the Marques de Comillas destined 
for Dutch Guiana. However, their entry into Dutch Guiana was revoked during their 
passage, and in December 1942, they found themselves held in the Gibraltar Camp 
on Jamaica. Although the family eventually found refuge in the Dutch West Indies 
and ultimately settled in the US, the recollections of internment and life in British 
West Indies feature in this thesis’ discussions of internment and colonial 
development.66 
*** 
The study of the British colonial response offers clear examples of the conflict of 
ideas and perceptions that dominated policy. These included tensions between: the 
rights and responsibilities of the British government to different races; 
humanitarianism and paternalism; and liberalism, imperialism and immigration. The 
ideological frameworks of liberalism, race and humanitarianism will be used as a 
way of exploring the complex interactions within these tensions. The following 
chapters provide the historical and historiographical context of the frameworks as 
well as case-studies of how these impacted and shaped the application of colonial 
policy and the refugee experience. 
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Chapter One: 
International Relations, Empire and Refugees 
 
Before considering the three ideological schemas of liberalism, race and 
humanitarianism more fully, this chapter provides important contextual information 
on three key areas: (1) the international context; (2) the colonial context of the 
interwar years; and (3) the refugee crisis across the whole period under study, 
1938-1943. While highlighting the importance of liberalism, race and 
humanitarianism is the primary aim of this thesis, policy-making rarely happens on 
purely ideological grounds or in political and cultural isolation. Colonial policy-
makers were subject to the broader international context in which they formulated 
policy, influenced by dominant trends and discourses in their department and 
responsive to the changing nature of the refugee crisis itself. These factors must be 
highlighted and explained in order to connect more abstract ideas with practical 
policy-making. Therefore we must start with this thorough grounding in the 
interwar British, European and colonial worlds before moving to the main body of 
the thesis’s argument. 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS 
The refugee problem was contemplated through the lens of four important and 
interconnected international contexts: the League of Nations, the Palestine 
Mandate, appeasement of Germany and Anglo-American relations. Although the 
League of Nations had helped to provide a response to refugee questions in the 
early interwar years, the diminishing success of its responses to the German refugee 
crisis, questions of sovereignty and the general deterioration in European 
diplomatic relations made the league a focus of British concern in the 1930s. 
Palestine, under British control as a League of Nations mandate, became the 
destination of choice for many refugees leaving Europe. As the rising levels of 
immigration caused tension with the Arab population, Britain was compelled to 
respond. Another diplomatic imperative for Britain was to improve relations with 
Germany. The policy of choice, appeasement, impacted decisions on refugee policy. 
These included the failure to admonish Germany for its treatment of its Jewish 
population, as well as Britain’s response to suggestions of refugee settlement in the 
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empire. Finally, Anglo-American relations informed so much of British action, and 
understanding the wide context of this as well as the ways it specifically interacted 
with the refugee problem is of vital importance to this study. 
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
The League of Nations was the most powerful manifestation of Europe's interest in 
internationalism in the interwar years. It was established after the First World War, 
with the hope that it would help stop further armed conflict, deal with questions of 
sovereignty in the light of the changed geopolitical context and (what many 
contemporaries saw as a small sideline) help answer other humanitarian problems, 
including disease and refugees, which were also products of the First World War.1 
Although created at the suggestion of its President, the US never became a 
member. Without America’s leadership, the integrity of the League was muted from 
the outset.2 Indeed, it limited its ability to act, including on refugee issues. The US’s 
absence was soon compounded by the departure of other countries. German 
participation ended with the rise of Hitler in 1933. Italy withdrew its participation in 
1936 following its invasion of Ethiopia. Similarly, Japan had exited after the 
Manchuria Incident in 1931. In the face of such expansionist actions, Susan 
Pedersen argues, the League’s ‘time-consuming and wordy deliberations drove the 
aggressor states out of the League, but not out of the invaded territory’.3 Clearly 
unable to respond to these serious infringements on League ideas by major 
international powers, the League gradually lost legitimacy and power. 
However, one area in which the League proved to be particularly successful 
was in the task of ‘refugee advocacy’. Initially this was in response to Russian 
refugees and people fleeing the creation of new nation-states in the Baltic region.4 
In fact, the first major action taken by the League was the creation of a High 
Commissioner for Russian Refugees in 1921 to deal with the huge numbers of 
refugees fleeing the Russian Revolution and the resulting civil war. The newly 
appointed High Commissioner, Fridtjof Nansen, a Norwegian explorer, diplomat and 
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humanitarian, was a powerful and successful refugee advocate.5 On a personal 
level, he took an active role in highlighting the suffering of 300,000 ‘stateless and 
starving Armenian survivors’. In 1922, after winning the Nobel Peace Prize, he 
toured the US and Europe, emphasising the plight of Armenians. William F. Fuller 
explains that ‘[h]e felt that Europe’s bloodless passivity toward Armenia and 
Armenians was as shameful as the bloody massacres perpetrated by the Turks’.6  
Under his leadership, the League helped facilitate the mass movement of 
many hundreds of thousands of people, sometimes in less than ideal ways. For 
example, he played a notable role in the forced Greek-Turkish population 
movement in the early 1920s.7 He also played a central role in the development of 
the ‘Nansen Passport’, a document which allowed stateless people to cross borders. 
This pragmatic document was an important change in refugee affairs. 
The League’s refugee work continued under Nansen, co-ordinated from the 
Nansen Office for Refugees, until his death in 1930. By 1931, many believed that the 
refugee problem would be solved in the next seven years. This was reflected in the 
planned closure of the Nansen Office for Refugees at the end of 1938.8 However, as 
the interwar period progressed and additional refugee problems developed, it was 
recognised that in fact new bodies would be needed. The growing number of 
refugees from Germany led to the creation of a High Commissioner for Refugees 
coming from Germany. The Commissioner was assigned the role of dealing with this 
new refugee movement in parallel to the work of the Nansen Office. In order to 
ensure German agreement, the body was established away from general League 
business, with its own budget (that it needed to repay within its first year) and 
located in Lausanne, rather than Geneva.9 The first High Commissioner (and future 
US ambassador to Israel), James G. McDonald, was another passionate refugee 
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advocate who, rather than simply dealing with the result of refugee movements, 
encouraged the League to deal with the root cause of refugee-producing countries. 
However, McDonald tendered his resignation in 1935, shortly after the Nuremberg 
Laws, in protest against the limited powers of the High Commissioner position, 
restricted as it was by finance and separation from the League. He was succeeded 
by Sir Neill Malcolm in 1936 and Sir Herbert Emerson in 1938. 
When it became clear that the international refugee problem would not be 
resolved by the proposed date of 1938, discussion turned to the possibility of 
merging the League’s various bodies that dealt with refugee questions, such as the 
Nansen Office and the High Commissioner for Refugees. This took place in May 
1938, and Emerson became the High Commissioner for Refugees in January 1939. 
Emerson was a former member of the Indian Civil Service, where he had built a 
reputation for effective administration and strong diplomatic skills. His work in India 
spanned over thirty years, and this background undoubtedly informed his near 
decade of work in the humanitarian field.10 The new body Emerson headed was 
charged with providing legal aid to refugees, coordinating private organisations’ 
humanitarian endeavours and assisting private groups and government efforts in 
the process of emigration and settlement.11 However, as this new body set out to 
respond to refugee problems, the scale of the refugee issue expanded several times 
in 1938: after Anschluss in March, after the Munich Agreement in September and 
finally after Kristallnacht in November. 
During this year of crisis, the ability of the League to deal with the new scale 
of the refugee problem was called into question and undermined by external 
events. A clear sign of the League’s diminishing power in refugee matters was the 
instigation of the international refugee conference at Évian in July 1938 (discussed 
later in this chapter). The US, which was notably absent from the League, called the 
meeting, and this, along with the resulting Intergovernmental Committee on 
Refugees, became the new forum in which refugee questions were discussed. 
However, these initiatives were still directly related to action by the League of 
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Nations. As Wyman explains, ‘the delegates who brought the new committee into 
being repeatedly specified that its efforts would complement, not supplant, those 
of the League’. This was particularly a British concern; however ‘[q]ualms about 
overlapping responsibility ended when, in February 1939, Sir Herbert Emerson, 
head of the League’s newly formed High Commission for Refugees, was also named 
director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees’. Although the two 
organizations remained separate, Emerson’s role in both ensured co-ordination of 
what little action did take place.12 
From the creation of the first High Commissioner for Refugees in 1921 to the 
High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany in 1933 to the Office of the 
High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees in 1939, the League of 
Nations was the main international framework, or ‘regime’, that impacted 
governmental policy towards refugees in the interwar years.13 The origins of the 
post-war international community can be seen in this period too. Susan Pedersen 
argues that rather than peacekeeping or managing questions relating to 
sovereignty, the long-term impact of the League’s actions was greatest in the area 
of humanitarian endeavours. Furthermore, she argues that: 
while the United Nations’ refugee regime was from its origins much 
more comprehensive and ambitious than the League’s, UNHCR’s basic 
structure and practices – its insistence on political neutrality, the 
concentration of authority in ‘a man and a staff’ – still bear Nansen’s 
imprint.  
 
She concludes that ‘[m]any of the agreements and institutions that today regulate 
movements of peoples, services, and goods around the globe took shape in Geneva 
between the wars’.14 
The League of Nations, as well as being a vital forum for international refugee 
action, was representative of the shifting nature of international humanitarianism in 
the interwar years. The First World War had marked a turning point in 
manifestations of humanitarianism, when acts of charity motivated by religion or 
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ideology started to link more fully with national and international humanitarian 
action. In its role as the meeting point for declining empires, emerging international 
legal systems and old and new nation-states, the League challenged state 
sovereignty and older ideas of Western imperialism and power. Nonetheless, it also, 
sometimes implicitly, endorsed the Western political and cultural dominance, for 
example by the League of Nations mandate system (see chapter four).  
PALESTINE 
For Britain, the issue of Jewish refugees was also deeply connected with the history 
of Palestine, which was under British control in the 1930s as a League of Nations 
mandate. At least partly as a result of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which 
outlined Britain’s support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the 
territory was generally accepted by many British people as a natural destination for 
Jewish refugees.15 Palestine was ruled from 1920 by a British High Commissioner in 
Jerusalem, and in 1921, despite its status as a non-colony, responsibility for 
Palestine was passed from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office.16 Until 1936, 
Palestine largely remained a Colonial Office concern. However, developing Jewish-
Arab tensions over the region ‘brought the active intervention in the policy-making 
process of the senior Department, the Foreign Office, as well as that of the Chiefs of 
Staff and the War Office’.17  
The number of Jews entering Palestine had steadily risen in connection with 
growing persecution in Europe. However, this increase of Jewish immigration had 
led to Arab protests and violence, the physical manifestation of the tensions 
created by the rival claims to Palestine as a Jewish or Arab homeland. In 1932, 
authorised Jewish entry to Palestine had totalled 9,553. The next year, when Hitler 
gained power in Germany, the number rose to 30,327. By 1935, it reached 61,854.18 
The challenges prompted by increased Jewish migration became a prominent 
political issue for the British government. So much so, in the summer of 1938, 
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British participation at Évian rested on an agreement that Palestine would not be 
discussed.  
Ultimately, the British, motivated by their need for support from their 
predominantly Arab empire in the event of war, responded by strictly limiting 
Jewish entry. The 1939 White Paper was undoubtedly a political manoeuvre which 
sought to improve Anglo-Arab relations. It limited Jewish immigration to 75,000 for 
the five-year period between 1940 and 1944, setting the yearly limit at 10,000 and 
containing a supplementary quota of 25,000 to cover refugee emergencies. The 
restrictions did not necessarily limit Britain’s problems in Palestine. For example, it 
prompted the illegal entry of many refugees, which reached unprecedented levels 
in 1938-1939.19 The outbreak of war in September 1939 marked the start of a more 
bitter and violent resistance to illegal Jewish immigration by the British government, 
including the events surrounding the Tiger Hill, a vessel carrying illegal immigrants 
which the British authorities attacked in questionable circumstances and which will 
be discussed more fully later in the context of humanitarianism. 
Palestine is, quite deliberately, not the subject of this thesis. Nonetheless, it 
formed one of the central contexts in which all other British refugee policy was 
made and appears in this work only in so far as it directly impacted on the tropical 
colonial refugee policy that is analysed herein. Kushner also raises the important 
connection between the closing of doors in Palestine and other British refugee 
efforts. For example, he references the ‘generosity’ of British policy after Anschluss 
and Kristallnacht with ‘guilt at the appeasement of Arab unrest and the further 
move away from the remnants of the Balfour declaration’.20 
Indeed, Palestine prompted strong views among officials, which undoubtedly 
impacted other areas in which they made policy. Winston Churchill’s pro-Jewish and 
pro-Zionist stance is well documented and discussed.21 Wasserstein makes much of 
his anti-White Paper attitudes, especially in contrast to colonial officials who 
broadly supported it, including Secretaries of State for the Colonies, MacDonald, 
Lord Lloyd and Lord Moyne. (Moyne would ultimately be assassinated by Jewish 
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terrorists in Palestine in November 1944). It was only Viscount Cranborne, as the 
Secretary of State between February and November 1942, who expressed any 
discontent towards the policy. Cranborne’s views, however, do not change 
Wasserstein’s argument that the Colonial Office was broadly anti-Jewish, with some 
attitudes bordering on paranoia.22 Nevertheless, Palestine was a violent and 
quagmiry background to all official discussion of the refugee crisis. Indeed, ‘creating 
another Palestine’ was an explicit and oft-repeated fear in the Colonial Office. 
APPEASEMENT 
The rise of Nazi control in Europe, the associated persecution of the Jews and the 
more general threat to peace and stability in Europe that these represented 
unsurprisingly prompted British efforts to use diplomatic means to improve 
relations with Hitler, a policy that has become known as appeasement. According to 
Paul Kennedy, the policy of appeasement aimed to satisfy ‘grievances through 
rational negotiation and compromise’.23 Although mostly associated with the ‘Guilty 
Men’ (most infamously Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain) and their policy 
towards Germany in the 1930s, particularly regarding Munich, appeasement was in 
fact part of a well-established framework of diplomatic conciliation. 
The Munich Agreement, reached in September 1938, provided a resolution to 
the Czech Crisis, which had dominated international events in the summer of 1938 
and had looked set to bring Europe to war. Chamberlain, believing a general 
settlement was possible with Germany if the Czech issue could be resolved, looked 
to reach an agreement with Hitler for the sake of peace and worked personally to 
ensure this.24 However, the resolution of European-based problems were not the 
only means by which the British sought to improve relations; colonial appeasement 
was another part of this broader effort. Therefore, in 1937 and 1938, a potential 
colonial agreement with Hitler became the focus of significant domestic attention 
and looked likely to become a major factor in Anglo-German relations.25  
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Colonial appeasement was based on the potential to settle peace with 
Germany by agreeing to renegotiate the status of Germany’s former territories.26 
These had, after the First World War, been distributed to other powers as League of 
Nations mandates. Chamberlain’s plan was essentially ‘to restore to Germany the 
former Togoland and Cameroon colonies, and in addition to create for Germany a 
completely new colony’. To achieve this, it was proposed that ‘Britain and France 
would each surrender their colonies in Togoland and Cameroon’. The British would 
then ‘add bits of Nigeria’, ‘Belgium would surrender a portion of the southern 
Congo; Portugal would be compelled to give up a part of Northern Angola’ but 
would be compensated with a bit of Tanganyika. This was all to ensure that Britain 
did not have to surrender all of Tanganyika which, although a former German 
territory, was considered strategically important.27 
Wm. Roger Louis argues that it was Britain, rather than Hitler, that was 
concerned with colonial settlement between 1936 and 1938. Indeed, a Sub-
Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence had concluded in 1936 that 
appeasement offered little benefit to Germany: 
Though Germany would undoubtedly obtain certain advantages from 
the return of her former colonies, these advantages would, we think, be 
much smaller than she expects. Her amour-propre, though not her 
ambitions, would be satisfied; a considerable temporary stimulus would 
be given to her export trade; and she would find the limited 
opportunities for employment of her upper-middle classes useful. On 
the other hand, she would not be able to send out any substantial 
number of emigrants; she would obtain comparatively little in the way 
of raw materials; and she would find her colonies expensive, particularly 
if she attempted intensive development.28 
Whether Hitler was ever really prepared to make peace based on a colonial 
agreement, the British believed he might. Therefore, the centrality of this idea to 
British policy-making cannot be underestimated, especially in the Colonial Office 
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where it was generally opposed but nevertheless informed ideas on refugee 
settlement. 
For example, when discussing options of Jewish settlement in Tanganyika, it 
was recognised that ‘to transplant [...] the very people whom Germany is doing her 
utmost, by the most brutal methods, to exclude from “the homeland” would surely 
be regarded by the present Nazi regime as a significant and perhaps even 
provocative act’, and that ‘any such settlement [...] would be regarded as an 
indirect but certain indication that Britain does not intend to restore Tanganyika to 
Germany’. Moreover, the number of Germans already in territories such as 
Tanganyika was another ‘deterrent factor’.29 Although some felt that ‘to turn 
Tanganyika into a sort of Jewish Colony might be easier politically and strategically 
than to return it to Germany’ and that settlement there ‘might ease things in 
Palestine’,30 concern remained over the potential that Germany might recover the 
territory. It was felt that ‘the Jewish settlers would get short shrift’ because of the 
territories’ ‘considerable German (largely pro-Nazi) community, very well organized, 
highly race-conscious, and anxiously awaiting the day when “Ost Afrika” will be 
restored to the fatherland’.31 J.G. Hibbert, an assistant secretary in the Colonial 
Office’s General Division and Social Services Department, concluded that: 
[p]ersonally, I should very much like to see a large colony of Jews 
established in Tanganyika, if only for the purpose of counteracting the 
aggressive and highly objectionable Nazi element [...] However, I think 
we had better keep politics out of this business as far as possible.32  
The question of colonial appeasement also engendered much public debate, 
particularly regarding the morality of such action. As early as 1933, staunch refugee 
supporter Eleanor Rathbone wrote against negotiation with Germany, specifically 
referencing the colonies. She argued that ‘[t]o permit any measure of rearmament 
to Germany under its present Government would be lunacy, and to give them a 
share in mandates would be a crime against any coloured race affected’.33 
Rathbone, and others like her who criticised colonial appeasement on the grounds 
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of British responsibility to the ‘interests of the natives’, referred to the moral duty 
of Britain as a colonial power.34 In the context of changing ideas about trusteeship 
and development in the colonies, this was a compelling argument.  
With particular reference to colonial appeasement, The Times ran an editorial 
which argued that: 
The savage outburst of the German Government against the Jews, their 
manifest indifference to the common promptings of humanity where a 
defenceless subject population is concerned, the wave of indignation 
and sympathy which has swept the civilized world – all these are 
convincing evidence that, whatever solution may eventually be found of 
the colonial problem, it will find no support nowadays if it lies in this 
direction.35 
 
The editorial went on to state that ‘no one at the moment feels disposed to 
risk the unconditional transfer of any backward race to the sort of subjection which 
finds favour in Germany to-day’.36 This was a view echoed in numerous comments 
of readers. W.E. Goodenough, the deputy chairman of Barclays Bank and son of its 
founder, asked, ‘Is the public conscience, which is still, we believe, the chief factor 
in our administration, prepared to turn over the care of those inhabitants to an 
administration who are behaving with the discrimination now being shown in 
Central Europe?’37 Goodenough’s views were, at best, paternal when his ‘stubborn’ 
position on race, regarding hiring non-whites in branches of Barclays in the West 
Indies are considered.38 However, they are no doubt representative of the 
complexity of attitudes towards race common during this time (see chapter three).  
Contemplating in 1943 the consideration given to the issue of colonial 
appeasement by the government before the outbreak of war, correspondence 
between Sir George Gater, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, 
and Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 
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observed that ‘[o]ut of fear of Germany, we were prepared to hand over large tracts 
of colonial empire to Germany without consulting the wishes of the inhabitants’.39 
Although the policy of appeasement ultimately failed, based as it was ‘on 
fundamental intelligence misconceptions about Hitler’s benevolent intentions and 
exaggerated capabilities’, that it was pursued at all provides important context for 
British action that had significant consequences for British refugee policy.40 Official 
interest in looking for solutions to international and domestic problems in colonial 
spaces was explicit and pervasive, as were questions of race and changing 
perceptions of Britain’s rights and responsibilities to various groups.  
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS  
In the interwar period, both the Foreign and Colonial Offices sought to improve 
relations with the US and to encourage the US to move from isolationism to greater 
engagement with Europe. Both before and during the war, good relations with 
America were considered to be vital by many in the British government.41 However, 
an Anglo-American ‘alliance’ was not ‘without its difficulties’.42 Suke Wolton 
highlights the source of this tension, explaining that: 
British officials were on the one hand annoyed with the United States 
for not playing a larger role in maintaining a peaceful world order and, 
on the other hand, irritated by American pretensions to tell the British 
what to do especially within their own domain such as the Empire.43 
Anglo-American relations were also interconnected with and complicated the 
issues of the League of Nations, Palestine and appeasement in the interwar years. 
America’s abdication from a central role in the League of Nations weakened that 
body’s ability to respond to international tensions and the growing refugee crisis. 
Given America’s anti-imperial views, tensions over refugee entry into Palestine 
were also problematic. Furthermore, America’s general anti-colonial attitude made 
Britain mindful of how colonial appeasement would be viewed across the Atlantic. 
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These issues played out both in response to the refugee question and American 
anti-imperialism. 
As the scale of the refugee problem grew, Britain wanted to encourage 
American diplomatic and financial support and thus felt it particularly necessary to 
participate in the American-initiated Évian Conference in July 1938. However, 
British participation was complicated by the conference’s independence from the 
League of Nations and the pressure it undoubtedly placed on Britain regarding 
Palestine (see below). Moreover, having responded to the American invitation and 
successfully removing Palestine from public discussions, the Foreign Office felt it 
necessary to offer some concrete contribution to the reduction of the refugee 
problem, including possible colonial solutions. The meeting’s key result was the 
creation of the Intergovernmental Committee, a body that became a key site for 
Anglo-American cooperation on the refugee question.  
From 1941, Britain and America faced questions of refuge and rescue together 
as allies in war. Although both powers have been criticized for inaction, their 
responses differed and sometimes produced points of tension. The Allied 
Declaration on 17 December 1942 marked the first occasion that Britain and 
America publicly recognised the Jewish plight. The declaration was made in London, 
Washington and Moscow at the same time and confirmed the ‘barbarous and 
inhuman treatment’ to which Jews were being subjected to in ‘German-occupied 
Europe’.44 Despite public pressure for action after the declaration, the British 
government, along with America, still assumed that they could continue to focus on 
the successful pursuit of war and therefore gave only limited attention and 
resources to rescue initiatives. This was exemplified by the Bermuda Conference, an 
Anglo-American meeting held in April 1943 which, while seeing the revival of the 
Intergovernmental Committee, achieved little positive action in terms of aid to 
refugees. 
Kushner argues that the liberal powers’ action was, in 1942, still in line with 
each other. However, after the Bermuda Conference and as the end of the war 
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neared, Britain and the US adopted increasingly different approaches to the 
question of rescue and re-settlement.45 Louise London explains the shift:  
[t]he British believed the US government’s commitment to saving Jewish 
lives to be as weak as their own and until the end of 1943 this 
assessment was reasonably accurate. But thereafter the Foreign Office 
failed to realise the extent to which the substance as well as the 
appearance of American policy on rescue had changed.46  
 
Prompted by internal pressures, America launched a much more liberal policy. The 
creation of the War Refugee Board (WRB) in 1944 signalled a separation of the two 
countries. Although this inadvertently encouraged more action, particularly as 
Britain took on a competitive view of the WRB, it added further strain to Anglo-
American relations on questions of post-war settlement of refugees and survivors. 
A second area of tension in Anglo-American relations was that of American 
anti-imperialism. Despite its own complex racial issues, anti-imperialism was a 
widely held conviction in the US in the late 1930s.47 As well as having specific 
consequences for colonial policy, American perceptions of Britain’s empire 
dominated foreign relations between the two countries for much of the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This manifested itself practically after the First 
World War when President Woodrow Wilson shaped the League of Nation’s 
mandates policy. While British colonial officials were deeply aware of how their 
relations with their colonies were viewed in America, this was heightened after riots 
in the West Indies highlighted imperial unrest on the very doorstep of the US. 
Britain looked to colonial development to help ease international criticism, and a 
pre-war movement of prioritising social welfare was crystallized in the political 
turmoil of war.  
The Atlantic Charter, signed in August 1941 by Churchill and Roosevelt, in 
which Article 3 recognised the right of self-determination, further challenged 
Britain’s imperial status. Despite Churchill’s later claim that he understood Article 3 
to refer to European populations under the grip of Nazism, ‘the article’s wider 
significance for the populations of the dependent empire was clear’. Anglo-
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American relations over the empire were further compounded by the loss of 
Britain’s Southeast Asian colonies to the Japanese in the first few months of 1942. 
This humiliating defeat ‘reinforced’ for America ‘the conviction that colonial rule 
was inherently flawed’.48 Nonetheless, Britain was determined to maintain control 
of the empire after the war, despite US-led discussion of international trusteeship 
for British colonies.  
These two distinct aspects of Anglo-American relations coalesced over the 
issue of refugee settlement in the empire. Many officials viewed Jewish settlement 
as a threat to the interests of indigenous populations, and a growing focus on 
development and welfare in the colonies, especially in light of American criticism, 
ensured that local populations were prioritised.  
COLONIAL PERSPECTIVES: ECONOMIES, NATIONALISM AND THE CONCEPT OF 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE INTERWAR YEARS 
White, European settlement in the colonies was well-established by the interwar 
years and, given this precedent, many viewed it as a possible answer to the rising 
refugee question. For example, in July 1938, Count Richard Nikolaus Eijiro von 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, the President of the Paneuropean Union (an organisation that 
advocated for a united Europe), advocated Jewish colonial settlement. He argued 
that refugee settlement in the colonies: ‘might prepare a general solution of the 
Jewish question in Central and Eastern Europe’; bring ‘about a reconciliation of Jews 
and Arabs in Palestine’; and ‘[f]inancially [...] have the advantage of developing the 
natural resources’ of the British Empire.49 Although Coudenhove-Kalergi presented 
the benefits of refugee settlement in explicitly colonial terms, it was an idea 
supported by many within the British government, particularly by representatives of 
the Foreign and Home Offices as well as other external commentators. Supporters 
all agreed that settlement potentially offered a solution to many of Britain’s major 
diplomatic, political and economic concerns and would have alleviated internal 
domestic tensions over how best Britain should respond to the growing refugee 
crisis.  
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However, the reality was much more complex and events that unfolded in the 
empire during the interwar years provided the specific context in which all imperial 
policy was formed. For colonial officials, refugee settlement was seen in terms of its 
consequences on colonial objectives. It was, therefore, ultimately these that 
dictated the nature of refugee policy. A brief assessment of the changing ideas 
about colonial rule and how these interacted with questions of refugee settlement 
are the subject of this section. 
The economic depression and the simultaneous rise in colonial nationalism 
seen in the interwar years threatened the very foundation of colonial rule. To 
counter these challenges, various territory-specific actions were taken across the 
empire, reflecting the reality of a complex and diverse ‘imperial system’.50 In the 
Dominions and India, the interwar years saw changes in the mode of government. 
In India, ‘dyarchy’ was introduced in 1935 when the Government of India Act 
passed local government control to the Indian peoples. In the case of the 
Dominions, the 1931 Statute of Westminster effectively handed complete domestic 
control to territories including Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. 
Meanwhile, political and social unrest, with deep-rooted economic and social 
causes, dominated other areas of the empire. Unrest in Palestine grew steadily over 
Jewish immigration, leading to violent eruptions including the 1936 Arab Revolt. In 
Britain’s tropical empire, economic strife also manifested itself in violence, such as 
the 1937 riots in the West Indies. As John Darwin identifies, ‘the onset of economic 
depression by 1930 created dangerous economic grievances among the rural 
masses [...] grievances which colonial rule could do little or nothing to alleviate’.51 
The Colonial Office ordered an investigation of the causes of the unrest; Lord 
Moyne started the Royal Commission in 1938. The report, finished in 1939, was ‘felt 
to be too critical of Britain’s past record’, and publication was suppressed until 
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1945, as it was feared that it would be detrimental to the war effort.52 Nonetheless, 
it was felt by many that ‘even the recommendations were a sufficiently damning 
indictment’.53 
These problems in the empire challenged the fundamental principles on 
which British imperial rule had been based and was most obvious in the passing of 
the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act. The act sought investment in 
Britain’s dependent empire for development and welfare initiatives. In total, a 
maximum of £5 million a year was to be made available, with an additional 
£500,000 a year given for research. Finally, £11 million of debt owed by the colonies 
was to be cancelled.54 The bill had been in draft since before the outbreak of war, 
and although the war was important in shaping the bill, a broader change in colonial 
thinking was also central to the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. 
The interwar years saw an evolving attitude towards the nature of colonial 
rule. Although there remained a ‘fundamental assumption’ of British ‘control’ over 
the process of change, many nonetheless recognised that change was necessary.55 
Lugard’s principles of ‘trusteeship’ and ‘indirect rule’ had formed the basis on 
British rule, especially in Africa during the interwar years. Essentially Britain was to 
act as a trustee for the development of resources and the welfare of indigenous 
people, while the tasks of local government would be carried out by traditional 
authorities in the colonies. These principles soon spread from their origin in 
Northern Nigeria right across the empire, and their adoption was actively 
encouraged from Whitehall.56 
In 1938, Lord Hailey’s African Survey challenged the principle of ‘indirect rule’, 
arguing that ‘the static conception of administration enshrined in Lugard’s 
philosophy was inconsistent with a growing recognition of the need to improve 
colonial living standards through the promotion of welfare services and economic 
development’.57 Hailey’s report highlighted the importance of ‘partnership’, a 
theme that would be taken up throughout the war, calling for active collaboration 
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with colonial people, rather than the old-fashioned paternalism which justified 
British leadership and direction.58 
This change was linked to the increased international attention on colonial 
issues, notably by the US. With the prospect of war and then war itself, Britain 
sought American involvement in the Allied cause and were thus keen to present an 
‘energetic and purposeful’ image which proved that they were working fruitfully ‘in 
the interests of local populations’ welfare’.59 As MacDonald stressed during his 
presentation of the Colonial Development and Welfare Bill to the Cabinet in 
February 1940, ‘[a] continuation of the present state of affairs would be wrong on 
merits, and it provides our enemies and critics with an admirable subject for 
propaganda’.60 In fact, as R.D. Pearce argues, it was the ‘ideological requirements of 
a war against Nazi Germany’ that cemented the new Colonial Office direction.61 
Despite important changes in attitude, old expectations did not completely 
disappear in colonial thinking. Indeed, the empire remained ‘a given’, with ‘a set of 
often unspoken assumptions about Britain’s interests and status in the world’ 
dictating policy. Most importantly, the argument of this thesis is that ‘[t]hese did 
not have to be codified to have substance or importance’.62 Ideas about, for 
example, the tropical empire and African territories remained particularly fixed. It 
was accepted ‘even among liberal and reformist critics’ that policy in Africa was ‘not 
about whether Britain should leave Africa, but what type of rule should exist’.63 
Even given the move towards development and welfare, there was still a general 
assumption that ‘the African simply could not stand on their [sic] own feet, and that 
the British were giving them good government’.64 As Hyam argues, ‘[d]espite low-
grade racial prejudice and some high-handed politics, the empire had a definite 
countervailing doctrine of trusteeship – the idea that African territories were held in 
trust, and the interests of the ward should be carefully considered’.65 It was these 
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attitudes that framed colonial officials’ responses to proposals of Jewish refugee 
settlement in Africa and across the tropical empire. For colonial officials, Jewish 
settlement schemes had to be rationalised within the context of colonial 
development. Ultimately, this pushed officials towards supporting the 
developmental needs of the colonies over the emergency needs of the refugees by 
specifically trying to connect refugee entry with colonial development (see chapters 
four and five). 
DEPARTMENTAL DIFFERENCES 
Despite a specific colonial agenda, Colonial Office officials could not formulate 
policy without regard to wider world events and to the views and priorities of other 
government departments. While this thesis deliberately presents a colonial 
perspective, this section establishes the tensions between various departments in 
order to show that British policy was not a homogenous entity, but rather it was 
often divided, with different departments pursuing different objectives that 
manifested themselves in specific policies. Sherman argues that: 
each Government department was burdened by its own particular 
anxiety: for the Home Office it was, overwhelmingly, the large numbers 
of British unemployed and the possible importation through 
inadvertence of an undesirable ‘racial problem’; for the Foreign Office, 
fraying relations with Berlin and the desire to avoid criticism from 
Washington and later from new allies such as Poland and Rumania; for 
the Treasury, the spectre of unlimited financial liability for the 
settlement and possible relief of needy migrants; and for the Colonial 
Office, Palestine and the entire constellation of issues in the Arab-Jewish 
conflict.66 
The differences between the departments, while reflecting the particularities 
of the refugee question, also highlighted more fundamental differences in officials’ 
background, training and knowledge. Hyam identifies that ‘in the broadest terms’ 
the Colonial Office mind was ‘humane and progressive’, ‘proud of the empire, but 
also sceptical about it’. In terms of administration, ‘[t]hey were happiest and 
worked most effectively under radical administrations, such as that of the Liberal 
government of 1905 to 1915 and the Labour government of 1945 to 1951’. The 
business of the Colonial Office was carried out through a hierarchical circulation of 
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papers and minuting which was ‘extensive and meticulous’, especially compared to 
that of the Foreign Office’s ‘sparser’ and ‘less reflective’ files. As Hyam argues:  
The approach of the Foreign Office was radically different, its main 
interest being in diplomatic accommodations without the responsibility 
of actually running any territories. All too often it seemed to think the 
Colonial Office could well afford to make gestures within the colonial 
empire in order to make its own general task in the international arena 
simpler.67 
Comments by Sir Cosmo Parkinson, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State 
for the Colonies – for example, that ‘the Foreign Office rather tend to regard the 
colonies as a useful dumping ground’ – exemplified the tensions caused by different 
departmental views.68 Similarly, Hibbert minuted that ‘I am getting very tired of 
these continued and rather silly letters from the Foreign Office asking us whether 
the British Colonies can take refugees from countries occupied by Germany’.69 The 
Foreign Office clearly failed to appreciate the problems of colonial settlement, while 
it was well understood by colonial officials that there were difficulties in ‘providing 
accommodation for any serious numbers of European refugees’.70 Hibbert stated 
that ‘it is almost unbelievable that a senior official in the Foreign Office should 
suggest that the colonial governments in the Mediterranean should be asked to 
admit these people’.71 Sir J.E. Shuckburgh, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State, 
agreed with Hibbert’s view, explaining that those territories ‘have [...] played up 
well, within the limits inferred by local conditions. I cannot think that either of them 
ought to be asked to do more’.72 The political ramifications of large-scale Jewish 
entry into various colonies were of deep concern to colonial officials. However, 
these concerns were not necessarily recognised or shared by officials from other 
government departments, who sought to ease their own difficulties with the 
resources of the empire. 
The tension continued throughout the period under study. During the 
preparation for the Bermuda Conference, Herbert Morrison, the Home Secretary, 
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complained that ‘[a]s usual the Foreign Office is good at taking the cheers [and] also 
good at passing the real problem to someone else’. He nevertheless went on to say 
that ‘[w]hat I much prefer to this rather dribbling policy is to find a biggish territory 
where large numbers can go e.g., Madagascar’.73 Morrison made this point again in 
a meeting of the War Cabinet Committee, stating that ‘the refugee problem could 
only be solved satisfactorily if some large single area could be found in which really 
large numbers of refugees could be settled’.74 Morrison wanted to reinforce the 
point that Britain was unsuitable for this purpose, implicitly placing the 
responsibility elsewhere. The Home Office may not have taken the cheers, but it, 
like the Foreign Office, certainly looked to pass on the real problem. 
Overriding these departmental clashes was the role of the Treasury. Whether 
action was proposed by the Foreign, Home or Colonial Offices, it was subject to 
Treasury sanction. Although very keen to limit British expenditure, Louise London 
identifies that Treasury officials were sometimes more willing to support refugee 
agencies than other departments and, in comparison, were motivated by 
humanitarian concerns rather than political calculations.75 Likewise, the economic 
limits placed by the Treasury could be overcome if political arguments were strong 
enough, which was the case for colonial development in the late 1930s.76 However, 
as a general rule, across government departments, significant gestures towards 
refugee aid were simply not considered politically worthwhile or economically 
expedient.  
Within governments, individuals enacted policy. While ‘decision-makers in 
Whitehall were inevitably imbued with British ideas, thought with British minds, and 
saw with British eyes’, there was significant variations within and between 
departments.77 It is therefore necessary to examine the role of key individuals 
involved with refugee policy. London identifies the restrictive role played by Alec 
W.G. Randall, the head of the Foreign Office’s Refugee Department, who was, at 
times, positively obstructive during his tenure between 1942 and 1944. In contrast, 
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Sir David Waley, a principal assistant secretary in the Treasury (who was also 
Jewish) and one of his juniors, Edward Playfair, were much more open-minded, as 
was Emerson, the High Commissioner for Refugees and the head of the IGC.78  
In the colonial context, MacDonald was open to plans for small-scale 
settlement of doctors in the empire (see chapter five) but adopted restrictive 
policies towards Palestine. Officials such as Shuckburgh, the Deputy Under-
Secretary of State at the Colonial Office in the 1930s, had long-standing experiences 
in areas relevant to the refugee question. Shuckburgh had in the 1920s worked for 
Churchill, advocating the latter’s pro-Zionist views over Palestine. He is noted as 
being ‘more positive towards Zionism than the average official dealing with 
Palestine’ and worked hard to improve Arab views of Jewish settlement by pushing 
the benefits of Zionist enterprises.79 Parkinson, another high-level official at the 
Colonial Office, had particularly strong views on ‘Britain’s obligations to the colonial 
peoples’.80 Hibbert worked extensively on the refugee question and was the 
colonial representative at the Évian Conference. At times, his comments make 
uncomfortable reading because of his ready use of stereotypes and anti-Jewish 
views. Yet at other times, he wrote against colonial appeasement, arguing that 
‘until the non-totalitarian states feel brave enough or strong enough to tell [...] the 
totalitarian countries that unless they allow these unfortunate people to remain 
and live [...] there can be no question of any concessions’.81 
Individual attitudes of governors also made a great deal of difference. From 
Sir Herbert Palmer, the Governor of Cyprus (1933-1939), who was keen to limit 
refugee entry, to Sir Gordon James Lethem, the Governor of the Leeward Islands 
(1936-1941) and of British Guiana (1941-1947), who responded positively to 
MacDonald’s request to employ Jewish refugee medical practitioners, actions by 
individual officials on the ground also helped to shape policy. 
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The very nature of the British Empire and its bureaucratic structure of rule 
complicated the process of policy-making, particularly in comparison to other 
domestic departments. The channels of power were more complex in the colonial 
environment. Decisions rested with governors, the ‘men on the spot’ who were 
selected and responsible to the Colonial Office. Ultimately, however, these 
decisions had to be justified to the British government as well as to the wider British 
public, by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who was often an elected 
Member of Parliament. Policy in Whitehall was generated by many who had never 
visited the colonies, and the views of the governors were influenced by their own 
unique perspective on any given colonial context. 
More broadly, this issue relates to debates about the power structure 
between the metropolitan ‘centre’ and the colonial ‘periphery’ in Britain’s policy-
making. Although centre-periphery debates have occupied imperial historians since 
the work of Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher in 1950s to 1980s, more recent 
scholarship – often postcolonial in nature – has sought to widen the debate on the 
spatial importance of policy-making in the empire.82 Rather than just considering 
centre-periphery debates in traditional areas of economics and politics, these 
scholars have looked to the importance of ‘multiple transactions across the empire’ 
between groups such as ‘British emigrant communities, missionaries, officials, 
traders [and] newspaper editors’.  These groups (and others) created networks that 
ultimately meant there were many and varied centre-periphery dynamics. This 
complicates our understanding of the imperial system, and forces us to understand 
factors of influence other than just white men of power.83 
 Therefore, it is important to conceptualise the empire as well as policy 
across it as the results of varied competing interests, those of: the British 
government in London; the specific interests of the Colonial Office; colonial officials 
in different imperial centres; the power of white settler communities; other colonial 
migrants; and indigenous communities. In different places and at different times, 
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these networks and dynamics varied. In this study, this was clear in Kenya over land 
settlement, as the influence of white settlers complicated the relationship between 
the centre and periphery. It was clear in Cyprus, where the particular nature of the 
Governor and the fact that this coincided with a broader foreign policy agenda 
afforded him significant influence. Finally, in Jamaica, the interests of the British 
government, the personality of the Governor, and external Jewish bodies (whose 
criticism of British action was registered) helped create a distinct refugee policy on 
that West Indian island.  
These inter- and intra-departmental differences only added to the difficulty of 
formulating a unified policy. One contemporary observed that: 
It is becoming increasingly difficult to put one’s finger on the point 
where the responsibility of one Department ends and another 
Department begins. There is even some danger, that, with the divided 
responsibility which now exists in dealing with this complicated and 
constantly evolving problem, Departments may be disinclined to 
shoulder as much responsibility as perhaps they should, with the result 
that work which ought to be done may be left undone.84 
 
This is significant. In understanding the British government’s response, and 
particularly that of the Colonial Office, bureaucratic inertia as much as the lack of 
political will often slowed down policy-making initiatives. Indeed, in a trend that will 
emerge in this thesis, and has been acknowledged by others, often government 
policy was to have no policy at all.85 With divided opinions across and within 
departments, schemes of settlement, financial aid and humanitarian endeavours 
could and were easily sidelined. It also highlights that different government 
departments adopted different policy agendas. Although it is fair to speak about 
‘British’ refugee policy, within this broad description, individual departmental 
objectives undoubtedly shaped the action they took. 
COLONIAL REFUGEE SETTLEMENT AND REFUGEE ADVOCACY 
As we shall see in the following chapters, the action taken by the Colonial Office, 
particularly in regard to small- or large-scale settlement, took place only in 
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connection with the help of refugee organisations. The reliance on refugee 
organisations for the funding of any colonial refugee scheme reflected the domestic 
reliance on Jewish organisations’ finances and resources in helping refugee entry to 
Britain. In 1933, as the refugee crisis started to grow, the Jewish community in 
Britain gave a written guarantee for Jewish immigrants, promising that no refugee 
would become a public charge. This promise, although made on the original 
assumption that those needing help would count between three or four thousand, 
lasted until May 1938 and facilitated the entry of many thousands of Jewish 
refugees into Britain.86 In fact, Kushner argues it gave British immigration policy a 
‘flexibility’ it otherwise would have lacked.87 Zionist organisations also aided 
refugees, although with the aim of establishing them in the British mandate of 
Palestine rather than Britain itself.  
Pamela Shatzkes notes that ‘[a]n important element in the evaluation of the 
‘bystander’ nations and a partial explanation for their relative inaction has been 
held to be the failure of their organised Jewish communities to exert pressure on 
their governments’.88 While this particular aspect of the ‘bystander’ response is not 
the focus of this study, many of the stories it tells overlaps with the content of this 
thesis, including prominent and active Jewish organisations and actors within the 
Anglo-Jewish community. Therefore, a brief overview of these groups and people 
are necessary, particularly for the discussions that will be had in the chapters on 
liberalism and colonial development. 
REFUGEE AGENCIES 
Jewish organisations were not all united. The question of Palestine divided many, 
and the differences between Zionist and non-Zionist organisations became more 
pronounced when it came to the search for alternative places of settlement in the 
British Empire. Some organizations were international, such as the World Jewish 
Congress. Others operated on a national level, such as the Board of Deputies of 
British Jews, which was widely understood to be representative of Anglo-Jewry. 
Although this body did not actively engage with refugee relief, it maintained 
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connections with those organisations that did.89 Such organisations of importance 
include the Jewish Refugee Committee (JRC), which was founded by Otto Schiff, and 
the Central British Fund for Jewish Relief and Rehabilitation (CBF), both created in 
1933.90 The JRC’s work focused on helping refugees already in Britain by providing 
immediate relief. Money for this work was provided by the CBF, whose mandate 
was ‘to foster reconstruction rather than relief’. The CBF managed to strike a 
balance between their broader aim of increased settlement in Palestine with 
helping those Jewish refugees already in Britain. However, this focus on settlement 
in Palestine reflected divisions within the organisation between Zionist and non-
Zionist factions. In 1936, the Council for German Jewry (CGJ) was formed by Anglo-
Jewish leaders ‘to organise a massive programme of permanent emigration 
overseas to places other than Palestine’.91 The tensions between these two kinds of 
responses to refugees - relief and reconstruction – are discussed in the colonial 
context in chapter four.  
Notable families and individuals from the Anglo-Jewish community also 
played a significant role in the Jewish organisations and refugee agencies discussed 
or through personal financial generosity and advocacy. Particularly well-known, the 
Rothschild family was heavily involved with the refugee question. As Louise London 
explains, ‘[t]he dynamic and flexible Rothschild organisation offered an alternative 
forum to the formal institutions of Anglo-Jewry’. Anthony de Rothschild was the 
head of the family organisation as well as the Chairman of the CBF and the CGJ, 
which merged during the war to become the Central Council for Jewish Refugees 
(CCJR). Rothschild took a central role in some of the discussions about potential 
settlement in the colonies. London describes Rothschild as ‘non-Zionist and 
assimilationist’, an important observation when his role in refugee settlement plans 
are discussed in more detail in the chapters on liberalism and colonial development. 
London argues that, like the British government, British Jewish agencies were 
keen to limit the entry of ‘foreign-seeming and unassimilated’ refugees. This was 
because of a fear of increasing domestic levels of antisemitism. The question of 
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assimilation and the ability of Jews to settle into British society will be dealt with 
more fully in chapter two on liberalism. Here, however, it is important to note that, 
as London argues, Jewish agencies were often just as keen to limit domestic entry 
as the government.92 
REFUGEE ADVOCATES 
Various influential public figures also took up the Jewish cause. Churchill is the most 
notable supporter of the Jews in Palestine. In the colonial sphere, Secretaries of 
State MacDonald and Lord Lloyd supported the White Paper.93 However, as will be 
discussed in chapter five, the role of MacDonald was more complex than this pro-
White Paper stance might suggest. Of course, political interest in the Jewish 
question did not just concentrate on high-level public officials. Other refugee 
supporters included Eleanor Rathbone, an Independent MP for Combined English 
Universities. Rathbone was a vocal and tireless advocate of refugee rights. A 
staunch defender of women and women’s rights across the empire, the fate of 
Europe’s Jews took up increasing amounts of her attention in the 1930s. While 
many took the view that Jewish persecution in Germany was a domestic matter, 
Rathbone saw it as one of importance to humanity.94 This conviction manifested 
itself in the creation of two important bodies that worked on behalf of refugees: the 
All-Party Parliamentary Committee on Refugees and the National Committee for 
Rescue from Nazi Terror. Rathbone was not alone in her pursuit of more generous 
policy towards refugees. She was joined by, among others, Victor Cazalet and 
Harold Nicolson, both of whom were members of Rathbone’s refugee 
organisations.95  
Rathbone’s particular role has been highlighted by Susan Cohen. Cohen 
identifies Rathbone explicitly as an ‘humanitarian activist’, stressing her role as an 
advocate for many marginalised groups before the her attention turned to the 
refugee crisis in the 1930s. Cohen’s assessment of Rathbone is particularly relevant 
to this study as it sees the latter’s work with women (including colonial women) and 
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her aid of refugees as part of a broader international humanitarianism (both 
political and social) that developed in this period (see chapter four).96  
Norman Angell, another refugee advocate, penned the book, You and the 
Refugee, with Dorothy Buxton. It was, in part, ‘an attempt to destroy [...] the illusion 
that a foreigner taking a job in Britain necessarily threw a Briton out of work’.97 The 
book placed the refugee question, and possible solutions, firmly in the context of 
the empire, both on economic grounds and in relation to the feared consequences 
of population decline. They argued: 
Our empire constitutes a quarter of the world’s surface, and contains 
the emptiest spaces fit for human habitation. Possessions so vast 
certainly carry with them very definite responsibility. We talk readily 
enough of our great empire being held ‘as sacred trust for civilization’. 
[...] If while refusing to use the house ourselves, we allow those whom it 
might shelter to perish miserably in the cold outside because we think 
that their presence within it might cause us some slight inconvenience, 
then indeed we shall have come very near to those Nazi standards 
which have of late provoked the execration of mankind.98 
 
To this end, they argued that: 
If we are to find even a temporary corrective to those tendencies to 
decline of population which are so threatening to our future as a nation 
and as an empire, and also to find a real solution of the refugee problem 
and give private charity in that matter a chance of being effective then 
we must restore something of that freedom of migration which existed 
before the war, and which, for the countries receiving the emigrants – 
our Dominions, and the United States notably – was found to be 
compatible with a steadily rising prosperity.99 
 
Their rhetoric linked to key concerns of the time. These included economic 
and population problems, to which they saw a mutual solution by increasing Jewish 
refugee entry to both Britain and the empire. The moral imperative in their 
argument directly referenced League of Nations mandates. This undoubtedly 
tapped into debates about the necessity and nature of humanitarianism, empire 
and immigration practices that were underway in the interwar years. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS 
Between 1933 and 1938, people left Germany in response to events and escalations 
of persecution. Historians have identified various distinct but overlapping stages. 
For example, Sherman outlines five main phases of refugee movement. The first, 
from Hitler's rise to power as Chancellor in January 1933 to the enactment of the 
Nuremberg Laws in September 1935, created a refugee problem ‘relatively small in 
numbers’ and ‘rather tentative in character’. Those leaving could still exit with many 
of their possessions and financial assets, which made arriving in a new country 
much easier. Many of those who left simply went to neighbouring European 
countries to wait out a change in government or for the introduction of more 
moderate Nazi policy.100 However, those leaving still had to pay a flight tax of up to 
fifty percent of their capital, a serious disadvantage for those seeking a new home 
at a time of worldwide economic depression.101 
The second stage, following the Nuremberg Laws until Anschluss in March 
1938, still witnessed a steady movement of people, but it became increasingly 
difficult for those seeking refuge to find countries of safety particularly as Nazi 
confiscation of financial assets and property only became more severe. Third, the 
period between March and the Kristallnacht pogrom in November 1938 was 
characterised by ‘massive flight’ and ‘widespread panic’. Refugees were ‘stripped of 
almost all their property’, and receiving countries tightened their own regulations 
to limit entry of large numbers of impoverished refugees. In the fourth stage, 
between November 1938 and March 1939, privately organised efforts to aid 
refugee movement broke down, and the situation was complicated by new refugees 
from Czechoslovakia. In the face of the crisis, countries adopted policy that 
effectively closed the possibility of refugee entry. The final stage, before the 
outbreak of war, ‘saw the widest possible territorial spread of the problem’. 
Refugees ‘wandered for weeks in search of some port’ where they could land and 
be received safely, but the attempts to find permanent settlement grew 
increasingly desperate.102 
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Sherman’s five stages are based primarily on Nazi policy and refugee reaction 
and are essential to this study. To understand the British colonial response to 
Jewish refugees, however, another set of turning points – turning points in the 
narrative of Allied government perceptions of and actions regarding the unfolding 
refugee crisis and worsening international relations – must be laid on top of 
Sherman’s timeline. These turning points, which will be discussed below, are the 
Évian Conference, Kristallnacht, the outbreak of war, and the Bermuda Conference.  
THE ÉVIAN CONFERENCE 
The Évian Conference was a meeting called by the US government on the refugee 
question and held at the French lakeside resort, Évian-les-Bains, between 6 and 15 
July 1938. Representatives from thirty-two countries gathered together to discuss 
possible solutions to the rapidly growing refugee crisis. The was called with 
grandiose claims of a ‘humanitarian purpose’ and mindful of the ‘harrowing 
urgency’ of the problem. However, expectations for a positive response were 
limited from the outset. The American delegate, Myron C. Taylor, stated on the first 
day of the conference that: 
We must admit frankly [...] that this problem of political refugees is so 
vast and so complex that we probably can do no more at the initial 
Intergovernmental Meeting than put in motion the machinery, and 
correlate it with existing machinery, that will, in the long run, contribute 
to a practicable amelioration of the condition of the unfortunate human 
beings with whom we are concerned.103 
 
The American invitation had made it clear that no participating nation was 
asked to amend their existing immigration laws in preparation for the meeting. 
Similarly, no country was obliged to offer finance to any scheme suggested. This, it 
was agreed by participating governments, was to remain the responsibility of 
Jewish agencies. However, these agencies were not allowed to actively participate 
at Évian but rather had to present to sub-committees in closed meetings. It was 
feared that co-ordinated international action, funded by those governments 
participating at the meeting, would inadvertently encourage other Central 
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European nations to introduce further anti-Jewish policies and exacerbate the 
refugee problem.  
Unsurprisingly, Évian saw delegate after delegate explain why they could not 
offer greater refuge to Jewish refugees. Great powers and small Latin American 
countries alike explained that they were unable to help because of domestic 
financial difficulties or, in the case of the under-developed tropical countries, 
because of the limited possibility of large-scale refugee settlement. The refusals 
focused on the perception that tropical territory lacked suitable work for the urban 
Jewish refugee. For example, M. Leon R. Thebaud, the delegate of Haiti, stated that 
‘[i]n view of the country’s economic structure (essentially agricultural), its social 
situation and the financial crisis at present prevailing [...] preference will be given 
among such persons to agriculturalists and agricultural experts’.104 
This perception was borne out by statistics which suggest that of the 14,800 
refugees who had enquired about settlement abroad, 29% were businessmen, 
while only 3.6% were farmers.105 As one official put it, ‘this idea of permanent [...] 
(agricultural) settlements in the tropical areas, for the class we are considering here, 
is absolutely impossible’.106 Historical assessments have been no less critical. In 
relation to Jewish settlement in the Dominican Republic, Simone Giglioti argues that 
‘[h]alf the German-Jewish population were over 50, most of them were not involved 
in labour-intensive occupations, and only 1.5 per cent of them were farmers’.107 
The only exception to the negative responses discussed at Évian was the 
Dominican Republic, which offered settlement opportunities to some 100,000 
Jewish refugees. The Caribbean country offered to accept these refugees largely to 
help with its own development. Importantly, the settlement also did not face anti-
Jewish opposition. In fact, Jewish money and citizenship were viewed positively as a 
way of developing the territory. However, the Sosúa settlement has been judged to 
be only a relative success. Of the 100,000 positions offered, the settlement peaked 
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at 500 settlers. Despite local support and significant finance, the settlement never 
flourished.108 
Britain’s response to the meeting was defensive from the outset. When the 
invitation was received in March 1938 following Anschluss, limitations were 
immediately set on British participation, including, most significantly, the 
agreement that Palestine would not be a topic of discussion at the meeting.109 For 
the British government, attendance at Évian was a diplomatic necessity rather than 
a meaningful humanitarian endeavour. As Britain was keen to encourage American 
engagement with Europe, officials felt obliged to participate but likewise worked 
hard to find a way to contribute without compromising on any of their own key 
policy concerns and objectives (e.g. Palestine and colonial appeasement).  
Although the British government as a whole was in agreement on the 
importance of the meeting, government departments formulated very different 
ideas on where this contribution should come from. The Foreign Office and Home 
Office assumed that the British contribution should be underwritten by the 
colonies, especially given that Palestine was not to be discussed and that the 
Dominions were largely uncooperative. The Foreign Office called for a ‘generous 
and constructive contribution’, such as ‘an area in British territory for permanent 
settlement of refugees’.110 The need for this was directly connected to diplomatic 
relations with the US, and the Foreign Office confronted the Colonial Office with the 
consequences of a negative response from the empire in an inter-departmental 
meeting: 
the United States Government probably regarded the British Empire as 
in a position to make an important contribution to the [refugee] 
problem, but it seemed that not only would the Empire make no 
adequate contribution, but that only one Dominion would even be 
represented at the conference. [Therefore] it would be open to the 
United States to criticise very strongly this negative response to their 
initiative and to attribute to it any blame that may accrue from a 
possible failure of the meeting.111 
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Although the Colonial Office was keen to prevent pressure falling on the colonies, 
during a series of interdepartmental meetings which took place in preparation for 
Évian, they conceded that some investigations would have to take place but limited 
them to Kenya, Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia. 
 The initial public statement made at Évian by the British representative, 
Edward Turnour, Lord Winterton, outlined the limited nature of settlement 
opportunities in the colonies: 
The question is not a simple one. The economic and social factors which 
operate in the United Kingdom are here further complicated by 
considerations of climate, of race, and of political development. Many 
overseas territories are already overcrowded, others are wholly or 
partly unsuitable for European settlement, while in others again local 
political conditions hinder or prevent any considerable immigration.112 
 
Settlement in East Africa was briefly mentioned but couched in very limited 
terms, with no specific details given. However, pressure during proceedings to 
discuss Palestine and to expand on the opportunities for settlement in East Africa 
saw Winterton make a speech on both of these issues during the last session. He 
revealed, after communication with officials in Whitehall, that a small-scale 
settlement scheme was underway in Kenya and that local authorities and Jewish 
agencies were working together on the project (see chapter two).113  
Winterton’s statement was welcomed by colonial officials, who noted that it 
would ‘make it clear that the possibilities in Kenya are strictly limited’ and forestall 
‘any unduly optimistic notions on the part of the Jews’.114 In fact, Hibbert, who was 
present at Évian, concluded that ‘one of the main achievements of the Conference 
was that every country was agreed that large-scale settlement of Jews was out of 
the question’. To this end, he was hopeful that the meeting would act as ‘an 
effective silencer to the many misguided people in this country who consider that 
large-scale settlement in the wide open spaces of the British Empire is a practical 
proposition’.115  
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The only other practical step taken at Évian was the establishment of the 
Intergovernmental Committee (IGC), which as ‘[a] child of the Évian Conference [...] 
inherited many of its defects from its parent’.116 The IGC met for the first time in 
August 1938. The body had two main functions. First, it was responsible for trying to 
improve the conditions of immigration, turning disorder and chaos into controlled 
departure. Second, it was responsible for leading investigations into possible 
locations for permanent settlement.117 It’s success was limited on both counts. 
Historians and Holocaust survivors alike have judged the meeting negatively, 
seeing it at best as ‘a weak reed unable to stem or direct the engulfing tide of 
refugees’.118 At worst, the conference was a ‘public relations exercise’.119 Clearly, 
Évian failed to formulate a policy which actively helped the large-scale settlement of 
refugees anywhere, let alone in the British Empire. However, it was never a forum 
at which actual rescue initiatives could have developed. Foreign, domestic and 
colonial imperatives dictated a limited response for several key reasons, and the 
conduct and constitution of the IGC highlight the increasingly limited but complex 
nature of international co-ordinated humanitarian policy towards refugees during 
the approach of war. 
KRISTALLNACHT AND ITS AFTERMATH 
On the night of 9/10 November 1938, Nazi persecution of its Jewish minority 
reached new levels of violence when state-sponsored anti-Jewish riots saw the 
widespread destruction of Jewish property and people. Although Nazi officials 
claimed that the violence was a spontaneous demonstration of public feeling, the 
pogrom was in fact a calculated response to the assassination of a German 
diplomat, Ernst vom Rath, at the German Embassy in Paris. On 7 November 1938, a 
young Polish Jew named Herschel Grynszpan had opened fire in response to the 
harsh treatment of his parents in the course of Jewish expulsions from Poland. Vom 
Rath died of his injuries on 9 November, and two nights of violence followed. In all, 
177 synagogues were destroyed, and 7,500 shops were plundered, leading to 
material damage amounting to several million Reichsmark. The impact on Jewish 
                                                          
116
 Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, p. 9. 
117
 Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe, p. 215. 
118
 Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, p. 9. 
119
 London, Whitehall, p. 279. 
63 
life was no less severe: ninety-one Jews were murdered, and 20,000 Jewish men 
were imprisoned.120 
News of the attacks spread quickly. ‘Detailed press reports of violence, 
destruction of property, and the threat of massive expulsions’ soon reached 
Britain.121 On 10 November, The Times correspondent described ‘scenes of 
systematic plunder and destruction which have seldom had their equal in a civilized 
country since the Middle Ages’.122 Using similar language, Neville Baille, writing to 
The Times, noted that ‘[a] series of attractive tourist posters has for some time been 
displayed bearing the caption, “Visit Mediaeval Germany.” How well this adjective 
fits, in view of present-day happenings!’123 An editorial on 16 November stated 
boldly that ‘[i]n this, as in previous cases, deeds not words are required’.124 In an 
opinion poll carried out shortly after the pogrom, seventy-three per cent of those 
polled ‘believed that the persecution of the Jews was an obstacle to good 
understanding between Britain and Germany’.125 
The pogrom changed the momentum of the refugee crisis and in turn 
prompted a re-evaluation of British policy. Neville Chamberlain ‘was appalled at the 
barbarity of the Kristallnacht pogroms’.126 In a circular telegram to the colonies sent 
on 1 December 1938, MacDonald also recognized the impact of the November 
pogrom: ‘[The position of] the various classes of persons in Germany who are likely 
to become involuntary emigrants […] has steadily deteriorated, and it is not too 
much to say that in some cases, particularly that of the Jews, it has become almost 
desperate’. In fact, linking this with further action, MacDonald wrote, ‘I am very 
anxious that the Colonial Empire should play its part in furnishing a contribution 
towards the solution of this great and most urgent problem’.127 
Perhaps the most notable example of a liberalisation of British policy was the 
changes adopted over the entry of refugee children. After Kristallnacht, schemes 
designed to specifically help children were implemented. Between 2 December 
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1938, when the first Kindertransport children arrived in Harwich, and 31 August 
1939, 9,354 children (7,482 of whom were Jewish) had arrived in Britain under a 
scheme organised by Jewish and non-Jewish refugee agencies.128 Although 
government leniency on this issue was, in part, based on the belief that children 
were less dangerous than adults, largely because they were more assimilable, the 
policy was nonetheless generous. This was particularly the case when such action is 
considered against the failure of similar changes to pass through the American 
government and the subsequent failure of the Wagner-Rogers child refugee bill (see 
chapter 2).129 
On 21 November 1938, Prime Minister Chamberlain spoke in the House of 
Commons of the issue of refugees. While he did not publicly denounce German 
action, the events of early November had clearly prompted a public statement on 
British action in response to the refugee crisis.130 Chamberlain spent some time 
talking about possibilities in the empire. At the time of the Évian Conference, Kenya 
had been the focus of such plans. After Kristallnacht, attention turned to 
Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia (see chapter two) and British Guiana (see chapter 
five). Chamberlain explained that: 
Many of our Colonies and Protectorates and our Mandated Territories in 
East and West Africa contain native populations of many millions, for 
whom we are the trustees, and whose interests must not be prejudiced. 
Many large areas, which at present are sparsely populated, are 
unsuitable either climatically or economically for European settlement. 
The Colonial Governments could only co-operate in any schemes of 
large or small-scale settlement provided the schemes were formulated 
and carried out by responsible organisations.131 
 
Chamberlain concluded that ‘however great may be our desire and that of other 
countries to assist in dealing with this grave situation, the possibilities of settlement 
are strictly limited’.132 
Kristallnacht shocked many in the liberal democracies who objected to its 
obvious and persecutory nature as well as illiberal violence against people and 
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property. Although some concessions to this were made, the frameworks of 
liberalism and race, along with humanitarianism, meant that doors were not 
opened wide in response. Rather, a carefully considered prioritisation of factors was 
made in the light of new circumstances. These were naturally subject to change 
once more at the outbreak of war.  
WAR AND INTERNMENT 
On 3 September 1939, Britain declared war on Germany. War-time commitments 
resulted in a further reduction of British action to aid Jewish refugees.133 Attention 
increasingly focused on fighting the war, rather than specific re-settlement, rescue 
or relief initiatives. Likewise, it halted action already underway and limited the scale 
and type of new schemes envisaged. Perhaps most significantly, war changed the 
status of Jewish refugees. Not only did the Nazi invasion of Poland create yet more 
refugees, this act of war inadvertently turned refugees into enemy aliens. This 
potential change in status had been under discussion even before the war – one 
official noted that ‘[i]t will probably be very difficult for countries of refuge to 
accept further refugees from Germany, even if they are allowed to leave’ – but its 
implementation clearly changed refugee status for the worse.134 Fear of fifth-
column agents in wartime refugee movements became just one more factor limiting 
refugee entry.  
As well as increased restrictions on those able to enter Britain and the 
colonies, there were changes for those already in British territory. Within days of 
the outbreak of war, the Home Secretary, Sir John Anderson, called for a review of 
all German and Austrian people in Britain.135 ‘One-man tribunals’ set about 
assessing those enemy aliens in Britain to decide whether they posed a risk to 
British security. Between September 1939 and May 1940, 64,244 people were 
assessed, and the vast majority had been automatically exempted from internment. 
Generally, the Home Office found the idea of mass internment ‘unnecessary on 
security grounds and inexpedient on grounds of general policy’. However, in May 
1940, at the lowest point in the war, the British government implemented a policy 
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of mass internment.136 After Dunkirk and the increased threat of air attack or 
invasion of Britain itself, people were frightened and felt threatened by foreign 
refugees who were, after all, often enemy nationals. Churchill himself was 
convinced by claims that fifth-column activities had contributed to the fall of the 
Netherlands and feared the same happening in Britain.137 
Public opinion, however, soon shifted again, and within three months, the 
government began a reversal of its mass internment policy. After July 1940, mass 
internment effectively ended, and although it took several months for many of 
those held to be released, internment was never adopted again as general policy. 
Significantly, the timescale of these changes differed in Britain and its colonies (see 
chapter four). 
War did not bring about a total end to refugee entry. Some exceptions were 
made for people who had embarked on a journey with a valid visa but had not yet 
made port before the outbreak of war. Similarly, relatives of people already in 
Britain were sometimes allowed entry, and transmigrants were allowed to enter in 
certain circumstances.138 Even in the context of these limited concessions, the 
situation only worsened when, after October 1941, German policy completely 
limited Jewish escape. Instead of questions of refuge, the Allies were faced with 
questions of rescue. With the commencement of Operation Barbarossa, the 
German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the mass murder of Jews had also 
began. Small units of men, known as the Einsatzgruppen, followed the German 
army and rounded up and killed thousands and thousands of Jewish victims. The 
scale of these killings was at least known by Churchill, but British policy generally 
saw no obvious changes. It was not until the following year in 1942, that Britain, 
along with America and Russia, publicly acknowledged the crimes being committed 
by Nazi Germany, particularly against the Jews. However, as previously outlined, the 
Allied Declaration came at the end of 1942, the year in which it is estimated that 
about half of the 5.1 million Jewish victims of the Nazi regime were murdered.139 
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The public reaction to the declaration prompted a government response and 
resulted in the Anglo-American meeting at Bermuda in April 1943.  
THE BERMUDA CONFERENCE 
British and American representatives met on the secluded island of Bermuda 
between 19-30 April 1943 to discuss possible rescue initiatives for European Jews. 
The 1942 Allied Declaration had caused a huge public outcry in Britain and America 
and forced both governments to take action to allay this. Initial calls for the joint 
meeting came from Britain.140 Unconvinced for several weeks after the initial British 
suggestion, the US adopted a more positive attitude after it too was subject to 
growing domestic pressure for action. Although there were important differences 
between British and American objectives for the meeting, both agreed that the 
meeting would not lead to drastic changes in policy. Moreover, both powers were 
pleased with the location of the conference; Bermuda was subject to strict controls 
during the war, which meant that as well as limited inference from Jewish and other 
refugee organisations, it would also be easier to control the press. For both Britain 
and the US, the central objective remained winning the war. A brief prepared for 
the Foreign Secretary by Randall, stated that while: 
all other possible remedies should be tried […] to provide a solution of 
the refugee problem at all commensurate with the tragic seriousness 
and deplorable magnitude[,] we – not only His Majesty’s Government 
but the whole United Nations – must bring the whole Hitlerite system 
down.141  
Therefore, Randall concluded, ‘the essential stipulation remained’ that ‘any steps to 
aid refugees that might interfere with the war effort were forbidden’.142 
In line with the limited plans for meeting, Bermuda only really considered ‘the 
very modest problems of assistance and removal of escapees in country’s of first 
asylum’.143 Therefore, the conference ruled out any major action, including large-
scale rescue and re-settlement initiatives. For example, a proposals to send 15,000 
refugees to Angola (a Portuguese colony in Africa) using Portuguese ships did not go 
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far, and nor did similar suggestions for settlement in Santo Domingo, Madagascar 
and British Honduras.144 Plans for negotiations with Germany for the release of 
potential refugees were also rejected. Officials, especially in Britain, feared where 
large numbers of refugees would go if negotiations with Hitler were actually 
successful. After more significant gestures were discounted, discussions followed on 
possible smaller initiatives. As at Évian, plans for action revolved around the 
Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees (IGC). The decision to turn to this 
‘dormant’ institution included extending its ‘mandate’ to ‘acquire new power to 
receive and spend private and public funds’. Its two main tasks were: (1) to 
‘promote resettlement of refugees who were out of immediate danger’; and (2) ‘to 
encourage neutral countries, Switzerland and Sweden in particular, to admit 
potential refugees from enemy territory’. Another topic discussed was the possible 
evacuation of about 6,000-8,000 Jews who were then in Spain, which, it was hoped, 
would keep escape routes open and provide the British with a much-desired boost 
in public opinion.145 These efforts did little to help European Jewry, and the 
limitations imposed at Bermuda on immigration confirmed the preference for 
limited, individual nature of admission into Britain. 
Just as they had done at Évian, the Colonial Office still felt duty-bound to 
protect itself against long-standing pressure from both the Foreign and Home 
Offices to provide answers to the refugee and settlement question. The Colonial 
Office outlined that ‘as regards policy, no doubt [the Colonial Secretary’s] line must 
be to prevent having refugees planted on the Colonial Empire’. C.G. Eastwood, a 
principal in the Colonial Office, argued, ‘it is sufficiently clear that the United 
Kingdom, the United States, the Dominions and almost every other country is going 
to find very good reasons for taking very few of these refugees’. Eastwood re-
emphasized the importance of strong colonial policy, explaining that: 
it is essential that before the Conference we should ascertain whether 
there are any further possibilities of assisting in the solution of this 
urgent and difficult problem on which public opinion is greatly 
exercised. If as a result of investigation it is considered that no more 
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refugees can be accommodated a refusal to receive them must be 
backed by strong and convincing reasons.146 
 
The empire was mainly discussed in reference to refugee entry into Jamaica and 
East African territories (see chapter 4). However, in line with the results of the 
meeting, the empire ultimately faced very little pressure for action. 
Historians of the Bermuda Conference almost unanimously describe the 
meeting as a failure or worse, as a deliberate attempt to justify Allied inaction and 
to relieve public pressure for a more active policy towards Jewish refugees. For 
some contemporaries, the latter was almost certainly the case. For example, the 
former British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, said in 1943 that ‘it is most important 
that we should avoid any reproach that we are not doing all we can to rescue these 
unfortunate people’.147 His perspective did not focus on what Britain should do but 
what they should be seen to be doing, a distinction that largely defined (in)action at 
Bermuda. While the conference undoubtedly failed to help a significant number of 
refugees – Wyman places this number at approximately 600, those who eventually 
made it to the camp established in North Africa as a result of the meeting – Wyman 
suggests that ‘help for the Jews was not, after all, the objective of the diplomacy at 
Bermuda’. Rather ‘[i]ts purpose was to dampen the growing pressures for 
rescue’.148 As attention turned to post-war plans, there remained a fundamental 
lack of energy in government refugee policy. 
The Bermuda Conference is also an important bookend in the structure of this 
thesis. 1943 saw plans move to post-war efforts. More broadly, the failure of 
Bermuda shows how the limits of liberalism (set by the preference for controlled, 
individual entry), racial concerns (especially fear of enemy aliens), and the clash of 
humanitarianisms (over the implementation of internment in the colonies, 
particularly when they were asked to take more refugees in preparation for 
Bermuda) all limited action. 
*** 
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The developments of interwar international relations, the refugee crisis itself and 
events in the colonial sphere all interacted with British refugee policy and, more 
specifically, British colonial refugee policy. Nazi persecution of Europe’s Jews clearly 
presented an intractable problem for the liberal democracies and for individual 
departments within the British government. Because the historiography of the 
British response to the refugee crisis focuses on the Foreign and Home Offices, the 
colonial empire has been primarily assessed in terms of its ability to alleviate the 
domestic and diplomatic pressures caused by the growing refugee crisis. However, 
while the Colonial Office shared similar interests to those of the Foreign and Home 
Offices, its views and priorities were different. Like the Foreign Office, its 
relationship with the US was essential. However, rather than interests based on the 
wartime alliance, the Colonial Office was concerned with American anti-colonialism 
and what this would mean for the empire in the post-war world. Like the Home 
Office, they had to satisfy the British public, while keeping colonial territories 
economically, politically and practically functioning. However, for the Colonial 
Office, there were multiple territories with multiple and various kinds of needs. 
Moreover, the Colonial Office remained a part of the domestic political system to 
which it was answerable and upon whose foreign and domestic relations it could 
have an impact.149 
In order to navigate this complex web of connections, colonial officials had to 
be capable of adopting subtly or significantly different policies as need dictated and 
in pursuit of their own goals. This ultimately produced a policy of compromise that, 
while developing alongside that of the other departments, remained separate and 
sought to help ease the refugee crisis in a way that benefited the colonies. The 
problems encountered in the empire during the interwar years and the change in 
direction this prompted provided the framework in which colonial officials sought 
to work, and this is evident in the connection their policy of compromise made to 
concerns about colonial development, international reputation and pressures 
exerted by international humanitarianism. British and colonial refugee policy were 
most readily expressed through immigration policy. In the next chapter, I will 
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explore one of the most defining undercurrents of immigration policy, liberalism, 
which shaped immigration and refugee policies by its concern for assimilation and 
preference for controlled, individual refugee entry. 
72 
Chapter Two: 
The Limits of Liberalism: Britain’s Domestic and Colonial Immigration 
Policies 
 
In his 1994 work, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, Tony Kushner placed 
the Allied response (that of Britain and the US) in the context of the limits of liberal 
democratic powers. Kushner concluded that ‘[t]he failings of Britain and the United 
States with regard to the Jewish crisis during the Nazi era may [...] be explained by 
the failure of state and society to solve the contradictions and ambiguities of 
liberalism’. Within this argument, Kushner identifies several key themes that are 
relevant to this study. First, assimilation (i.e. that immigrants would replace their 
foreign ‘otherness’ with the ideals and outward appearances of their adoptive 
country) was central to liberal democratic immigration policies. Second, liberal 
democracies struggled to respond to the illiberal phenomenon of Nazi persecution 
(which, it was often implied in government circles, the Jews had somehow partly 
brought upon themselves). Finally, within ‘democratic liberalism’ there was a 
prevalent view (held most infamously by Ernest Bevin after 1945) that Jews, despite 
persecution, should not be given ‘special treatment’ in immigration practices.1 
Kushner’s work provides a starting point for the assessment of liberalism as a 
conceptual framework. However, this chapter will take the assessment further by 
considering the role of liberalism through a colonial lens. In imperial spaces, 
questions of group versus individual rights as well as the importance of assimilation 
were starkly exposed because of the presence of several different groups and the 
ways in which British officials understood their relationship and responsibilities to 
them. 
In response to the refugee crisis, rather than the development of a distinct 
refugee policy, both Britain and its empire utilised existing immigration legislation 
to control entry.2 The primary aim of immigration legislation was to retain control of 
how many and in what manner foreign peoples entered Britain or those territories 
under its control, in order protect themselves from what they considered to be the 
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problems of unlimited immigration.3 Time and again during the 1930s, both Britain 
and its empire developed and changed immigration policies in accordance with the 
level of perceived threat from growing refugee numbers. While self-interest and 
self-preservation ultimately motivated all government action, the underlying 
influences of liberalism (and also racial thinking and humanitarianism) defined 
official perceptions of the ‘refugee threat’ and dictated the limited extent and type 
of government action. 
This chapter explores the immigration laws and practices adopted by the 
colonies, particularly in relation to official views on individual entry and large-scale 
settlements. Both of these kinds of settlement plans raised questions about 
assimilation and group rights, and a study of them helps to highlight why small-
scale, individual entry was ultimately more successful. First, this chapter will 
examine the arguments of Kushner (and others) on liberalism. Second, it will discuss 
British domestic immigration policies. Finally, it will examine colonial policies in 
terms of both individual entry and large-scale planned settlement. As well as 
Colonial Office records, this chapter utilises refugee testimony, as nowhere was the 
limits of liberalism more clear than in the specific experiences of those who tried to 
enter the colonies. 
BRITISH LIBERALISM DEFINED 
‘Liberalism’ is a contentious term. This section does not set out to engage with the 
wide-ranging (and often confusing) debates about its value as an analytical term but 
rather seeks to establish what liberalism means in relation to the British imperial 
context of this study. Two main factors dominate this definition: (1) British 
liberalism has an historic precedent, which firmly places it at the centre of British 
politics and as a worldview of many officials; and (2) the contradictory value that 
liberalism places on both individualism and universalism. 
First, a brief history of British liberalism highlights its firmly established roots 
in British political thought, adding weight to the claim that Britain was a liberal 
democracy, no matter if Conservative, Labour or Liberal governments were in 
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power. The earliest form of liberal intellectual thought emerged at the time of the 
English Civil War, which began as an attack on absolute monarchy but soon 
broadened to a wider challenge of the existing social order, ultimately releasing ‘a 
torrent of radical ideas that challenged the traditional image of a rigid social 
hierarchy, in which authority was the monopoly of a privileged minority’. Within 
this context, a group called the Levellers emerged. They sought to expand the 
electorate, abolish the authority of the monarch and the Lords and guarantee equal 
civil rights, and by doing so espoused the idea of ‘free and independent citizens’. As 
such, they have been identified by some as liberals’ ‘ideological ancestors’. Despite 
the failure of the Levellers’ radical programme, opposition to authoritarian rule 
continued, next in the guise of John Locke, ‘the father of Liberalism’, and the 
creation of the political group known as the Whigs. As a political party, the Whigs 
moved away from Locke’s more radical ideas, such as the support of ‘natural rights’ 
for all. After the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and a new parliamentary context, the 
Whigs continued to distance themselves from Locke’s call for civil equality and 
rather sought to confirm the propertied status-quo. As Eccleshall agues:  
Later liberals, then, inherited an ambivalent legacy from the 
seventeenth century. Some found in the arguments of the English 
revolution inspiration to continue the struggle for individual 
emancipation from existing social constraints; whereas others 
discovered a defence of parliamentary government that could be used 
in a post-revolutionary world to resist demands for further reform.4 
 The Liberal Party, which formed in 1859, provided a middle ground for Whigs 
and Radicals, until a split over Irish Home Rule in 1886 pushed many Whigs back 
towards the Tory Party. Economic liberalism, as espoused by Adam Smith, was soon 
called for in response to growing political rights. Samuel Smiles’s Self Help became a 
central tenet for Radical Liberals who believed (often in connection with non-
conformist religious beliefs) that one was in charge of one’s own fate and needed to 
work for improvement. A move away from the influence of laissez-faire politics at 
the turn of the nineteenth century saw a call for more state intervention on the part 
of liberals, manifested clearly in the social reforms introduced by the Liberal 
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government in 1906 regarding national insurance, old age pensions and free school 
meals for children from the poorest families. This movement towards state 
intervention was sold as a compromise between Conservative free capitalism and 
socialism. This came to a head in the ‘Welfare State’, a system proposed by William 
Beveridge. A liberal idea, it was implemented by a Labour government in 1948. 
Many aspects of interwar liberalism, especially economic, were followed by Labour 
and Conservative governments until the 1960s. Despite the interwar years seeing a 
decline in the electoral success of the Liberal Party, liberal ideas saw a growing 
popularity across the political spectrum.5 
Liberalism also impacted attitudes towards Britain’s growing empire, and 
scholarly work has explored the connection. Uday Singh Mehta has studied the 
views of key nineteenth-century liberal thinkers on empire and argues that the 
‘urge’ to be imperial was ‘internal’ to liberalism. This was manifest in liberals’ focus 
on ‘civilizing’ colonial ‘others’ and discourse that identified colonial people as 
childlike and superstitious. To this end, Mehta argues: 
In the empire, the epistemological commitments of liberalism to 
rationality and the progress that it was deemed to imply constantly 
trumped its commitments to democracy, consensual government, 
limitations on the legitimate power of the state, and even toleration.6 
 
Other studies, including that by Thomas C. Holt, on the subject of British 
emancipation policy in 1838-1866, also elucidate the place of liberal thinking in 
imperial policy, arguing that the consequences of emancipation challenged both 
economic and political tenets of classical liberalism.7 Although the literature on 
liberalism and empire focuses on the nineteenth century, it offers an important 
guide for the study of the issues in the interwar period. For example, while 
individual emancipation was deemed to be desirable, it was also widely believed 
that Britain was in a unique position to ‘civilise’ colonial peoples as a group, an 
attitude which ideas on race only helped reinforce (see chapter three). 
                                                          
5
 Ibid., pp. 16-17, 22, 24, 49-51. 
6
 Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought 
(Chicago, IL, 1999), pp. 20, 36. 
7
 Thomas C. Holt, ‘The Essence of the Contract: The Articulation of Race, Gender and Political 
Economy in British Emancipation Policy, 1838-1866’, in: Frederik Cooper, Thomas C. Holt and 
Rebecca J. Scott (eds), Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor, and Citizenship in 
Postemancipation Societies (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000). 
76 
This brief history of British liberalism highlights key aspects that became an 
accepted part of British culture and thought, particularly in the interwar years. The 
pervasive nature and influence of liberalism in this period has been explained by 
Gunn and Vernon in the following way:  
Far from being wedded to a particular set of ideas or the ideology of a 
political party, this mentality was the product of new forms of 
knowledge and expertise. In turn, they produced and justified new 
techniques of rule over those subjects deemed capable of self-
government (the informed, industrious, healthy, and self-improving 
individual) as well as those others found incapable of it. [...] As a political 
technology that extends far beyond the realm of politics and the work of 
the state, liberalism here is a diffuse rationality, generated by many 
actors from multiple sources and evident in a panoply of everyday 
practices and material environments.8 
 
The impact of British liberalism on interwar refugee policy was complex. First, 
from its earliest origins, liberalism left an ambivalent and sometimes contradictory 
legacy. This was clear in the interwar years when liberal attitudes did not define a 
single response to refugees, but rather helped shape policies that were inconsistent 
and subject to change. Second, self-help – a long-standing tenet of the liberal 
worldview – dictated that individuals had to work for self-improvement. Although 
never stated so explicitly, this idea permeated the discussions in the 1930s 
regarding refugees, in which many argued openly that it was necessary for 
individuals to have key skills or money to be allowed to enter Britain and the 
colonies. The centrality of individualism and self-help within liberal thought meant 
that refugees’ skills and commodities were considered to be essential factors in the 
formulation of government policy. 
 Third, universalism was, contradictorily, also central to liberal thought. 
Eccleshall contends that ‘liberalism’ never provided a clear answer on the issue of 
‘universal freedoms’, that is, ‘which particular freedoms should be made available 
to every citizen’.9 This was very much relevant to both imperial subjects and Jewish 
refugees. For example, were they entitled to basic rights, and, if yes, who was to 
ensure these rights (especially as many Jewish refugees had lost their German or 
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Austrian citizenship as a result of Nazi persecution)? These questions were 
heightened in the colonial context, where questions of who was a British citizen and 
to what rights this entitled them were serious points of contention. Finally, the 
centrality of assimilation to liberal thinking significantly shaped British colonial 
refugee policy. However, the importance placed on assimilation sat uneasily 
alongside officials’ continued suspicion of assimilated Jews, bringing us once again 
back to the contradictions inherent in liberalism. 
LIBERALISM AND BRITAIN’S DOMESTIC IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 
Britain’s restrictive immigration policy during the refugee crisis of the interwar years 
had its origins in the early twentieth century and its long-standing ‘liberal tradition’. 
Britain, until 1905, was relatively open for immigrants, a legacy of the ‘Victorian 
tradition of free immigration and political asylum’. Although causing some tension 
in international relations, many political refugees from continental Europe entered 
Britain in the Victorian period. However, this more open policy was challenged in 
1881 when large numbers of impoverished Russian Jews started to enter Britain.10 
Large-scale immigration (which by the 1901 census measured 247,758 aliens 
in Britain, of whom approximately 100,000 were Jews who had arrived since 1881) 
had two important implications.11 First, for Britain’s Jewish community, increased 
immigration changed Jews’ relationship to the state, by threatening middle-class 
Britain’s liberal tolerance of Jewish ‘others’ in the context of emancipation.12 
Indeed, Feldman identifies a change in the status and treatment of Jews in England 
as they became ‘objects of policy as a social problem and not as a religious 
minority’. This was clear in questions regarding living and working conditions, 
particularly in the East End of London, where the majority of recent Jewish 
immigrants arrived.13  
Second, large-scale immigration had a significant impact on anti-alien 
legislation. Specifically, John A. Garrard highlights a complex tension between 
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antisemitism (deemed to be ‘disreputable’) and anti-alienism (deemed to be 
‘respectable’). He concludes that ‘the amount or extent of racial prejudice is really 
irrelevant [...] [w]hat matters is the suspicion of its existence; and the suspected 
presence of racial prejudice serves to muffle, rather than increase, hostility’. Against 
this backdrop, he traces the development of anti-alien agitation into legislation 
between 1880 and the passing of the 1905 Aliens Act, identifying the various Liberal 
and Conservative responses to the development of immigration laws.14  
Feldman develops this idea, arguing that ‘the hostility and opposition aroused 
by Jewish immigrants was more than an episode in this history of xenophobia or 
anti-Semitism. It was part of an attempt to redefine the state and the idea of the 
nation’.15 This, then, interacted with ‘a more general theme of jingoism’ that 
developed around the turn of the century, particularly in relation to imperial 
expansion and conflict, especially the Boer War. 16 The Boer War led to increased 
levels of xenophobia, particularly to white ‘others’ (see chapter three).17 Feldman 
links this conflict and the later Marconi Scandal (1912) to broader discussions about 
the place of Jews in Britain, immigration legislation and social questions after the 
Boer War.18 The work of Feldman and Garrard shows that immigration policies were 
not always simply about racism, but rather the complex interaction of other 
external factors, for example, national identity, state formation and, important 
here, the ambiguity of liberalism and the influence it had on these issues. 
The 1905 Aliens Act ‘removed the earlier (unconditional) right of asylum; no 
alien could now enter the country, other than temporarily, without a Ministry of 
Labour permit or visible means of support’.19 Indeed, immigration officials were 
‘empowered [...] to refuse to admit undesirables – the diseased, the insane, the 
criminal, and the putative public charge’.20 However, a closer look at the details of 
the Act highlight the role liberalism had in defining the restrictions it imposed. 
While officers were allowed to refuse leave to land, immigration agents only 
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checked vessels ‘carrying 20 or more passengers in steerage’, meaning wealthy 
immigrants could enter more easily. In an important concession to Britain’s earlier 
tradition of asylum, ‘impoverished aliens’ could be granted entry ‘if they could 
prove they were fleeing religious or political persecution’. Undoubtedly, the Act 
marked a turning point towards restriction, but more significantly, its details help 
highlight the ways in which liberalism influenced later restrictive domestic 
immigration policy.21  
Changes during and after the First World War in the form of the Aliens 
Restriction Act (1914) and the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act (1919) not only 
formed the basis of immigration laws in the post-war era but also ‘removed the 
earlier (unconditional) right of asylum’.22 These acts in effect ensured ‘undesirable’ 
immigrants were not allowed entry. These included ‘East European Jews, Germans 
and Chinese’.23 Indeed, the interwar years saw the growing strength of xenophobic, 
racist and ultimately anti-alien sentiment reflected in British immigration policy.  
Work by numerous scholars has explored this aspect more fully. For example, 
In addition to the importance of race (see chapter three), Laura Tabili’s work on the 
1925 Coloured Seamen’s Order serves as one example of a generally restrictive 
attitude that developed in British immigration laws in the interwar period. The 
order outlined that all ‘undocumented Black seamen register as aliens in Britain’. 
Although originally employed as colonial subjects and therefore paid much less 
(one-third to one-fifth of a British seaman’s wage), many black seamen tried to 
jump ship in Britain (or Europe) and then find work, this time getting hired as British 
seaman and thus entitled to higher levels of payment. The 1925 Black Seaman’s 
Alien Order also helps illuminate the influence of liberalism on Britain’s immigration 
practices. The order, a manifestation of social, cultural and economic factors in the 
interwar years meant Britain started to define ‘nationality and entitlement’ by 
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factors such as race.24 In this context, liberal frameworks on belonging and 
assimilation coalesced with race to create restrictive immigration practices.  
Gavin Schaffer’s study of the attitudes of British race scientists towards Jewish 
immigrants in the interwar years shows that immigration of ‘others’ was 
consistently viewed as a question of benefits versus problems in line with liberal 
concerns, such as assimilation. Schaffer contends that Jewish difference was never 
in question. Rather, debate focused on whether this difference was beneficial or 
problematic to Britain. Racial scientists, although sharing a common belief in the 
importance of race per se, also believed it was intimately connected ‘to concerns 
about the social welfare of the nation’, especially in regard to immigration 
practices.25 
Like Tabili’s work, Schaffer’s study shows the way that both race and 
liberalism (as well as competing views of humanitarianism) worked together to help 
shape immigration practices. In another of Schaffer’s studies, he places the wartime 
response of the British government to Jewish refugees and black immigrants in the 
specific context of liberalism, arguing that in both cases the fear that racial ‘others’ 
were somehow fundamentally unable to assimilate dictated policies over 
internment of Jews and the treatment of black immigrants. These two groups’ 
differences were based on perceptions of racial stereotypes that meant that they 
could not become a part of British society, either because of, in the case of Jews, 
being weak-willed and defeatist or, the case of black people, a sexual prowess that 
threatened ‘miscegenation’ and children of dual heritage.26 
Sascha Auerbach identifies similar restrictive attitudes, but this time with a 
focus on the experience of Chinese migrants. Auerbach explains that ‘the Chinese 
puzzle [...] aptly portrayed the challenges of regulating Chinese immigration and 
dealing with the social and cultural compatibilities of Chinese immigrants and white 
residents’. The difficulties between these migrants and the host country Britain 
developed before and after the First World War and were manifestations of ‘the 
economic, political, social and legal development of British society as a whole in the 
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early twentieth century’.27 Many of these tensions focused on Chinese labourers 
and how their presence at home and in the empire challenged British whiteness as 
well as power (the two were intimately linked). More broadly, this once more 
played on liberal concerns over assimilation. Restrictive immigration practices for 
Chinese ‘others’ were justified by the perceived behaviour of Chinese migrants, 
providing patterns of prejudice that could easily be transferred to Jewish 
immigrants and refugees who were frequently, if sometimes implicitly, blamed for 
their part in their own persecution. 
Clearly, immigration practices and the ideological frameworks in which they 
were formed, set the tone for restrictive immigration practices during the 1930s 
and were well-established by the time increasing numbers of Jewish refugees 
attempted to enter Britain. This can be seen in Home Secretary Sir John Gilmour’s 
response to the refugee question in early 1933, when he emphasised the ‘continuity 
of existing legislation against aliens’. Moreover, he advocated that Jews would not 
be dealt with collectively but rather ‘judged on [their] merits’. In this, ‘Gilmour 
reflected the strong commitment to individualism and opposition to treating Jews 
as a collective entity’. Indeed, ‘their ability to be assimilated into the national 
culture was the key factor in such considerations. Antisemitism was seen as an 
unacceptable price that would have to be paid for allowing in refugees who would 
not be able to adjust to the “English” way of life’.28  
The desire to appear ‘liberal’ (especially in contrast to illiberal Germany) 
remained central to many policy-makers, even as immigration practices became 
more restrictive. However, this desire was always in tension with the accepted 
necessity to exclude, or at least to have the power to exclude, unwanted 
immigrants. Ultimately, this meant that, for British officials, the rise of Hitler and 
increasing Jewish persecution was never considered to be reason enough in Britain 
(or America) to liberalise immigration regulations.29 
Liberal frameworks did not just impact the response to increasing Jewish 
persecution on the continent and its associated immigration concerns. They also 
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impacted popular domestic politics. During the Battle for Cable Street, which took 
place on 4 October 1936, it is estimated that about 100,000 people stopped a 
planned march by Oswold Mosley and the British Union of Fascists in the East End 
of London. While political protests that impacted public order had increased since 
the turn of the century, the government, guided by liberal ideals, was hesitant to 
legislate against such action. However, the events of the Battle of Cable Street were 
severe enough, argues Richard C. Thurlow , that the government rushed through 
the passing of the 1937 Public Order Act. Although the tensions between politically-
extreme groups like the British Union of Fascists (right-wing) and the Communist 
Party of Great Britain (left-wing) caused a change in legislation, this was not really 
connected to the humanitarian needs of Jews and other minorities that were 
subject to attack in these debates. Rather, ‘police on the ground were more 
concerned, provided that public order was not threatened, about the principle of 
free speech for fascists and communists than they were with protecting Jews or 
other minorities from verbal abuse’.30 As with immigration, Jewish persecution was 
not sufficient to overcome universalist liberal ideas.  
Jewish refugees seeking entry to Britain in the interwar period required 
passports or identity documents, and in some cases visas were also necessary. 
These requirements were viewed as tools of protection and were adapted and 
amended in the course of the 1930s to help further control the entry of unwanted 
migrants and prevent the mass entry of refugees. Requirements included the 
introduction of time and employment restrictions on the entry of some people into 
Britain.31 Some of these changes specifically impacted refugees seeking entry. For 
example, those made stateless by the political and national convulsions in Europe 
were consequently exempt from deportation if they managed to enter Britain. This 
resulted in stateless people often being denied entry because Britain was fearful of 
the lack of recourse should these migrants become a public charge. All those 
entering Britain had to show that they were able to maintain themselves, 
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sometimes without the prospect of employment, due to concerns over domestic 
unemployment. Britain was still feeling the impact of the Depression, and 
unemployment was high. Therefore, those entering Britain had to have 
independent means, a financial sponsor or the prospect of employment.  
In response to these government restrictions, the Jewish community in Britain 
gave a written guarantee for Jewish immigrants, promising that no refugee would 
become a public charge. The guarantee helped abate some of the government’s 
fiscal concerns. The role voluntary organisations played in the administration of 
refugee entry was also important, as they took on the ever-growing case work 
required to implement Britain’s immigration laws. The already heavy caseload grew 
after Anschluss in March 1938, in response to which the government reintroduced 
the requirement for visas for German and Austrian migrants in May. This change 
added further bureaucratic difficulties for refugees in Europe who sought safety in 
Britain. In addition to this, the head of the British GJAC, Otto Schiff, informed the 
British government that it would no longer be able to honour the 1933 financial 
guarantee, as refugee numbers increased way beyond original estimates.32 
Another concern at this time was the ‘consequence of the recent German law 
obligating every German living abroad to report to a German consulate. It was 
anticipated that most German refugees would avoid reporting, thereby forfeiting 
their German nationality and rendering themselves stateless’.33 The reintroduction 
of visas for German and Austrian nationals can therefore be seen as both a 
response to rising numbers of refugees and the revocation of the GJAC financial 
guarantee, as well as to fears over the longer-term control Britain would have over 
refugees if they were to become stateless.  
Before the re-introduction of visas, the decision for admittance was made 
when refugees presented themselves at a port of entry. Refugees could therefore 
leave Europe and only face restrictions when they tried to enter Britain. While visas 
kept these difficult decisions away from the British border, it meant that refugees 
could be rejected without ever having arrived in Britain. In a circular despatch sent 
to passport control officers, the Foreign Office ‘emphasised that the main purpose 
                                                          
32
 Shatzkes, Holocaust and Rescue, pp. 48-49. 
33
 Ibid., p. 48. 
84 
of the new visa procedure for German and Austrian passport holders was to 
regulate the flow of refugees’. The policy was justified by the Home Office which 
was trying to ‘prevent the accumulation of undeportable stateless aliens in Britain’. 
Louise London argues that ‘fears of fostering the growth of antisemitism were a 
subsidiary issue’.34 
The events of Kristallnacht caused another change in policy. Reflecting the 
shock and concern that the pogrom caused, the process of entry was accelerated 
and simplified with more staff employed to process paperwork.35 In total, the 
months before the outbreak of war, 40,000 Jews entered Britain. Although these 
were mostly on temporary transit visas, they represented a significant liberalisation 
of policy.36 This move to a more generous immigration policy places the ambiguities 
of liberalism at the centre of the assessment of British action. For example, the 
policy the British government adopted towards refugee children, known as 
Kindertransport, highlights the British government’s successful navigation of 
liberalism’s contradictions (i.e. assimilability and individual versus collective rights) 
to implement a more open immigration policy. The key in this case was the fact that 
the refugees were children and thereby believed to be more assimilable. 
The Kindertransport developed from the efforts of various groups and 
individuals who worked under the umbrella organisation of the World Movement 
for the Care of Children from Germany (which was known later as the Refugee 
Children’s Movement). These included the Jewish Refugee Committee, religious 
groups such as the Quakers, and British political figures such as Sir Wyndham 
Deedes, Viscount Samuel and Sir Nicholas Winton.37 These groups and individuals 
worked within the confines of limited British entry, and the initiative ultimately 
facilitated escape from Nazi-controlled Europe for thousands of children. Between 2 
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December 1938 and 31 August 1939, Britain received 9,354 children. Of this 
number, 7,482 were Jewish.38  
While the Kindertransport, in popular British memory, has become associated 
with a particularly generous aspect of British action during the Holocaust, there is a 
growing move by both survivors and academics to approach the issue more 
critically. Indeed, as Caroline Sharples has outlined, there must be an 
acknowledgement of: 
the reality of the ad hoc nature of the scheme, including the lack of 
resources and qualified personnel and the failure to check on the 
suitability of some of the foster parents [...] [as well as] the abuse and 
exploitation experienced by some of the children.39 
 
As well as the sometimes negative experiences of Kindertransport children, 
the limits of the scheme more broadly, especially in the context of Britain as a 
liberal democracy, must be acknowledged. The scheme only applied to children 
under seventeen, which was an expression of the fear that adult refugees would 
ultimately become a burden on the state and increase domestic antisemitism.40 As a 
result, the scheme was not extended to parents, and scholars have criticised the 
longer-term impact on parents and family networks.41 Nonetheless, others have 
notably disagreed with this general consensus. For example, Anthony Grenville, 
who was a child of the Kindertransport, argued that ‘[t]he parents were not 
“excluded”’ and that ‘of those who survived probably about two in five, the greater 
majority succeeded in emigrating from the Reich before the war, and the bulk of 
them came to Britain’.42 
Whatever the debate, the Kindertransport undoubtedly did save the lives of 
thousands of young Jewish children. However, the scheme highlights exceptionally 
well the limits of liberalism in British immigration policy. Children were favoured, in 
part, because they were believed to be less dangerous, largely because they were 
believed to be more assimilable. While the Kindertransport was an expression of 
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concern and relative generosity, it took place in the context of Britain’s otherwise 
limited immigration/refugee policy and should be assessed as such. Finally, the 
Kindertransport is also often assessed in comparison to American action to help 
child refugees. Scholars have generally lamented the lack of American action on the 
behalf of children, specifically focusing on the failure of the Wagner-Rogers Bill as 
evidence of this. In February 1939, a bi-partisan bill outlined a plan to settle 20,000 
refugee children in the US over two years, in addition to the existing immigration 
quotas for this period. The plan, however, was very unpopular, and even after 
significant amendment, it did not pass. The failure of the Wagner-Rogers Bill is 
viewed as evidence of anti-immigration and antisemitic attitudes in the American 
government.43  
Although there was a marked increase in the interest in the refugee question 
after Kristallnacht both in Parliament and in the public sphere, the aim of policy 
remained the same: to protect Britain. As Nazi domination of the continent 
continued, persecution increased, and refugees were increasingly stripped of their 
assets, making it ever harder for them to find refuge in other parts of the world. 
Due to the increasing numbers of refugees, exacerbated by new refugees from 
Czechoslovakia, refugee agencies became less effective in providing help for those 
in need, and governments, including Britain, responded by making it harder for 
refugees to enter.44 This can be seen in the British response to the Czech crisis when 
money was provided for refugees created by the Agreement rather than entry into 
Britain.45 After the outbreak of war, refugee entry into Britain reduced significantly, 
although refugees were able to enter Britain by various ways and means. War also 
halted plans that were underway for large-scale settlement plans (for example, in 
British Guiana). Winning the war became the primary goal of Allied governments, 
and calls to aid Jewish refugees were responded to with the claim that winning the 
war was the best way of solving the problem of Jewish persecution. 
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As other historians have shown, there were very real limits to Britain’s 
immigration policy, limits that had been in place since the early 1900s and which 
only grew in response to domestic constraints caused by economic downturn and 
an increasingly hostile international scene. These limits applied to all those whom 
Britain considered to be ‘other’, and Jews frequently fell into this category. Kushner 
argues that although there was ‘genuine anguish at the violence of Nazi anti-
Semitism’, there was also ‘ a failure to confront why it was happening and a 
tendency to blame the victims if not support the severity of the punishment’. The 
long-held self-belief that Britain was ‘a genuinely tolerant society that prided itself 
on the help it had offered refugees in the past’ could not overcome the extent of 
the Jewish refugee crisis in the mid- to late-1930s.46 
At this time, the key tensions within liberalism – including questions of 
assimilation, individual versus group rights and the belief that the Jews did not 
deserve particular help – meant that the British government actively worked against 
‘letting in’ any ‘other than carefully selected individual Jews, or individual groups of 
Jews’ who were believed to be beneficial , or at least not detrimental, to Britain.47 
More broadly, it points to the importance of understanding the complexity of 
British and American (in)action, rather than dismissing their policies as simply 
‘indifference’.48 
DOMINION IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE INTERWAR YEARS: A PRECEDENT? 
Immigration practices in the Dominions provided a precedent for colonial refugee 
policy in two main ways. First, the Dominions (white settler colonies) had, until 
1931, been under the direct control of Westminster. A separate Dominion 
Department had been created within the Colonial Office in 1907, and the role of 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs followed in 1925.49 However, with the 
passing of the Westminster Act in 1931, Britain’s Dominions gained more autonomy 
in areas including immigration. As a result, these countries of white settlement 
introduced more and more restrictive immigration practices. Looking at the 
immigration policies of Australia, Canada and South Africa, we can see that while 
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population growth was a top priority for policy-makers, the racial make-up of that 
growth was even more important. These concerns were particularly relevant in the 
question of Jewish settlement. Second, Britain’s imperial space had consistently 
been used as a way of solving domestic concerns, including economic and 
demographic issues. The 1920s saw the British government attempts to unite these 
two concerns in the Empire Settlement Act. The Act provided an ideological 
example of the possible in questions of population settlement that undoubtedly 
influenced policy-makers looking for imperial solutions to the refugee crisis in the 
1930s. As well as providing important frameworks for British action, both of these 
aspects of Dominion policy offer an important insight into imperial manifestations 
of the tensions of liberalism. 
From its founding in 1901, the Australian Commonwealth pursued a policy of 
‘white Australia’, in part by limiting the entry of ‘coloured’ (largely Asiatic) migrants. 
The First World War further perpetuated restrictive policies, with focus moving to 
migrants from southern Europe. Although limited immigration practices did not 
entirely stop migration from these areas, Australia continued to pursue racially 
restrictive immigration policies.50 Australia also did not have a clear refugee policy. 
Rather, they permitted officials the freedom to make a case-by-case assessment of 
those seeking entry. In practice, this meant immigration officials were able to 
increase the entry of desirable ‘white’ immigrants while specifically limiting Jewish 
refugee entry. This policy reflected the liberal preference for individual entry that 
the government could control. For example, T.H. Garrett, the Assistant Secretary of 
the Australia Department of the Interior, argued that ‘Jews as a class are not 
desirable immigrants for the reason that they do not assimilate; speaking generally, 
they preserve their identity as Jews’.51 
The interwar years also saw a rise in anti-Jewish feeling, especially connected 
to the economic downturn experienced after the 1929 Wall Street Crash. A number 
of right-wing political movements developed, including the New Guard in New 
South Wales, the Social Credit movement, as well as Australia First. In this context, 
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the question of assimilation became a focus for concern. For example, in cities such 
as Sydney and Melbourne, areas of Jewish settlement became the ‘foci of racial 
tension’.52 Paul Bartrop places Australia’s immigrant and refugee policy in the 
context of state-formation, arguing that the policies were an expression of ‘the way 
in which Australians saw themselves and others’.53 The centrality of immigration 
policy to state-formation and national identity are vital questions that feature 
throughout this thesis. They also link to another important issue: how was 
Jewishness seen in relation a racial identity of ‘whiteness’?  
Canada’s restrictive immigration policies also coalesced in the early twentieth 
century. The 1906 Immigration Act (coming only a year after Britain’s 1905 Aliens 
Act) ‘consolidated and revised all immigration legislation dating from the 
implementation of the primitive 1869 statute respecting immigration’. It defined 
who was an immigrant, limiting the category by excluding all those who were 
considered to be undesirable, such as the mentally or physically ill and prostitutes. 
Restrictive powers were increased again in 1910, and financial clauses were added 
to the policy.54 Like Australia, Canada’s restrictive immigration policies focused on 
Asiatic migrants, particularly in the western territories, such as British Columbia. 
Xenophobic attitudes, especially towards Japanese migrants, reached a peak in the 
interwar years, as Japan gained in strength and as the deterioration of international 
relations more broadly threatened stability.55 As discussed above, historians have 
highlighted ‘indifference’, ‘hostility’ and the failure of the ‘humanitarian appeal’ to 
prompt a more liberal policy.56 Clearly, the racial identity of immigrants (and later 
refugees) was central to the restrictive nature of Canada’s immigration policy.57  
The Union of South Africa adopted restrictionist immigration policies from its 
inception in 1910. Laws such as the Immigrants’ Regulation Act (1933), the 
Immigration Quota Act (1930) and the Aliens Act (1937) all sought to restrict entry 
of immigrants to South Africa. The focus of these laws changed over time, reflecting 
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the shifting perceptions of whom was considered to be ‘undesirable’, from 
‘Asiatics’, Eastern Europeans and German Jews. The issue of immigration was 
heightened in South Africa because, unlike the other white settler Dominions, there 
was not a white majority. South Africa’s large black population meant that the 
government was keen to limit poor white migration in order to maintain existing 
racial hierarchies, even against the British desire to bolster ‘white British’ entry. 
Moreover, that the white population was not united, given the presence of British 
and Afrikaner groups, added to this issue.58 The importance of white identity and 
the tensions within it will be explored further in chapter three.  
Despite the fact that South Africa had a large, established Jewish community 
of over 40,000, a move towards nativism after the First World War was reflected in 
the 1930 Quota Act and set the tone for future policy. The change saw the ‘concept 
of “national origins” and its corollary, “assimilability” rather than individual merit’ 
become the criteria by which an immigrant’s application for entry was judged. The 
Act, with its distinction between countries of origin that required quotas and those 
that did not, placed Germany on the ‘scheduled’ list along with Britain, other 
Commonwealth countries and the US. By 1936, the number of German Jews looking 
to South Africa for refuge had significantly increased, and government and public 
attention once more turned to the issue. In response to this, the passing of the 
1937 Aliens Act was designed to ‘exclude’ German Jews.59 
The reception of Jewish refugees in South Africa was further complicated by 
the presence of several pro-Nazi, antisemitic and nationalistic political 
organisations. These groups provided a constant source of anti-Jewish propaganda, 
pushing their antisemitic agenda into the heart of mainstream politics. More 
generally, as Edna Bradlow argues, this translated into cultural differences being 
perceived in racial terms which only bolstered calls for restrictive policies. Although 
not presented in explicitly racist terms – arguments were often based on the view 
that South Africa had reached its absorptive capacity for Jewish settlers, particularly 
at a time of economic difficulty – views on race certainly impacted South Africa’s 
response to Jewish refugees. Indeed, the government used ‘unspecified and 
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subjective criteria’ in decisions over the suitability of immigrants, which were often 
based on race.60 
Although Asiatic, Southern European and Eastern European immigrants 
tended to be the main focus of anti-immigrant policy, the practices already in place 
were soon put to use when, during the refugee crisis, entry of unprecedented 
numbers of poor and desperate Jewish refugees became a real possibility. Dominion 
immigration practices highlight the ways in which liberalism shaped and directed 
policy. For example, immigration restrictions challenged the idea of equality for all. 
This in turn raised questions about imperial citizenship and the assumptions of 
liberal universalism. Moreover, Dominion immigration and refugee policies show a 
preference for responding to the crisis on an individual basis rather than 
collectively. Many argued that Jews were unsuited to assimilation and would 
therefore choose to maintain cultural and religious practices that separated them 
from full integration into their new country. In countries that were just establishing 
a measure of independence (and thereby national identity), this was a genuine 
concern and used to justify limited immigration. Race played a significant part in 
Dominion immigration laws and was essentially used a signifier of difference. The 
continuities and inconsistencies of Dominion policy were also present in the 
colonies and will be explored further below.  
The Dominion’s general immigration practices can be usefully contrasted with 
the 1922 Empire Settlement Act, a scheme that aimed: to ‘rectify demographic 
imbalances in Britain and the dominions’, reducing ‘domestic unemployment, over-
crowding, and discontent’; to supply ‘labor and wives for colonial populations’; and, 
as a result, to ‘increase trade and strengthen defense within the imperial system as 
a whole’.61 Under the Act, funding was provided for ‘land settlement schemes, 
assisted passages [and] training courses’. The scheme was renewed again in 1937, 
continuing in some form until the 1970s, and was ‘part of a greater imperial 
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economic and welfare strategy [...] [that] remained self-evident to many 
commentators in the United Kingdom between the wars’.62  
The precedent of the Empire Settlement Act, therefore, potentially played a 
role in the popularity of large-scale settlement options for Jewish refugees. 
However, that such schemes did not take place reveals much about the tensions of 
liberalism. For example, the white settlement which had been encouraged by the 
Empire Settlement Act had unforeseen consequences. While the Empire Settlement 
Act had indeed bolstered white settlement in the Dominions, these groups of 
settlers sometimes became so powerful that they threatened policy initiatives 
directed from Whitehall, including refugee settlement plans (see discussion of 
Northern Rhodesia below). Moreover, large-scale settlement of Jewish refugees 
was seen as something different to the settlement of British settlers by some (in 
South Africa, the right kind of white settler was important), and the issue seemed to 
heighten the fact that Jewish refugees were perceived to be unable to settle within 
established national cultures.  
COLONIAL REFUGEE SETTLEMENT SCHEMES AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM 
Generally, Britain’s tropical dependencies implemented restrictive immigration 
policies. These both mirrored and were dictated by Whitehall and, broadly, aimed 
to prevent the entry of persons who might become a financial burden on the local 
government. Colonial immigration practices were directed by the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act of 1865, which outlined that colonies could amend any constitution 
granted by the British government but only if these changes did not fundamentally 
challenge British law. Indeed, this practice ‘whereby Westminster could overturn 
colonial legislation that was “repugnant” to British practice, ultimately determined 
the foundation upon which colonial migration policy was framed’.63  
Immigration controls varied from territory to territory but did have general 
trends. For example, Kenya outlined in its 1927 Immigration Restriction Ordinance 
those who were to be denied entry, including people without ‘visible means of 
support who [are] likely to become a pauper or a public charge’, the sick or insane, 
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prostitutes, convicts and ‘[a]ny person deemed by the Immigration Officer to be an 
undesirable immigrant in consequence of information or advice received’. Financial 
requirements necessary to prove ‘visible means’ varied for different groups. For 
example, ‘a native of Asia or Africa’ was required ‘a sum of ten pounds or such 
other sum as the Governor in Council may from time to time order’. All other 
potential immigrants required ‘a sum of thirty-seven pounds ten shillings’.64 By 1930 
this sum was increased to fifty pounds and remained in place when many Jewish 
refugees sought entry in the colony after 1933.65 
By new immigration laws in 1936, Cyprus restricted the same categories as 
Kenya (e.g. the sick, insane, prostitutes and convicts). In addition to financial 
requirements of £1000 disposable capital (a sum that decreased according to an 
immigrant’s skill or trade), entry into Cyprus required a ‘passport bear[ing] a British 
Consular visa for the Colony’. More than this though, the immigration officer was 
given wide powers to attach ‘such conditions as he may think fit to the grant of 
permission to an alien to enter the Colony’. To this end, the Ordinance made it clear 
that ‘no alien shall have an absolute right to enter the colony without the 
permission of the Principal Immigration Officer’.66 
Similar trends were also evident in West Indian immigration laws. By 1931, no 
colonial governments required visas, and only four territories (Jamaica, the Leeward 
Islands, Trinidad and the Windward Islands) required passports for entry. However, 
like Kenya and Cyprus, financial deposits were demanded by West Indian colonial 
governments, and different sums were also outlined for British and non-British 
citizens. In the case of British Guiana, a $24 deposit was required for the former, 
while the latter had to deposit $96. Other colonies also had other requirements. For 
example, Jamaica required a literacy test from 1919. However, restrictions grew, 
and in 1933, as Hitler became chancellor in Germany, passports were required in all 
West Indian colonies (except the Bahamas), and for entry into Jamaica and British 
Honduras, visas were also required. Despite these general trends, over time and 
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across colonies, policies varied, and as such, ‘no colony [in the West Indies] had 
exactly the same requirements’.67 
In 1940, Colonial Secretary Lord Lloyd explained to Sir John Maybin, the 
Governor of Northern Rhodesia, that ‘[g]enerally speaking, the immigration laws of 
the African Colonial Dependencies have in the past been framed on liberal lines 
admitting any person who did not fall into one of the limited categories of 
prohibited immigrants’.68 However, in reality, the only liberal thing about the 
policies were their contradictions. The examples of immigration practices in Kenya 
and Cyprus (e.g. high financial requirements and, in the case of Cyprus, the need for 
a visa) show how central assimilation was to policy-makers. In Kenya, the 
differentiation made between African and Asian and all other immigrant groups 
shows that, like in the Dominions, race was used as a category of difference that 
also helped shape policy. The powers given to immigration agents demonstrates the 
importance attached to the controlled entry of selected migrants.  
In response to the refugee crisis, immigration to the colonies was 
conceptualised in two main ways: individual entry and large-scale settlements. The 
majority of those who found safety in the colonies managed to navigate 
immigration requirements like those set out above and entered the colonies as 
‘immigrants’. As will be discussed later in the chapter, the stories of those who 
entered in this way are varied and complex and were influenced by factors such as 
finance, luck and personal connections. However, it was the potential for large-scale 
settlement in the colonies that held particular appeal for refugee advocates, with 
many looking to the empire for places of potential settlement. Indeed, questions in 
the House of Commons by people such as Eleanor Rathbone and in the House of 
Lords by the Bishop of Chichester reflected what a Times editorial described as the 
‘impulsive humanitarian emotion’ which found many people, ‘after glancing at 
maps displaying the British colonies in the conventional red’, picking places for 
settlement but ignoring ‘the numerous factors essential to successful European 
colonization’.69  
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It was not just within Britain that the idea of re-settlement held sway. Eric T. 
Jennings argues that potential Jewish colonisation schemes were deeply rooted in 
the culture of European colonial powers, particularly in relation to Madagascar. 
Settlement schemes for Madagascar dated back to 1885, when Paul de Lagarde, a 
German antisemite, first proposed such an idea. The French, British, US, Polish and 
Japanese governments as well as some Zionist organisations also identified 
Madagascar as a place of potential settlement before the Nazis incorporated the 
island into their more genocidal plans when they gained the territory in June 
1940.70 
Obviously fundamentally different to the other European re-settlement plans, 
the Nazi ‘Madagascar Plan’ started by asking similar questions to those in the liberal 
democracies about the nature of Jewish people and how best to deal with them.71 
For example, an article in the Völkischer Beobachter, the newspaper and 
propaganda tool for the Nazi Party, as translated by Sir Ogilvie Forbes, the British 
Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin, claimed that ‘the whole world is beginning to recognize 
that the Jews are a race which cannot be assimilated’. The article continued: 
one must look round for a suitable territory which is not yet inhabited 
by Europeans. The possibility of Uganda was once seriously discussed, 
why not now consider giving them a large territory in Africa which 
would afford them scope for independent creative effort? Another 
possibility is Madagascar. The situation is serious and can only be dealt 
with [...] by those powers who possess gigantic territories [...] in the 
interests of all nations and also of the Jews themselves.72 
 
The report based its assumptions on the view that Jews could not be 
assimilated. Although to a lesser degree than the Nazis, assimilation was a genuine 
concern for British officials. Likewise, the inclusion of Jewish stereotypes, such as 
the reference to Jewish ‘creative effort’, played a part in British official assessments 
of possible colonisation plans and was evident in the way that refugee entry was 
ultimately connected to colonial development. 
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American officials, including President Roosevelt, also viewed re-settlement as 
a possible solution to the problem of Jewish refugees, and their plans reflected a 
similar desire to displace population or refugee concerns to other parts of the 
world. Roosevelt viewed re-settlement as vital to the postwar order as well as to 
the more pressing Jewish refugee crisis. To this end, Roosevelt created ‘Project M’ 
(for ‘migration’). Top geographers and other thinkers were put to work on the 
question of large-scale re-settlement during the war, and although it never 
generated concrete results, the creation of such a project is indicative of the wider 
interest in the subject. In respect to Jewish refugees, re-settlement plans included 
Angola (a Portuguese territory) and Latin American countries Brazil, Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Mexico. Even closer to home, settlement in Alaska was linked to the 
development of the territory and argued that settler refugees were needed as much 
as they needed a place of safety.73  
In Britain, re-settlement plans had been discussed for many years, but in 
1938, at the height of the refugee crisis, that government and refugee organisations 
(which the British government still relied on for financial support of such schemes) 
started to try and turn these long-standing ideas into reality. Organised settlement 
schemes offered some flexibility, as long as an external body was willing to take 
financial responsibility for the refugees and the refugees possessed key 
requirements for emigration, such as specific skills and finance. 
Illustrative of this interest in pursuing re-settlement options was the meeting 
between Anthony de Rothschild and J.E. Shuckburgh, the Deputy Permanent Under-
Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, in December 1938. Rothschild, as head of 
the Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees, an organisation representing all the 
important voluntary refugee organisations in the country, both Jewish and non-
Jewish, met with Shuckburgh to discuss settlement opportunities in Northern 
Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Nyasaland and Kenya. Although the government was still 
unwilling to provide substantial funding, Shuckburgh personally assured Rothschild 
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that ‘we are ready and willing at all times to render you every assistance in our 
power’, as the Colonial Office was ‘convinced that much more can be accomplished 
by direct contact between representatives of the voluntary organisations and the 
local Government authorities than by any number of despatches from here’.74 
Eventually a commission was established to visit these territories and assess their 
viability.75 Through these investigations, the cost of settlement was established, and 
it was found to be prohibitive (see below). 
Of course, this was just one of many such meetings (not to mention those that 
took place in the US), but it serves to highlight the reluctance of the Jewish agencies 
and the political considerations that went into settlement. Moreover, the nature of 
refugee policy (which amounted to immigration practices) was limited by prevailing 
conceptual schemas of the period, particularly liberalism.  
Large or small, agricultural or urban, colonial refugee settlement triggered 
unease among officials. An examination of three case-studies illuminates this 
further. Here, focus is given to those discussions of refugee settlement in schemes 
that were planned for Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and Cyprus. In the discussions 
prompted by settlement plans, questions were raised about whether the Jews were 
likely to cause problems on arrival, their ability to assimilate and whether special 
schemes were necessary, even in the face of Nazi persecution.  
KENYA 
The small-scale settlement of twenty-five agriculturalists planned for Kenya was the 
most advanced scheme for refugee settlement in any colony and provided the 
model for other suggested settlement schemes. It was presented at Évian as an 
example of the colonial contribution to the refugee crisis and represented many of 
the benefits offered by organized refugee settlement. It was well-funded, time was 
invested to ensure the suitability of candidates and it was designed specifically not 
to antagonize local opinion. However, it also met with many of the limitations 
imposed by liberal perceptions of the refugee problem. This section will explore the 
discussion around this small scheme and highlight two aspects: first, the emphasis 
on the assimilability of those refugees allowed entry; and second, how tensions 
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manifested themselves over the rights of Jews as a group and the right of entry for 
individual Jewish immigrants. 
Plans for small-scale agricultural settlement in Kenya were developed under 
the guidance and financial support of non-government organisations, specifically 
under the auspices of the Council for German Jewry and the British Fund. The 
scheme was designed to include twenty-five young German Jews, aged between 
eighteen and thirty. Over half of those selected were to be over twenty-five years of 
age, and among the whole group, five men were to be married. The men would be 
selected from a group who had already received agricultural training in Germany. It 
was planned that when those selected arrived in Kenya, they would receive a period 
of six to twelve months training on an already established farm before being settled 
in groups on five to six farms, with a married couple on each. The Plough Settlement 
Association (PSA) was established to provide finance for the cost of transport, 
training and maintenance, as well as the purchase of the necessary equipment to 
establish their own farms.76 The PSA was as successful as it was, perhaps, because it 
treated their activity as ‘a relief measure for German Jews’ rather than as a 
commercial endeavour, which made them keen to help as many refugees as 
possible.77 This contradicts Feingold’s argument that the ‘guarantee of profit’ was 
necessary for the success of re-settlement schemes and therefore suggests that a 
more nuanced understanding of the ideological context for success or failure of re-
settlement is necessary.78 
The careful and calculated formula of the numbers and types of potential 
Jewish settlers was a prerequisite for overcoming significant official concerns over 
assimilation. Governor Brooke-Popham, for example, objected to the creation of a 
‘Jewish enclave’. He instead insisted on ‘the carefully regulated influx of Jews of the 
right type – i.e. nordic from Germany or Austria [...] in small groups of a size not too 
large to become part of the general economic and social life of the community’.79  
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These concerns were a central motif that appeared time and again in the 
communications of colonial officials. In another example, MacDonald wrote to 
Brooke-Popham that: 
the success of the scheme and in particular for the retention of the 
goodwill of the existing settler community, [...] the farms on which these 
persons are to be settled should be selected in such a manner as to 
ensure as far as possible, the assimilation of the emigrants into the 
general social structure of the Colony. It is contemplated that when the 
thirty original settlers have become sufficiently established on their 
farms, they will be joined by other members of their families. It is not 
anticipated, however, that the total number of settlers, including the 
original thirty, will exceed 150, and there is no intention of forming a 
Jewish enclave in the Highlands.80 
 
Mirroring this language, Paskin, a colonial official who worked on the issue of land 
settlement in Kenya, wrote to the Secretary of the Central British Fund for German 
Jewry that:  
it is necessary for the success of the scheme that the farms on which 
these persons are to be settled should be selected in such a manner as 
to ensure as far as possible the assimilation of immigrants into the 
general social structure of the Colony, and that there is no intention of 
forming a Jewish enclave in the Highlands of Kenya.81 
 
These are just three of many examples that use the same or very similar 
language to express the need for the settlers to assimilate. This reflected concerns 
in Britain (and in Kenya) that Jews could create problems by maintaining 
differences. Even the repeated use of ‘enclave’ evokes the fact that Jews were 
believed to be ethnically or culturally distinct. 
To overcome official concerns about assimilation, the PSA also went to great 
lengths to individually select settlers to ensure their suitability for success. As well 
as a financial guarantee, officials were reassured that ‘the settlers who are to be 
sent to Kenya will be carefully selected with particular reference to their suitability 
for the purpose’.82 Lieutenant-Colonel Knaggs, a white settler and agent for the 
Kenya government in London, was sent to Germany to select refugees suitable for 
agricultural settlement (presumably as a gesture to official concerns as well as local 
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opinion).83 However, by November, problems had emerged. Colonel Knaggs 
reported to Paskin that ‘the candidates who had been selected to go to Kenya had 
been sent to a concentration camp, and that the documents relating to the scheme, 
including the list of selected candidates, had been impounded by the German 
authorities’.84 
Their release was eventually negotiated, but this meant that rather than being 
able to use German money for passage directly from Germany to Kenya, the 
refugees would need to be ‘brought to [Great Britain] and maintained at the 
expense of the Jewish Council until they can be provided with passage to Kenya’.85 
The realities of implementing even a small scheme meant that the Colonial Office 
was increasingly asked to compromise its own guidelines on immigration. Questions 
were therefore raised about how much of a compromise would be necessary should 
large-scale settlement schemes be pursued. Furthermore, the attention, time and 
resources given to the selection of suitable refugees highlights another central 
tenant of liberalism that impacted refugee policy: there was a tension between the 
need to help Jews as a persecuted group and the desire to ensure that individual 
entrants were ‘deserving’ (i.e. able to meet liberal expectations of assimilability and 
self-help).  
The tension between the individual and group identity of Jewish refugees was 
far from straightforward. The contradictory and complex nature of the ways that 
liberalism impacted attitudes towards Jews can be seen in the discourse that 
surrounded official discussions of Jewish people and agencies that organised 
settlement. Mr. Fletcher, ‘[t]he leading spirit amongst the Directors’ of the PSA, was 
described by Paskin as ‘a Jew, who changed his name from Fleicher, and went out 
to Kenya some years ago’.86 Fletcher, who was by all accounts an assimilated Jew 
who even Anglicised his name, was still identified as Jewish by Paskin. Jewish 
refugees could not receive special treatment as a group, but individuals were 
consistently identified as Jewish, even when assimilated. 
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While Paskin’s opinion of Fletcher was dictated by the latter’s belonging to a 
larger Jewish community, Hibbert noted when discussing the proposed expansion of 
the settlement scheme by the PSA in 1939 that ‘[t]he Jews have made their usual 
stupid mistake of taking the ell. If they had not opened their mouth so wide [...] it 
might have produced a different reaction from the Governor’.87 In this comment, 
Hibbert carelessly dismissed all Jewish people as problematic. Officials, expressing 
the contradictions of liberalism, could both refuse to make special allowances to 
help Jews as a group in need, and criticize, stereotype, and/or dismiss individuals or 
entire groups as problematic. 
Given the particularity of the colony, individual and group rights as well as 
questions of ‘deserving’ became especially complicated. The Spectator, a weekly 
publication with Conservative leanings, published the following editorial:  
There are two points of view to be considered: the good of the Jews, 
and the good of Kenya. As far as the Jews are concerned one might 
assume that any land is better than those which refuse to have them, 
and that as other Europeans live and make a living in Kenya, why should 
not they? Yet the problem is not as simple as all that. The present white 
inhabitants of Kenya have, so far, not been consulted in any way; under 
the Colonial Office system of Crown Colony government they are not 
likely to be given any say in a matter which concerns them very closely. 
 
The editorialist went on to ask:  
What exactly is meant by ‘the good of Kenya’? The good of the land; the 
native inhabitants; the white settlers; or the Indians of whom there are 
about 30,000? It is noteworthy that the East African Indian National 
Congress is opposed to any scheme for Jewish settlement and it has sent 
a memorandum to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. They are 
opposed obviously because they foresee increased competition in 
commerce and trade generally. They are permanent and bitter 
opponents of white settlement: behind them lies the immense influence 
of the India Office; the settlers have no backing.88 
 
This article points to another concern of officials: whether Jews were any 
more deserving of special rights or privileges than other groups, such as white 
settlers or Indian settlers. This issue was complex, especially in the colonial setting 
where politics (and conceptions of race) played into official understandings of who 
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was ‘deserving’ of help. That the article was included in official files reflects the fact 
that the issue was a live one and of public interest. The ramifications of this will be 
discussed more in the context of humanitarianism (chapter four). 
As well as understanding the attitudes that helped formulate policy, the 
centrality of liberalism to the ambiguities and ambivalence of policy is evident in 
records of refugee experience. The refugee testimony used in this thesis highlights 
examples of refugees who found safety in Kenya outside of organised settlement 
schemes and therefore had to navigate Kenya’s immigration laws themselves, 
including financial requirements as well as when immigration policies changed at 
short notice. In the cases of the Zweig, Berg and Bauer families, we are afforded the 
opportunity to see how different refugees navigated Kenya’s immigration laws with 
varying levels of success, and through this, the impact of liberal attitudes on 
refugees’ lived experiences.  
Walter Zweig, a Jewish legal professional from Breslau (now Wrocław) arrived 
in Kenya in early 1938. When Walter arrived, he could not speak any English and 
was unsuited to the agricultural work he was expected to undertake. Although he 
and his immediate family successfully found refuge in Kenya, they were not 
considered ‘desirable immigrants’. They had no financial resources and no specific 
skills that could benefit the colony, and as such, his stay in Kenya was fraught with 
challenges. Although the family found safety in the colony, other members of their 
extended family were not so fortunate. Zweig’s father, Max Zweig, did not initially 
wish to leave Germany. However, as the situation in Nazi-occupied Europe 
deteriorated, he too sought safety in the British Empire. Although Walter Zweig 
encouraged his father and sister to leave, he did not have the sufficient funds to 
help them fulfill the £50 immigration requirement for entry into Kenya. Max Zweig 
nonetheless sent a letter to the British Government in the hope he would be 
permitted to travel to meet his son: 
My son Walter Zweig, a former lawyer and public notary of Leobschutz 
in German Upper-Silesia, had as a jew [sic] to leave his country. He 
emigrated in February 1938 to Kenya and is since November 1938 
owner of a farm in Eldoret. Because he is not yet allowed to request my 
coming to him at present, I request your Excellency to grant me a visa 
for entering Kenya without being obliged to depose money there. Being 
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a lonely man, I ask your Excellency to help me to see my only son who is 
in the position to care for my living there.89 
 
The Colonial Office response acknowledged Max Zweig’s desire to see his son 
but offered no practical help. He was advised to contact the Government of Kenya, 
but as he did not have sufficient resources, he was unable to find safety with his son 
in Kenya. There is no indication that Walter Zweig knew about his father’s 
correspondence with the Colonial Office. He only learnt of his father’s fate after the 
war. A friend wrote to tell him that his father had died at the hands of the SS when 
they beat him in the street.90 What this personal tragedy illustrates is that the 
individual entry of refugees remained based on the individual refugee’s ability to 
fulfil immigration requirements. Access was based on immigration regulations, 
rather than refugee policy, and individuals were often denied entry despite need, 
especially where there was no individual or agency willing to advocate or provide 
financial assistance for them. 
The Berg family managed to escape in much larger numbers, mostly due to 
the fact that they had financial resources outside of Germany which could pay for 
the visas and deposits required for entry. In fact, the Bergs’ close-knit, observant 
Jewish family managed to escape almost intact. Already successful farmers in 
Cologne, the family were able to translate this to Kenya, where they took up cattle 
farming. They arrived in the colony with skills that could be directly applied in the 
colonial agricultural setting, and they went on to own a 375-acre farm in Limuru and 
an additional 125 acres about eight miles to the south in Muguga.91 Although they 
did not stay in Kenya after the war, Jill Pauly recalls that her father had been happy 
there, and both Jill and her sister Inge recall positive memories of life on the farm. 
The Bergs were ‘desirable’ immigrants, and their adaptation to life in the colony is 
suggestive of this. The Bergs had financial means and valued skills and sought entry 
on that basis rather than solely as refugees. This, along with a helpful dose of luck, 
meant that the family found safety in Kenya. Although with a more positive 
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outcome than the Zweigs, the experiences of the Berg family once again illustrates 
the influence of liberalism in action in refugee and immigration policy. 
Heinz Bauer’s family’s experiences highlight the way that the restrictions in 
immigration practices could be navigated by refugees, particularly when others 
could provide financial help or advocacy. Heinz and his brother’s departure was 
initially made possible by the assistance of an English patient of their father who 
helped guarantee their entry to Kenya. During their journey, via Paris and London, 
they received more help, this time from a family friend who provided funding for 
their parents’ eventual emigration to Kenya. On arrival in Kenya, Jewish benefactors 
provided finance and employment. The family were eventually reunited in Kenya 
after Heinz’s parents and future wife made it safely to Kenya with the help of 
government and consular officials. In his memoir, Bauer even defends the financial 
requirements of Kenya’s immigration policy: ‘[b]ut, to be quite fair, without their 
knowing what kind of people we were, such misgivings were somewhat 
understandable’.92 Bauer also praised the post-immigration experienced: ‘[o]nce a 
refugee was a legal resident of Kenya [...] no distinction was made between [them] 
and any other immigrant’. He also said: ‘We were all given an equal and fair chance 
which is much to the credit of the British’.  
The Bergs were successful agriculturalists and the type of settlers who were 
tolerable for the British. The Zweigs, on the other hand, were the kind of 
problematic settlers the British feared. This is made clear by the fact that Walter 
Zweig struggled to find the stability and success he sought and that his father was 
denied entry to the colony on economic grounds. Heinz Bauer’s age and the good 
fortune he had in receiving help at the most desperate of times shaped his 
experiences. However, he again found most success when he adapted to the 
preferred role of agriculturalist. The immigration laws in place in Kenya favoured 
self-sufficient individuals who were able to find employment in the established 
racial hierarchies of the colony. Liberal attitudes, as well as race, helped make these 
traits central to the success of refugee colonial settlement.  
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 NORTHERN RHODESIA 
While Kenya was the location of the most advanced settlement scheme, Northern 
Rhodesia was also frequently mentioned during discussions of potential refugee 
settlement. Unlike Kenya, which was categorized by the 1923 Devonshire 
Declaration officially as a future black state (thereby limiting white settler interests 
and power), Northern Rhodesia was involved in contentious debates about its racial 
future, specifically regarding closer union with Southern Rhodesia and even 
Nyasaland. At this time, Southern Rhodesia was led by a white settler government, 
and many wanted this same privilege for settlers in Northern Rhodesia. Henry J. 
Antkiewicz argues that Southern Rhodesia prided itself on being, unlike South 
Africa, ‘untainted by Afrikaanerdom’. Similar aspirations were evident in Northern 
Rhodesia.93 Therefore, white settlement of anyone other than British people would 
have been potentially unpopular. It was in this context that possible Jewish refugee 
settlement was discussed and the place of liberal ideas, including assimilation, in 
the construction of refugee policy are shown in their full complexity.  
The possibility of settlement in Northern Rhodesia was first raised at a 
meeting between Parkinson and Sir Hubert Young, the former governor of Northern 
Rhodesia in May 1938. After this meeting, Parkinson reflected, ‘[o]ur ideas as to 
large scale Jewish settlement in the Colonial Empire may have to be revised’. Young 
had indicated that ‘there was room for a very large number of Jewish refugees to be 
settled in the north-western part of Northern Rhodesia on Crown land where there 
are very, very few natives’. Parkinson explained: 
We shall have to take this seriously. If it should be possible for the 
British Government to offer a home to Jewish refugees in large numbers 
in N[orthern] Rhodesia, it would be a splendid gesture, and I have no 
doubt that from the political, as well as the humanitarian point of view 
the S[ecretary]of S[tate] would welcome it.94  
 
Despite his optimistic posturing to Parkinson, Young had previously ‘rejected 
the possibility’ of settling around 10,000 Assyrian refugees on ‘geographical, 
climatic, economic and political grounds’.95 Assyrian refugees (from areas of 
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modern-day Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria) had also sought safety across the empire 
earlier in the 1930s. Antkiewicz explains that the Assyrians ‘were Asiatics and would 
not be welcome’.96 Although this definition is certainly open to debate, it does 
touch on the fact that Asiatic, particularly Indian settlers, were also considered to 
be problematic. Regarding Young’s suggestion for Jewish settlement, Hibbert wryly 
observed, ‘I cannot help feeling that it is very doubtful whether Sir. H. Young would 
have made his suggestions had he been returning to Northern Rhodesia as 
Governor!’97 
Following Young’s suggestion, in June 1938 the Acting Governor was asked 
about the possibilities of settlement in the Mwinilunga district of Northern 
Rhodesia, to which he responded that around 500 families could possibly be 
accommodated. However, as he felt that the plan was likely to be unpopular with 
the local European community, he asked to seek the opinion of the representatives 
of the local white population, known as ‘unofficials’, on the issue of refugee 
settlement.98 Although officials in Whitehall hoped that settlement options in 
Northern Rhodesia could be mentioned at Évian, where it was felt that it would be 
‘at least desirable that [Britain] should have made specific enquiry of these two 
territories which are most likely [...] to suggest themselves to others as possible 
places for settlement’, a response was not received in time for its inclusion.99 
Moreover, when a response was received, it was, unsurprisingly, negative. The 
unofficial element rejected even small-scale settlement based on subsistence 
farming for reasons including the concern that that Jewish refugee settlers would 
soon abandon farming and present competition in trade or on the labour market (a 
similar fear to that held by Brooke-Popham in Kenya).100 
Although it seemed that white settler opinion had stopped plans for Jewish 
settlement, Hibbert wrote a compelling minute in August 1938, observing that 
‘some of the papers’ on file: 
might convey the impression that some of us here also think it is dead, 
and are possibly glad to think so. I do not think it is dead, and I will 
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prophesy that in a very short time [w]e shall be subjected again to very 
heavy pressure to try and do more than we have done towards finding a 
partial solution of the dreadful German Jewish refugee problem within 
the Colonial Empire.101  
Hibbert was proved to be right, and as events deteriorated in Europe in the autumn 
of 1938, attention once more turned to Northern Rhodesia. In fact, just five days 
after the events of Kristallnacht, colonial officials were specifically requested by 
MacDonald to communicate with colonial territories including Northern Rhodesia 
about the settlement of Jewish refugees.102  
In December 1938, a meeting between Shuckburgh and Rothschild about 
refugee settlement in the empire brought Northern Rhodesia once more to the 
fore. Before the meeting, Shuckburgh had written to Rothschild explaining that ‘the 
Governor has set up a local committee to examine the possibility of small-scale 
settlement’ based on ‘the settlement in the first instance of a small number of 
trained refugee agriculturalists’, with final numbers of settlers reaching only about 
150 persons. The Colonial Office, however, pushed for the investigation of options 
for more significant settlement and to this end wanted to establish a committee to 
investigate the possibilities of settlement, an ‘exercise of considerable tact’ given 
the ‘great apprehension’ expressed by the local settler community.103 
Despite concerns over the cost of investigations, it was finally agreed that a 
commission would be sent to Northern Rhodesia on 29 April 1939 to investigate 
possibilities of settlement there.104 The commission, headed by Sir James Dunnett, a 
retired member of the Indian Civil Service, was made up of six people, including a 
settler from Northern Rhodesia called Hector Croad and a retired provincial 
Commissioner for the Northern Province.105 The inclusion of a settler voice was 
undoubtedly a concession made to the powerful white settler community in the 
colony, which remained opposed to even the investigation of settlement. 
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After the Commission visited Northern Rhodesia, it reported that ‘the capital 
cost involved was so high that it would prohibit the refugee organisations from 
considering the schemes at all.’ It was explained that ‘the resources at their disposal 
could not spare funds of the order of half a million pounds to settle some four to 
five hundred refugees and their wives and children’.106 The report outlined that 
settlers in Northern Rhodesia would need at least £120 a year to survive. Without 
this money, the likelihood of successful settlement was considered to be small. 
African expert Lord Hailey warned against ‘the introduction of a “poor white” 
community’.107 This was generally agreed, particularly as there was already such a 
problem ‘among Afrikaner small-holders [...] half of whose children were said to be 
malnourished’.108 For those who wanted increased power for white settlers, it was 
necessary to bolster the territory with the right kind of white settler. Jews, 
particularly impoverished, persecuted refugees, were not deemed to be suitable 
based on their stereotyped inability to assimilate.  
Due to the negative findings of the Commission’s report, particularly in regard 
to the cost of settlement, Rothschild’s refugee organisation asked that a proposed 
White Paper of the findings not be published. They viewed it as a ‘grave mistake’, as 
‘it might encourage’ other countries where settlement schemes could be carried 
out at a cheaper cost to inflate their estimates in order to ensure that refugee 
settlement did not take place.109 Ultimately, the Colonial Office agreed, which 
suggests that they had some sensitivity to the difficulty of the situation for the 
refugee organizations. 
The importance attached to funding by external bodies must also be 
understood as a manifestation of the limits of liberalism. In May 1938, Lieutenant-
Colonel Acland-Troyte, MP for Tiverton, asked during a discussion of the refugee 
problem ‘Why should we give away public money on these refugees from other 
countries?’ Many questioned why refugees, let alone Jewish refugees, were more 
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deserving of money than other groups in need, including the unemployed in Britain 
itself.110 
The opinions expressed about Jewish settlement in Northern Rhodesia 
between May 1938 and August 1939 provide clear evidence of the way that 
liberalism helped shape refugee entry into the colony. In this regard, the presence 
and influence of the powerful white settler community is key. Despite the hopes of 
the British government in London and others such as Coudenhove-Kalergi (who had 
suggested in his statement at Évian that colonial settlement by Jewish refugees 
‘would have the advantage of developing the natural riches of Rhodesia and 
securing this promising country for the white race’), the settlement of Jewish 
refugees remained limited largely because it threatened local opinion.111 Indeed, 
the powerful white settler community argued that ‘[y]ou have always told us that 
[Northern] Rhodesia is a black man’s country and that that is the reason why we 
cannot be allowed to dominate it. How can you reconcile this with an attempt to 
impose white settlement on the country?’112 
The debate was taken up by Sir Leopold Moore, who raised the issue in July 
1938 while giving a speech at an agricultural show in Southern Rhodesia. In his 
speech, he exaggerated details of the settlement plans under discussion, claiming 
that up to 500 refugees were to be settled. He also argued that Jews would 
ultimately enter Southern Rhodesia, ‘owning this farming country, running 
businesses and banks and no one could live very long here’. This reveals the 
underlying racial perceptions of Jews not just as potentially unassimilable but as an 
overt threat. This was also, of course, in complete opposition to the concern that 
Jewish refugees would add to the ‘poor white’ problem. The contradictory images 
show how within a liberal context, Jews could be viewed as a threat because of 
their perceived abilities and/or because of their refugee status. More often than 
not, group stereotypes abounded despite the reluctance to respond to refugees as 
a group in need.  
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Although the white settler community was able to impact the scope of action 
taken towards Jewish refugees, this did not go unnoticed by Whitehall. For 
example, Parkinson minuted that ‘[t]he position is unfortunate, but I do not think 
we can allow ourselves to be deterred by these Unofficials. We really must do 
something for these Jews, and if we are going to be stopped by every outcry of this 
kind, we shall never get anywhere. But we must proceed cautiously’.113 Likewise, 
Hibbert minuted that ‘I trust that we shall not allow ourselves to be too much 
swayed by the opinions of the Unofficials in Northern Rhodesia and of their double-
faced leader [Sir Leopold Moore]’. 114 Parkinson and Hibbert expressed, first and 
foremost, a general frustration with problematic white settlers. However, it is clear 
that while Jewish refugee needs consistently lost to the needs of local colonial 
peoples (see chapter four), the decision-making process was less clear cut in the 
case of white settlers and refugees. 
Nonetheless, settlement remained limited. Figures from the South African 
Board of Deputies estimated that only 230 German Jewish refugees found refuge in 
Northern Rhodesia between 1937 and 1939. Taking into account other estimates by 
the Chief Immigration Officer, Macmillan and Shapiro place the number of refugees 
who entered Northern Rhodesia by early 1940 at between 250 and 300.115 Clearly, 
in Northern Rhodesia the tensions within liberalism mixed almost seamlessly with 
those of race. By unpacking these problems around Jewish settlement, both here 
and in subsequent chapters, the reasons behind restrictive, limited policies become 
clearer, illuminating not just that re-settlement schemes failed but also why.  
CYPRUS 
Cyprus was a small, strategically important colony in the Mediterranean Sea. As a 
result of its proximity to Palestine, it received unprecedented interest as a 
destination for Jewish settlement. An examination of this territory – where political 
issues were as much international as domestic and where British rule was more 
actively challenged in the interwar years than in Africa – offers another view of the 
contradictions of liberalism and the ways in which they limited Jewish settlement. In 
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the interwar years, the colonial government was challenged by a rise in tensions 
between those parties on the island seeking enosis (union with Greece) as well as a 
rise in communist activities led by parties such as the communist Progressive Party 
of Working People (AKEL).116 In 1931, as a result of these tensions (which climaxed 
in the form of a small revolt and the burning down of Government House), the 
Governor abolished the Legislative Council and instead worked with an advisory 
Executive Council, made up of the Colonial Secretary, the Commissioner of Nicosia, 
the Attorney General and the Treasurer (official members) and three non-official 
members who were nominated by the Governor. This meant that ‘there was no real 
representative organ on the island’.117 Therefore, settlement questions were based 
largely on official views of the situation, and the international dimension of Cypriot 
politics ensured that a conservative and limited response developed. 
Although the Foreign Office was keen to pursue opportunities of settlement 
on the island for larger geopolitical reasons, the Colonial Office viewed these in a 
more limited way because of local political concerns. Indeed, the political 
ramifications of large-scale Jewish entry into Mediterranean territories were 
frequently discussed in the Colonial Office, which felt that prioritising refugee needs 
would be to ‘rob Peter to pay Paul’ – that is to say, aiding refugees would cause 
difficulties and tensions with the Cypriots.118 In response to questions about 
possible refugee settlement, the Governor responded: ‘I cannot understand why it 
should be supposed that there is room in Cyprus for refugees. There is no room and 
I am sure you will agree that we should not attempt to remedy one injustice, 
however great, by creating another one’.119 Indeed, even small-scale agricultural 
schemes were rejected because it was felt that ‘to facilitate land settlement in 
Cyprus in any form [would] forfeit the respect of the Cypriots forever’.120 The 
Governor also expressed his fear that refugee settlement ‘for reasons however 
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excellent, which are of no interest to Cyprus[,] could not fail to assist’ the political 
unrest which was ever-present over issues such as enosis. 
Although ‘one or two newspapers took the view that an influx of capital and 
skilled labour would be a valuable accession of economic strength to the Colony, 
the traditional opposition to the settlement of foreigners in Cyprus was 
predominant’.121 While Williams noted the ‘Cypriot prejudice against the Jews’, 
Hibbert responded with a hand-written note that ‘[s]o has nearly everybody else’, 
highlighting the general tension over Jewish settlement across the empire.122 
Moreover, this exchange reflects the frustration of those officials working closely on 
the issue, that an indigenous dislike of Jews was so frequently given as a reason for 
not exploring settlement plans.  
Local prejudices and the fear engendered by the prospect of mass Jewish 
settlement were particularly relevant to Cyprus because of its proximity to 
Palestine. This was recognised by officials who argued that ‘with the tragic example 
of Palestine so near their eyes who can blame the Cypriots for feelings of disquiet at 
anything which they can construe as the thin edge of the wedge’.123 This alluded to 
the fact that Jewish immigration to Palestine had continued to increase and to 
cause many problems – problems that Cypriots did not want repeated in their own 
country. Moreover, Jewish entry into Palestine, especially after the 1939 White 
Paper, represented many of the liberal concerns officials had with Jewish refugee 
entry: levels of Jewish immigration had been so high that assimilation was not 
possible; the mass movement of Jews to Palestine heightened the negative 
connotations of Jews as a group; and illegal immigration highlighted for many that 
Jews were not deserving of special treatment. Many in the government, including 
high profile figures such as Ernst Bevin, viewed Palestine and illegal immigrants 
negatively, taking the position that Jews should not be allowed to circumnavigate 
immigration practices in place (see chapter four).  
Like many other colonies, immigration laws were amended in Cyprus to 
increase control. As in Britain, these largely focused on the requirement of a return 
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visa from the country of origin, which was difficult (if not impossible) for stateless 
refugees. There were also certain capital requirements to protect the colony from 
accepting refugees who were unable to leave and unable to support themselves. 
Governor Palmer tried to gain further control over immigration procedures by 
requesting the ability ‘to exclude persons, who on economic or other grounds, 
would not be suitable immigrants’. Although there was concern in London that this 
‘might lead to unfair discrimination’, it was, overall, deemed to be necessary.124 One 
Colonial Office official minuted:  
If a special regulation is needed to ensure this, I certainly think that 
there could be no grounds on which we could withhold approval of the 
Governor’s proposal. It would be an intolerable situation if he had no 
power to exclude from the Colony any person who happened to be able 
to comply with the regulations as regards the possession of capital.125 
 
Such statements highlight that the Jewishness of the refugees was a central 
issue. Even if refugees could comply with the standard immigration requirements, 
they could still be labeled ‘undesirable’ because of who they were: in this case, 
Jews. This was also linked to the reassurance that Palmer would not be pressed ‘to 
consent to a degree of immigration which would be contrary to the general welfare 
of the colony and its inhabitants, whose interests must be the primary 
consideration’.126 Like the laws produced in Australia which allowed for the 
discrimination of Jews by less overt means, giving Palmer the right to veto entry 
took immigration practices outside legal precedents and into the subjective power 
of the Governor. It was another way of asserting that the needs of Jews as a 
persecuted group could not and would not be prioritised above those of local 
inhabitants. 
An examination of one man’s recollections of refuge in Cyprus offers insight 
into the lived experience of British colonial policy and the limits of liberalism in the 
specific context of the Mediterranean territory. Frederik Wohl entered Cyprus after 
having been forced to leave Greece at the end of 1938 because the Greek 
government refused to renew the family’s residence permits. Wohl recalls: 
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The four of us, my parents, my sister and I, we went from one foreign 
consulate to the other in Athens to try and get a place to [...] go to. And 
this was quite difficult. We once thought we had a, we thought to go to 
Paraguay but when we went to buy steamship tickets, we found out 
that that consul was only an honorary consul, and wasn’t supposed to 
give visas out and after some difficulty we got half our money back.127 
 
Eventually, the Wohl family found safe passage to Cyprus, in part because of 
his father’s connection with the Free Masons. They also benefited from the fact that 
Frederik’s mother was related to Walther Rathenau, the Foreign Minister in the 
Weimar Republic and wealthy industrialist who was assassinated in 1922. A man at 
the British Embassy told the Wohls that they ‘could proceed [to] any place in the 
British Empire we wanted to go, provided we had the means to do so’. Therefore, as 
Wohl explains, the: 
Closest place was the island of Cyprus; but Cyprus required for anyone 
who came there one thousand pounds to show in cash. We didn’t have 
that kind of money. So the British Ambassador in Athens caused them to 
reduce this amount to a thousand pounds for the whole family [...] 
which was very nice. The only drawback was that we didn’t have the 
thousand pounds. And I managed to go to the two main employers I 
had, and I borrowed from each one five hundred pounds in Greek 
money. So we put that on an account in Cyprus [...] Half a year later, I 
could send them the money back [...] [W]ithout the help from the British 
Ambassador I don’t know what would have happened.128 
 
Although the family eventually entered Cyprus in March 1939, it is important 
to note that the initial permission to enter the colony was still based on the 
fulfilment of standard immigration requirements, despite the family’s obvious 
difficulties. However, by virtue of the father’s Free Mason connections and 
illustrious family history, they were considered to be ‘deserving’ refugees by the 
unknown British official. 
Immigration practices were often more flexible at an individual level, 
especially when someone within government or with influence was prepared to 
help. The nature of liberalism preferred this kind of movement of people, and this 
was therefore the most successful way Jewish refugees entered various colonies. 
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Moreover, personal intervention is again evidence of the contradictions within 
liberal society. Many people were happy to vouch for or financially aid Jewish 
people whom they knew or to whom they were connected. The same generosity 
was offered much less often in cases of larger schemes, when questions of 
assimilation and rights came into play.129 
Friedrich and Minna Burstein and their two-year-old baby were not as 
fortunate in their experiences as the Wohl family. As Czechoslovakian Jews, they 
had been forced to leave Istanbul as a result of the German annexation of 
Czechoslovakia in 1939. Their story came to the attention of the British Colonial 
Office after it was recounted to Barlow, a colonial official, by Mrs Marianne Fisher, a 
relative of the Burstein family. When the Bursteins left Istanbul, they had been 
informed ‘at the English Consulate that they would be allowed to disembark at 
Cyprus and that it was not necessary for them to have a visa’. They knew that 
Cyprus was set to introduce a visa requirement for all Czechoslovakian nationals 
from 1 April, so they planned to arrive in Cyprus before this date. However, Barlow 
noted, ‘they were not allowed to land at Cyprus, and are still on board the ship, as it 
seems that no authorities anywhere will allow them to land’.130 
An investigation found that the Bursteins had ‘informed the immigration 
officer that they were “seeking refuge” in Cyprus and he was therefore justified in 
not regarding them as “bone fide” travellers’.131 It was decided that the decision of 
the immigration officer was to be upheld. As the Governor of Cyprus explained:  
Owing to [the] changed regime in Czecho-Slovakia the principal 
Immigration Officer on the 20th March instructed all Immigration 
Officers to exercise special care in examining the bone fides of all 
Czecho-Slovakian nationals seeking to enter Cyprus as travellers and to 
guard against attempts to enter Cyprus by all such persons of Refugee 
class who had not obtained prior authorisation to reside in Cyprus and 
whose admission would render this Government responsible for 
permanent asylum.132  
 
After establishing the immigration officer was not legally at fault, it was accepted 
that the Bursteins had no case for entry, and the file pertaining to the couple does 
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not suggest that they were allowed to enter Cyprus. In this case, the personal plea 
of a family member was not enough to aid the family, and they were ultimately 
denied refuge because they did not meet the requirements of the Cyprus 
immigration legislation.  
*** 
This chapter has shown that the inherent contradictions and complexity of 
‘liberalism’ contributed to the limited nature of the British response. In the 
examples from Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and Cyprus, the concern with assimilation 
was paramount in defining immigration practices. Moreover, few exceptions were 
made for refugees simply because they were in need of help. Plans for large-scale 
entry were often played down as they would have gone against both of these key 
liberal concerns. This meant that in most cases, limited or individual entry was the 
only means of finding refuge in the colonies.  
 As discussed earlier in the chapter in the context of the PSA settlement 
scheme in Kenya, Feingold argues: 
the creation of such projects depended in the long run not on 
humanitarian sentiments, of which there were precious little in the 
world in the thirties, but on the promise of returns on capital 
investments. Had it been possible to guarantee a profit and harness the 
forces of the market, resettlement havens might have materialized 
more rapidly and in greater numbers.133 
 
Of course, re-settlement had to offer specific gains in order to win support, 
but as this chapter has shown, the reality was more complex than financial gain. As 
the following chapters will show, race also played a role in the perceptions of Jewish 
assimilability, and much more besides. ‘Humanitarian sentiments’, which Feingold 
identifies as lacking, can more helpfully be viewed as a clash of humanitarianisms. 
Finally, in colonial contexts, re-settlement plans were also connected to colonial 
development through the money and/or skills of refugees (see chapter five). 
Then, as now, ‘immigration’ is closely connected to ideas of toleration and 
liberalism. Practically, immigration policy also feeds into pragmatic considerations 
of the wider social, political and economic context, as well as the perceived limits on 
the possible by policy-makers and public opinion. These various influences manifest 
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themselves in the wide-ranging language we have to discuss the subject. Indeed, 
the terms ‘refugee’, ‘immigrant’, ‘displaced person’ and ‘asylum seeker’ remain 
politically loaded and are selected to best convey meaning other than the simple 
status of an individual who wishes to cross an international border. In the interwar 
years, the terms used to describe those Jewish people who sought, or indeed 
obtained, entry into the colonies supported and affirmed British and, specifically, 
colonial agendas. Generally, Jewish refugees had to fulfill immigration laws to enter 
a colony and were therefore defined as such. Exceptions could only be made when 
Jewish refugees had either useful skills or substantial assets. Then, their ‘refugee’ 
status could be used as a justification for changes in policies. These terms allowed 
officials to take different action according to their assessment of the benefits, or 
not, of entry and are revealing of the limits of liberalism, both in terms of Britain’s 
response to the Holocaust but also more generally in the interwar period. 
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Chapter Three: 
A Question of Race?: Colonial Policy, Race and Jewish Refugees 
 
The restrictions, prioritisations and contradictions inherent in the liberal democratic 
response to refugees were also significantly influenced by colonial officials’ 
perceptions of race. The relative importance of race to imperial policy-making has 
been debated by historians; this study takes the position that race was a central 
ideological framework in which policy was formed.1 This chapter will chart racial 
perceptions and consider their impact through an assessment of three case-studies: 
land settlement policies in Kenya; wartime internment of enemy aliens; and the 
refugee experience and engagement with colonial racial hierarchies.  
Identifying race as a central conceptual framework through which colonial 
officials viewed policy issues raises questions about whether the Colonial Office was 
an overtly, or wholly, racist institution. Historians such as Barbara Bush have argued 
that it was, stating that ‘[r]acism and imperialism have always been inseparable, 
although the nature and expression of racism has changed over time in form and 
content’. Bush also quotes Jan Nederveen Pietersie, who argues that ‘[r]acism is the 
psychology of imperialism, the spirit of empire, because racism supplies the 
element that makes for the righteousness of empire. Hence racism is not simply a 
byproduct of empire, but [...] part of the intestines of empire’.2 
In contrast, Ronald Hyam argues that in the British imperial context, it is ‘more 
satisfactory to distinguish between “racism” and “racial prejudice”’. The former 
term, ‘racism’, he restricts to ‘the abnormal systemisation of racial prejudice into 
institutionalised (legalised) discrimination or exploitation’.3 Hyam highlights that the 
aim of the empire was not ‘racial domination per se, but geopolitical security or 
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commercial profit’.4 Similarly, Michael Adas warns ‘against making racism the 
ideological essence of imperialism’.5 In regard to questions of citizenship, Daniel 
Gorman also suggests that racial restrictions were not the de facto aim of the 
government, but rather the means by which they sought to pursue imperial unity.6  
More specifically, this study makes distinctions between different motivations 
and manifestations of racial prejudice. Frank Füredi argues that the exact ‘role of 
racial calculations in twentieth-century international relations is hard to determine. 
It remains an unexplored subject, one that is rarely discussed as a problem in its 
own right’. Problems in the assessment of racial thinking revolve around the 
difference between what attitudes were privately felt and how this was altered or 
changed for public consumption.7 Another problem, as Wolton puts it, is 
understanding ‘what is not said’. Wolton continues, ‘the mainstream position is 
often taken to be common sense by those of the period’, and ‘[t]herefore they have 
no need to argue for something that is agreed by all sides’.8 This study makes a 
distinction, as outlined by Hyam, that ‘[i]n assessing what – if anything – “racial 
prejudice” as a cultural phenomenon might mean in practice, we need to 
distinguish between words and actions, ideas and their implementation’.9 
Hyam’s distinctions point to the fact that officials did not fall into binary 
categories of ‘racist’ or ‘not racist’, imploring us to seek a more nuanced 
understanding of the way that race functioned in policy-making. Therefore, in this 
study, a distinction will be made between institutionalised racism and racism 
manifest in thinking, in the formulation and implementation of policy and in the 
ways in which the world of the 1930s was understood by officials at the Colonial 
Office. 
Importantly, the use of the term ‘racism’ only emerged in the interwar period. 
Studies in the 1920s responding specifically to the actions of the Nazis brought the 
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term into common usage.10 Although this, in some regards, makes any discussion of 
‘racism’ in this study anachronistic, it can still be a useful analytical tool. Moreover, 
even before the term ‘racism’ came into use, other language had developed to 
delineate between racial groups, including ‘native’, ‘coloured person’ and ‘non-
European’. Differences between groups were understood and responded to. 
According to Lorimer, while a more optimistic focus on the ‘civilizing mission’ and a 
belief in assimilation changed in the late nineteenth century into a more pessimistic 
racial discourse that permanently separated ‘white virtues’ from colonial ‘others’, 
race and race differences have long informed official and intellectual thinking and, 
as such, impacted policy.11 
In 1997, George M. Fredrickson defined ‘the essence of racism as ethnicity 
made hierarchical, or in other words, making difference invidious and 
disadvantageous though the application of power’.12 In the context of my thesis, 
this relates to the idea that British officials viewed different ‘others’ in a hierarchical 
way. Officials, from their position of power, based policy decisions on their 
understanding of different groups and how they ranked against each other. The 
position they assigned different groups was based on wider social, economic, 
cultural and political factors and consequently was not static. In this study, racial 
perceptions provided the lens through which many colonial officials operated. 
However, this was not necessarily a manifestation of an overtly racist policy which 
had discrimination as its aim; as such, this study will adopt the terms ‘racial 
prejudice’ or ‘racial perceptions’ to describe the attitudes of many officials. As 
Fredrickson contends, ‘[t]he story of racism in the twentieth century is one story 
with several subplots rather than merely a collection of tales that share a common 
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theme’.13 This chapter focuses on the ‘subplot’ of interwar British imperial attitudes 
towards race in the formulation of colonial refugee policy. 
Racial thinking was a central part of the ‘intellectual climate’ in the 1930s. 
Indeed, ‘[i]mportant characteristics were attached to racial differences and the view 
that some races were superior assumed the status of self-evident truth’.14 These 
differences were often discussed in terms that included large generalisations and 
the use of stereotypes. Such stereotypes had been firmly established in popular 
culture, not least through a host of World Fairs and Great Exhibitions, including 
notable examples in Britain such as the Crystal Palace Great Exhibition in 1851 and 
the British Empire Exhibition at Wembley in 1924-1925. These events attracted six 
million and twenty-seven million visitors respectively and undoubtedly perpetuated 
stereotyped views of the empire and its inhabitants.15 Race also provided an 
important framework for assessing the perceived problems of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, including population control, hospitals, welfare 
provisions and education. This is evidenced in the popularity of eugenicist ideas 
across a broad spectrum of political, social and economic groups. It is also 
important to note that the connection between race and social problems was not 
just a domestic concern, but also one that featured in colonial policy discussions 
(see below).16 
In the colonial context, ‘natives’ were often seen as savage and dangerous but 
also in need of guidance. Racial thinking helped to frame the official responses to 
both these concerns. Limited, childlike qualities were often attributed to indigenous 
populations in some officials’ descriptions. For example, Sir Harry Luke, the High 
Commissioner of Fiji, wrote to Sir Harry Batterbee, the High Commissioner in New 
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Zealand, in July 1939, describing his encounter with the indigenous populations: 
‘The natives [...] range from quiet, mission-educated people to wild and almost 
naked people of the lowest type, who have never been brought under 
administration, are still engaged in inter-tribal wars and often have never seen a 
white man’.17 The duality of the official view of the ‘native’ – as both able to be 
educated and savage – is clear in Batterbee’s observations. Moreover, it highlights 
that ‘white’ was seen as the civilising factor. However, it was the duality of official 
views, and an attempt to respond to both of these, that defined the nature of 
British colonial governance as they sought to both develop and control colonial (and 
racial) ‘others’. 
Evolving understandings of colonial development in the interwar years 
marked a change in Colonial Office perceptions of and its relationship to the people 
it ruled. However, the changes that were envisioned concentrated on social 
solutions, and as Karl Ittmann argues in his recent work on population control and 
race in the British Empire, ‘[b]eginning in the interwar years, the Colonial Office 
experimented with allowing private birth control agencies to operate in colonial 
territories, imposed limits on imperial migration, and invested in new public health 
and agricultural programs’.18 Although this change highlighted a move away from 
explicitly oppressive colonialism, ideas about development were still underpinned 
by long-standing racial assumptions of colonial populations and the (moral) 
authority of the metropole.  
It was not just attitudes towards colonial groups that dominated the interwar 
period. Perceptions of Jews were never static, and the approach to Jewish refugees 
in the 1930s would have been influenced by the fact that many officials had 
witnessed, in whole or in part, the increased entry of Jewish immigrants into Britain 
from the 1880s and the problems that were believed to have emanated from this. 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the mass movement of Jews from Tsarist Russia 
certainly contributed to a change in attitude toward immigration and more 
generally toward Jewish, Chinese and black ‘others’. These views were also placed 
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alongside attitudes towards indigenous African populations as well as other colonial 
peoples, particularly Indian settlers, and in formulating refugee and immigration 
policies, colonial officials balanced their views of these groups. Furthermore, this 
process raised questions about, and at times affirmed, their own identities as white 
and British.  
This raised the question of how to prioritise these groups within refugee 
policy. Racial thinking not only assumed ‘the existence of distinct, identifiable races 
each with their own separate “essence” or “character”’ but also presupposed ‘a 
hierarchy of differences’ in which races embodied ‘higher and lower values’.19 As 
well as different assumptions about different racial categories, there was also the 
perception that ‘whenever different races came into contact with one another, 
some form of conflict was inevitable’. This made immigration to the colonies as a 
means of solving the Jewish refugee crisis problematic. In racially diverse colonies, 
those concerned with the prospect of racial conflict aimed to avoid this by limiting 
opportunities in which different races met.20 These fundamental concerns were all 
involved in the calculation of colonial refugee policy in the late 1930s, and it was 
these myriad and connected questions that made up the complex landscape in 
which colonial refugee policy was mapped out.  
The response of officials to different races can be helpfully understood as a 
way of ordering and organising governance. In the colonial context, this was 
specifically linked with the idea of indirect rule, originating from Lord Lugard, which 
had seen the British work with local elites to rule various territories. This meant, for 
example, that officials did not respond to ‘Indian’ issues but rather were more 
specific in their concerns (i.e. for Muslim Indians or Hindu Indians). The same was 
also true in African colonies where different tribal groups were dealt with 
differently. Rather than traditionally binary Atlanto-centric conceptions of 
differences in categories of ‘black’ and ‘white’, racial types were not simply divided 
by colour (although more simplified ‘black/white’ constructions of race did exist); in 
the imperial context, however, shades of difference were also important.  
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The Second World War further changed and challenged the ways racial 
perceptions influenced policy. The firm racial hierarchies that had been pervasive in 
the interwar years were challenged by Japanese victories in the Far East. The ease 
with which Britain lost its colonies to Japan during the Second World War caused 
many to rethink established perceptions of race and colonial loyalty. In more 
general terms, the Second World War is often seen as a turning point in racial 
thinking. Kenan Malik argues that, ‘[a]fter the death camps and the Holocaust it 
became nigh on impossible openly to espouse belief in racial superiority’.21 
Whether the war marked such a dramatic change is open to debate. It was, 
nonetheless, the case that by the end of the war, ‘old racial ideas proved to be 
ideologically inadequate for the new task of defending and justifying colonial 
empires in the context of the emergence of the USA as the globally dominant 
power’.22 Of course, America’s domestic racial policy left its position on British 
imperial policy open to challenges. However, the changes wrought by the Second 
World War were still conceptually far off in the interwar period, when, although 
changing attitudes were discernible, certain ideological frameworks, specifically 
concerning race and empire, remained.  
This chapter will show how Colonial Office policy decisions were 
problematised in the context of race and as such, how race impacted resulting 
policy initiatives. Refugee policy did not have the aim of being racist, but rather the 
consequences of Jewish entry into the colonies, settlement on certain land, or even 
the release of Jewish refugees from internment were thought about in the general 
framework of difference – difference of refugees, of indigenous peoples, and of 
other colonial subjects. By assessing specific issues and the formation of policy, this 
shows the embedded racial thinking of the time and the way it influenced policy in 
its contemporary complexities of interwar Europe, rather than assuming simple, 
binary categories of difference. First, the contemporary understanding of racial 
groups – specifically, Jewish, black, Indian and white – will be explored. These 
attitudes will then be analysed within the context of specific case-studies: land 
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settlement policy in Kenya, internment of enemy aliens in the colonies and refugee 
attitudes towards race.  
JEWISH REFUGEES 
Antisemitism – that is, the hatred of and prejudice against Jewish people – has a 
long history. Indeed, ‘deeply irrational and counter-factual’ stereotypes of Jews and 
subsequent prejudice have remained remarkably constant over two millennia.23 In 
the 1920s and 1930s, anti-Jewish attitudes focused on old Christian stereotypes of 
Jews as ‘Christ-killers’. Popular, Christian-based anti-Jewish attitudes had been 
revived in 1913 when a Russian Jew, Mendel Beilis, was accused of ‘blood libel’ (the 
ritual murder) of a young boy in Kiev.24 Other stereotypes such as international 
Jewish conspiracies were propagated especially by The Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion, first published in 1903 in Russia. Although exposed as a hoax in 1921, The 
Protocols was still widely read throughout the interwar period. 
Jews were also associated with success in areas like medicine, law, academia 
and, especially, finance. Much anti-Jewish feeling was directed at their supposed 
control of various economies, especially in Europe. For those on the left, Jewish 
control of capital was the main focus of anti-Jewish sentiment (as espoused by Karl 
Marx and others). At the same time, the interwar period saw a growing connection 
between Jews and the left, which became the focus of resentment for many on the 
right. This was linked to the perceived role of Jews in the 1917 Russian Revolution. 
Despite ‘only a tiny minority of Jews’ supporting the Bolsheviks, popular public 
perception held that many high profile socialist and communist leaders were of 
Jewish origin, with many outside of Russia (including, for example, Winston 
Churchill) believing that the revolution was a ‘Jewish phenomenon’.25 Despite the 
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inaccuracy or irrationality of these associations, antisemitism was often married, 
therefore, to both anti-communist and anti-capitalist politics.26 
The link between Jews, modernity and anti-Jewish attitudes is well-
established among scholars generally and is a central aspect in scholarly debates 
about the ‘liberal’ response to Jews in Britain during the nineteenth and twentieth 
century (see introduction and chapter two). Zygmunt Bauman has argued that 
modernity and, in particular relation to the Jews, emancipation were (in the words 
of Feldman) a ‘flawed bargain in which Jews gained their freedom as citizens by 
effacing their identity as Jews’.27 It was their failure to adopt successfully ‘national 
self-sameness’ that was the real problem.28 While others, including David Feldman, 
do not agree with the ‘monolithic’ argument made by Bauman, each side of the 
argument, in different ways, highlights the connection between Jews and modernity 
and that this could and did manifest itself in negative ways. This was especially the 
case, according to Feldman, with the onset of more democratised political systems 
in which anti-Jewish attitudes could be expressed.29 Wistrich identifies the way in 
which these debates played out in the interwar period: 
The tendency to identify Jews and Judaism with great and powerful 
forces of modernity (democracy, liberalism, and secularization, etc.) had 
already emerged in France during the European fin-de-siecle. It was to 
take on a tremendously heightened form in the Weimar Republic and 
throughout European society after 1918. These developments could be 
seen as a response to the growing and visible impact of Jewish 
emancipation and assimilation, to the general crisis of European 
civilization after the First World War and fear of the Bolshevik 
Revolution, as well as to the rise of extremist antisemitic movements 
that embraced fully-fledged conspiracy theories of history. Some of 
these antisemitic movements were Christian (Christian-socialist, 
Christian nationalist, Catholic populist, etc.) and some were anti-
Christian, but all believed in the centrality of the Jewish role in Western 
civilization.30 
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The contradictory connections between Jews and modernity underscored 
widespread antipathy towards the Jews. It is true that in the interwar years, Jews 
were seen as a people both frighteningly modern (in their association and success 
with finance and modern professions) but also something timeless, defying label or 
national identity.31  
Without doubt, some British officials who generated policy towards refugees 
were antisemitic to some degree or another. However, there were variations in the 
racial perceptions of Jews. From latent stereotypes to more malign associations, 
officials responded to Jewish refugees in numerous ways. While much has been 
made of British official inaction towards Jewish refugees, historians have also 
argued that antisemitism is not a sufficient explanation for the way Britain (and 
America) responded to Nazi persecution of the Jews and the events of the 
Holocaust.32 This presents a challenge for historians who wish to understand the 
ways in which perceptions of Jewish refugees (and other racial groups) influenced 
British policies in its contemporary complexity, without falling back on simplistic 
stereotypes of Jews and antisemitic tropes. Therefore, a more detailed assessment 
of official perceptions, especially in the colonial context, is needed to establish the 
nature and complexity of antisemitism, as well as the ways that perceptions of Jews 
impacted policy towards refugees. 
David Feldman has argued that despite a real and vital relationship between 
Jews and the empire, little has been written by either Jewish or imperial historians. 
Feldman illuminates how, in the imperial context, Jews were often viewed in 
stereotypical ways. For example, there were concerns over Jewish control of 
finances and the press during the Boer War. Feldman argues that during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ‘[t]he relationship between Jews and 
modernity was a concern for both Jews and non-Jews as they tried to shape and 
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comprehend the relationship of Jews to the British Empire’.33 This was also the case 
in the 1930s, when Jews and non-Jews alike questioned the possibilities and pitfalls 
of Jewish settlement in the empire for those who fled Nazi persecution in Europe. 
By the time of the refugee crisis in the 1930s, there was already an existing 
Jewish community in several British colonies, including Kenya, Jamaica, Hong Kong 
and Cyprus. Although by this time, these communities formed part of the colonial 
elite, earlier settlers had often arrived as refugees or poor immigrants. Some work 
on the role of Jewish people in the development of various African countries, 
including both Southern and Northern Rhodesia, has highlighted the 
disproportionate role small numbers of Jews had in the development of these 
territories, particularly as ‘middlemen and entrepreneurs in frontier zones’.34 
Jewish settlers, like other Europeans, were part of the complex process of 
colonisation of African land, with its myriad consequences for the settlers as well as 
local populations. In the 1930s, authority for much of this land had passed to the 
hands of colonial officials, who had a very clear idea of settlement options suitable 
for European Jewish refugees as well as a clear sense of where in the empire these 
were possible. When presented with ideas for settlement plans they deemed 
unsuitable, Hibbert dismissed these as ‘obviously written by a Jew or by someone 
who is particularly interested in Jews’.35 Prejudices and stereotypes were pervasive 
in official thinking. For example, Howell noted that ‘the Jews favour such 
occupations as thrive on the follies and vices of the Gentiles; furs and finery, 
entertainment, credit trading, and money-lending as examples’.36 
Colonial officials assumed that ‘the solution of the German Jewish problem 
lies in the establishment of urban refugee centres’,37 because these would ‘better 
suit the majority of refugees’.38 As one official put it, ‘this idea of permanent [...] 
[agricultural] settlements in the tropical areas, for the class we are considering here, 
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is absolutely impossible’.39 Louise London argues that this was ‘one of the 
stereotypes most entrenched in British official thinking’, and any confirmation that 
‘Jews [were] incorrigibly urban and incapable of settling to agricultural work’ was 
‘relished’.40 This was most notable in the British governmental response to the 
difficult progress made in the Jewish refugee settlement established in the 
Dominican Republic in 1940. The problems faced in the Sosúa settlement only 
confirmed the preconceived ideas about Jewish unsuitability to agricultural labour. 
One Foreign Office official argued that those ‘experiences [...] are likely to be 
repeated elsewhere and for the same reasons’.41 
The kibbutzim in Palestine contradicted the assumption that Jewish settlers 
would not be suitable for agricultural work. However, this contradiction was 
explained away by the settlers’ Jewish identity, both in terms of their special 
commitment to the land in Palestine and their ability to harness investment to 
develop the infrastructure there. Rita Hinden, a contemporary commentator, 
journalist and member of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, suggested that ‘the rate of 
progress has been unequalled; in all respects the approach has been bold and 
original’. However, a lot of this success was based on the investment of private 
capital and the long-term establishment of settlement infrastructure. Hinden 
explains that ‘[t]he fundamental work of draining and preparing the land for 
settlement, of building roads, of establishing the first pioneer villages, of building 
school and hospitals, was performed by [...] public funds’ between 1917 and 1939. 
For colonial officials, this success might have been appealing. Hinden did suggest 
that ‘the same results could be achieved with half the money’ in any other colony, 
and that ‘[t]he same approach, applied in the more favourable political atmosphere 
of an African or West Indian colony, is capable of opening up prospects as yet 
unimagined’. Nonetheless, she also explicitly stated that: 
Palestine is a special case. The capital, the initiative and special idealism 
which the Jews could command for a special cause, cannot be imitated 
in any other colony. And the Jews have a skill and an education which 
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most colonial people do not possess, and can only acquire in the course 
of years.42  
In 1938, the Colonial Office, despite some effort, had neither the funds nor the time 
to establish a settlement as economically beneficial as the kibbutzim in Palestine. 
In the context of African and West Indian colonies, the prospect of Jewish 
settlement, specifically the prospect of contact between Jews and indigenous 
populations, greatly concerned white settlers and officials. Feldman highlights the 
similarity in attitudes from the early 1900s, when Colonial Secretary Joseph 
Chamberlain offered British East African territory for Jewish settlement. At the time, 
it was hoped by some that it would bolster white settlement in the area, but there 
was concern even then that ‘the natives would soon realise that the Jews were “not 
white men according to their own ideas but would be influenced by them and their 
low code of morals”’.43 The stereotype of Jews as dangerously modern, 
representing ‘democracy, liberalism, and secularization’, put them at the heart of a 
process of Westernization that was believed to be bad for colonial peoples.44 This 
view was based as much on the stereotypes of Jews as the stereotypes of 
indigenous people and remained current in the interwar years. 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 
In the interwar years, the conception of race difference, especially in relation to 
indigenous populations, was complex and reflected political, social and economic 
realities as much as specific physical differences. This complexity was evident in the 
interwar domestic context where those identified as ‘Black’ included ‘Africans and 
West Indians, South Asians such as Burmese and Indians, Arabs, and people of 
mixed race’. Tabili argues that the fact that these groups were all from areas 
colonised by the British shows that ‘[t]he boundary between Black and white was 
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drawn, not merely on the basis of physical appearance, but on relations of power, 
changing over time’.45 
In the empire, two main strands of racial thinking can be identified. First, 
there was a strong belief among some that indigenous people were biologically and 
anthropologically different.46 Like perceptions of Jews, pseudo-scientific 
explanations of race difference had also been applied to sub-Saharan Africans (e.g. 
the eugenics movement in Kenya which carried out intelligence tests) and helped 
heighten the view that black people were not only different but inferior.47 Many 
believed Africans were ‘indolent, lacking in initiative, thrift, and honesty’ and that 
they had ‘invented nothing – founded no civilisation, built no stone cities, or ships, 
or produced a literature, or suggested a creed’.48 A second, ‘more romantic 
tradition’ believed that democracy was essentially Anglo-Saxon in origin, and it was 
therefore necessary for the British to help spread ‘freedom and justice to other, 
more backward parts of the world’.49 These ideas were not mutually exclusive and 
often served to reinforce each other; together, helped to justify British rule in 
African and West Indian colonies. 
Although Britain’s attitudes towards its indigenous subjects underwent 
significant changes in the interwar period and during the war, the new focus on 
colonial development and welfare was still underscored by established racial 
traditions and the belief that indigenous people needed help to ‘develop’ (i.e. to 
attain the Western ideals of democratic, representative government and to 
cultivate industries and economies). In fact, when the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act was introduced in May 1940, Malcolm MacDonald, as former Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, ‘defined the ethical content of the measure’. He said that 
the ‘development’ outlined in the act was ‘not a narrow materialistic interpretation’ 
but relevant to ‘everything which ministers to the physical, mental or moral 
development of the colonial peoples of whom we are the trustees’. As Paul Rich 
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argues, there was a ‘broad consensus’ of opinion on the role that Britain needed to 
play in the ‘benevolent civilising mission towards black societies’.50 
It was in this context that Jewish settlers were seen as a malign influence on 
indigenous people. In 1931, Lionel Curtis, a writer and civil servant, wrote that ‘the 
problem before us in Africa [...] is to bring the most helpless family of the human 
race into right conditions with Europe, America and Asia’. He also argued that if 
Africa was ‘exposed to the impact of Eastern civilization’, a phrase that alluded to 
Jews, this would ‘ruin the life of its child-like peoples unless it is controlled’.51 Curtis 
was eluding to the stereotypical association of Jews with left-wing and communist 
politics, which, in the context of the colonies, meant support for nationalist anti-
colonialism.52 
Concern over the entry of Jewish refugees was also connected to fact that 
colonial policies were organised around principles of multiculturalism.53 Britain 
ruled the empire by governing different ethnic communities, often through a 
process of divide and rule. However, in urban centres, both in the metropole and in 
the colonies, there was a concern over the mixing of races. This was also linked to 
perceptions of class. As Tabili outlines, ‘local and national authorities concerned 
with domestic order, often influenced by colonialist notions of Black people’s 
irrationality and volatility as well as class-based hostility to workers in general, 
increasingly viewed interracial settlements as potential sites of chronic crime and 
violence’.54 This meant that there was increasingly unease over black settlement in 
seaport towns, including Bristol, Cardiff and Liverpool. Given the stereotypes of 
Indians as artisans and tradesmen as well as of Jewish preference for urban centres, 
the concerns must have been magnified in the empire. The mixing of local 
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populations, Indian settlers and Jewish refugees seemed to offer, to many 
contemporaries, the potential for serious trouble. 
Despite some changes in attitudes towards race, especially in light of overtly 
racial policies spreading through fascist Europe, Rich argues, ‘[i]mperialism [...] even 
in its late and relatively benign phase, perpetuated a climate of opinion in Britain 
[...] that buttressed a set of social models based upon a hierarchy of races’.55 Racial 
views adapted and responded to the changing circumstances of social tensions and 
political power in the colonies. Although black indigenous people were clearly low 
down in the British racial hierarchy, this did not mean that they were necessarily 
disadvantaged (in colonial policies) against other groups, such as the Jews, as Britain 
clearly felt obliged to offer them ‘protection’ under the auspices of racially-
motivated paternalism.  
ASIATIC SETTLERS 
While black imperial subjects prompted a paternalistic attitude from officials, the 
empire’s Asiatic people generated a more ambivalent response. Neither wholly 
accepted as ‘trouble’ or as in need of help, Indian settlers raised fundamental 
questions about imperial identity and Britain’s rights and responsibilities to their 
many and varied imperial citizens. Throughout the British Empire, there were small 
but significant groups of Asian (including Indian and Chinese) settlers who had, 
since the mid-nineteenth century, filled labour shortages brought about by the 
abolition of slavery. These workers moved across the empire as indentured labour. 
Although this practise was officially ended in 1917, settlers and their families (many 
of whom had been born away from their country of origin) remained scattered 
across the empire. 
The Chinese were particularly associated with negative qualities. Sometimes 
this was connected to economics, although many employers in the Dominions, such 
as Canada and South Africa, argued that the Chinese were hard workers. However, 
other factors also contributed to Chinese ‘othering’ in Britain and the colonies. 
Auerbach argues that Chinese settlers became associated with threats to British 
working-class masculinity, which saw a new focus on the moral impact that Chinese 
people had on surrounding populations because of their association with practices 
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such as gambling and opium smoking.56 Thomas Otte argues that, at least until the 
First World War, British foreign policy-makers used racial stereotypes and 
hierarchies to help provide order to diplomatic engagements with eastern powers 
such as Japan and China.57 In the colonial context, Hyam also notes the impact such 
stereotypes had on policy: ‘[t]o an extraordinary extent, promiscuity, prostitution, 
and sodomy were depicted as central characteristics of Asian and other societies, 
and it was this which was said to make them inferior and unfit for self-rule’.58 
Moreover, their very presence was seen as a corrupting force, especially for white 
women in Britain and colonial subjects across the empire. As outlined in chapter 
two, Chinese (and later Japanese) settlers had been a point of particular tension in 
the white settler Dominions, and immigration regulations sought both implicitly and 
explicitly to control entry of these specific groups.  
Unlike the Chinese, relatively few Indian settlers made their way to the 
Dominions. Rather, Indians had mostly travelled and settled in the areas known as 
the tropical empire, such as Burma, Ceylon, Fiji, Malaya, Mauritius, Trinidad and, 
particularly relevant to this study, British Guiana and Kenya. Indian indentured 
labourers migrated under contracts that effectively bought their labour for a set 
term of five years, with the assurance that passage home would be provided 
thereafter. In reality, many were encouraged to renew their terms or give up their 
return passage for a piece of land in the colony to which they had travelled.59 The 
legacy of their presence in British Guiana and Kenya is discussed more fully in both 
this chapter and chapter five on colonial development.  
In 1945, a contemporary observer, Dr Sripati Chandrasekhar, detailed the 
problems faced by Indian settlers in each of these territories. Chandrasekhar was an 
Indian demographer, who, having received his doctorate from New York University 
in 1944, took several important roles in the US, including working for the American 
Office of Strategic Services and lecturing on India’s independence across the 
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country.60 In a 1945 article, he observed that Indians living in the West Indies 
(including British Guiana) had a ‘poor standard of living, agricultural bias, and 
backwardness in education’. There were many social problems in the West Indies, 
as detailed by the Royal Commission, but the author observed that some were 
specific to the Indian population, who retained ‘their Hindu and Moslem ways of 
life’. He described how ‘[d]espite the long and many years they have lived abroad, 
and though the majority were born in these regions, they have remained culturally 
loyal to the Indian way of life, and have resisted complete westernization’.61  
In Kenya, the problems focused on land settlement issues. The majority of 
Indian settlers in Kenya were not previously indentured labour, but rather had 
settled there even before white settlers established themselves. As Chandrasekhar 
outlines: 
The major Indian grievance in Kenya is against the reservation of Kenya 
Highlands for Europeans, not necessarily British, as against the Indians. 
This reservation is not statutory, but the British Government invariably 
vetoes any transfer or sale of land to an Indian, irrespective of his social 
and economic position. Indians cannot understand why a wealthy 
German can buy a piece of land on the Highlands and an Indian 
millionaire cannot do the same, especially when the colony is British and 
the Indian is a British subject.62 
Chandrasekhar’s report identified key areas of contention over Indian settlers 
in the empire, and his observations played into liberal fears over immigrant/refugee 
communities being unable to assimilate into colonial social and racial structures. 
Indian settlers were particularly problematic because, as colonial subjects, they 
were entitled to some protection. In turn, ideas about imperial citizenship 
challenged conceptions of ‘Britishness’ (see below). The complicated ethnic status 
of Indians mattered. Chandrasekhar observed that:  
India’s nationals are not ‘white’ to the man in the street or even to the 
minister in the Cabinet, irrespective of the anthropological view that 
India’s nationals belong to the ‘Caucasian race’ and are the only people 
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in Asia, barring the Soviet Union, who come closest to the European 
ethnically.63 
More practically, the settlement of Indian people in the colonies was believed 
to threaten the economic and social position of, firstly, the white settler and, 
secondly, the indigenous people. In correspondence between William Ormsby-Gore 
(Colonial Secretary) and Brooke-Popham (the Governor of Kenya), the latter wrote 
that:  
The Indian is not always a pleasant neighbour and in the case of a good 
many of them, his habits are beastly, while his increasing political-
mindedness and truculence gives no little annoyance. Also there is the 
fact that the Indian in Kenya is usually not out of the top drawer and 
there are quite enough people settled in Kenya with first-hand 
experience of India and Indians to make them feel great resentment at 
being asked to meet the Kenya Indian on equal terms.64 
Wolton argues that:  
The concept of ‘trusteeship’ was invoked to create another justification 
for the separate treatment of colonial people from Europeans. The 
Colonial Office worried that Indians employed in Africa would hinder 
‘trusteeship’ – as if Indians were indeed to blame for the lack of 
employment opportunities for Africans.65 
Therefore Indians, not ethnically white and loaded with negative stereotypes, 
were perceived to be a threat to British rule. Wolton identifies the treatment of 
immigrant groups, such as Indians and Chinese, as a good gauge of British race 
relations. Although they had served a purpose as indentured labour throughout the 
empire, Indians’ social and political demands as well as their ambiguous racial 
identity, by the 1930s, became intractable problems within a British imperial system 
defined by a strict racial hierarchy.66 
WHITE BRITISH PEOPLES 
In the stereotypes and racial classifications that British officials used to understand 
and interact with other racial and ethnic groups, they also reflected their 
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conceptualisations of themselves.67 While twenty years ago Ruth Frankenberg could 
claim that ‘the White Western self as a racial being has for the most part remained 
unexamined and unnamed’, historical literature on the subject has since 
developed.68 Sociological and anthropological studies (especially writing from an 
American perspective) have started to unearth the ways in which whiteness is 
constructed and understood. However, in an attempt to move away from this 
American-focused scholarship (which has been argued to be problematic), attention 
has turned to a more transnational approach to the question of whiteness. Jane 
Carey, Leigh Boucher and Katherine Ellinghaus have sought to examine whiteness 
and postcolonialism together. They argue that: 
the construction of whiteness and the phenomena of European 
colonialism are fundamentally interconnected, and that whiteness 
studies must be ‘Re-Orientated’ to take this into account. Equally, a 
greater and more rigorous focus on whiteness as a racial category has 
much to offer our understandings of the historical operations of 
colonialism and its ongoing effects.69 
Bill Schwarz has also tried to unpack the significance of whiteness in the 
empire, particularly in the context of white settler colonies and the end of empire. 
Schwartz explains that ‘[t]he white man may seem to be an uncontentious entity, 
obvious enough, and not in need of conceptual investigation’. In fact, Schwartz 
argues, it is an idea that has ‘an entire fantasized, discursive complex which 
underwrites its creation’, and therefore ‘[w]hat appears to be straightforward turns 
out to be very complex’.70  
Examining similar complexities within a broader discussion of empire and 
ethnicity, in which he considers the way empire helped construct ethnic identity for 
both white settlers and non-white imperial subjects, Darwin argues that: 
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[T]he Britishness asserted in these settler societies was not deferential. 
It was selective and critical. ‘Imperial’ Britishness did not aspire merely 
to replicate what existed ‘at home’. Quite the reverse. It insisted that 
British ethnicity (although the word was not used) was energised by its 
encounter with the colonial environment, where virtuous attributes, 
long lost at home, could flourish anew.71 
Clearly then, the identity of British settlers and what ‘whiteness’ meant in this 
context were not fixed and were open to interpretation by those experiencing it. 
Thus, while this burgeoning field continues to develop, as Angela Woollacott 
observes, ‘there is still not a great deal of work on the historical construction of 
whiteness in Britain itself’.72 
Nevertheless, this developing field, along with studies of the history of race in 
Britain and America, can help us identify the ways in which the perceptions of white 
British officials as different to those over whom they had authority (which was also 
intimately connected with ideas of superiority and inferiority) helped dictate the 
debates and decisions on refugee settlement in the colonies. The codification of 
difference by race, supported by pseudo-scientific arguments about biological 
difference which had been developing since the late nineteenth century, still 
provided justifications of social and cultural differences in the interwar years. 
Regarding refugee settlement in the colonies, the definition and understanding of 
whiteness mattered in two main ways: (1) the importance of the ‘white man’ as 
leader of the indigenous people, and (2) the consequences, both real and imagined, 
of classifying Jews as white. 
Hyam argues that colonial officials functioned in ‘a society consumed and 
permeated with class consciousness’ and ‘obsessed with snobbish codes of 
behaviour’. Moreover, they were often ‘conditioned to the need to have social 
inferiors to look down upon’. In this context, ‘these attitudes were inevitably 
magnified when thinking about and treating Asians and Africans’.73 Discussions of 
racial hierarchies were therefore closely linked with established class systems. In 
fact, Cannadine identifies class as the key structural foundation of Britain’s imperial 
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rule. He argues that ‘the hierarchical principle that underlay Britons’ perceptions of 
their empire was not exclusively based on the collective, colour-coded ranking of 
social groups, but depended as much on the more venerable colour-blind ranking of 
individual social prestige’.74 
While Cannadine sees this other, less racial way of codifying imperial peoples 
as important, more recent research has suggested that the relationship was more 
dynamic. In his case-study of ‘Domiciled Europeans’ in India and the study of 
whiteness, Satoshi Mizutani argues that the relationship between upper-middle 
class white Britons and other white Europeans was defined by race as well as class. 
Mizutani concludes that ‘[u]nder imperialism, it was not just class but race that 
defined the terms on which the internal civilising of “degenerates” was 
conducted’.75 While race was central to the way officials understood the colonial 
world, many of the concerns expressed in this regard were mirrored in the domestic 
context through class.  
For example, while the eugenics movement developed in Britain in response 
to the rising lower classes, eugenicists in the empire focussed primarily on racial 
constructs. In the colonies, eugenics was frequently used by white settlers, who 
were numerically smaller but politically and economically dominant (i.e. minority 
rule) to help maintain their position of power over their ‘social inferiors’. Although 
limited in its influence, the role of the eugenics movement, especially in the colonial 
context, is worth considering here. The presence of a eugenic movement in Kenya 
highlights the role that pseudo-science had in confirming the superiority of white 
men to lead indigenous populations. Intelligence tests were still being carried out in 
the 1930s by eugenicist groups, who hotly debated the predisposed ability of 
African populations. These ‘experiments’ were given more credence by some 
because it was believed the proximity to the ‘native’ added weight to the findings. 
These experiments also served a political purpose for those who lived and worked 
in the colony; they were used to show that Africans were not capable of 
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development and education. White racial superiority was a self-serving argument, 
as it endorsed white suitability for settlement and leadership.76 
As the discussion of settlement schemes in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia in 
the last chapter highlighted, the status of colonial territories as a ‘White Man’s 
Country’ was a contentious issue between Whitehall and the ‘unofficial’ elements in 
the colony. The interwar years and the Duke of Devonshire’s Declaration in 1923 
confirmed that (at least) Whitehall viewed Kenya as a place of African development, 
not a country for white settlers. Pressure from white settlers for unifying Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland added to these tensions. Nevertheless, settler authority 
was, in part, derived from ‘their incessant boast that they alone knew the native’, 
and the eugenics movement fed these claims.77 This resulted in unsolvable tensions 
over who could best direct policy: those in Whitehall or those in the colonial 
territories.  
White British settlers often held more stringent and negative racial views than 
their Whitehall counterparts, because the former’s power was based on a racialised 
socioeconomic relationship in which white people adopted the dominant position. 
The threat to minority rule posed by the majority indigenous populations generated 
fear, and as Hyam notes, ‘[f]ear was always at the bottom of settler racial 
prejudice’.78 Race difference therefore became a way of constructing a social-
economic structure that affirmed white settler dominance. In this way, racial 
perceptions were not simply theoretical constructions or necessarily overt 
manifestations of deeply-held racist attitudes, but were pragmatic theories for 
justifying and maintaining dominance.79  
While differences between white and black people were broadly accepted, 
whiteness itself was complex and highly contested. Those identified as Caucasian 
today have myriad identities, and in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
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centuries, these various origins and identities were named and important.80 Indeed, 
whiteness, like black identity, was about more than race. ‘To call oneself 
“European”’, Maxwell argues, ‘implied more than an identification with a particular 
race and culture. It also implied that one adhered to middle-class principles of 
behaviour’.81 According to Stoler, racial membership was sustained by observance 
of ‘middle-class morality, nationalist sentiments, bourgeois sensibilities, normalised 
sexuality, and a carefully circumscribed “milieu” – hence the metropolis’s 
demonization of impoverished and mixed-race colonials’.82 
This made Jewish people particularly troubling. As Friedländer has argued, 
‘[t]he Jew was the inner enemy par excellence. It is this mimetic ability which [...] 
will open the way for the most extreme phantasms’. In other words, ‘is otherness 
more threatening in its difference or is it more menacing in its sameness?’83 In the 
case of Jewish refugees, it was their sameness. For British colonial policy-makers, 
Jewish settlers were problematic because, while looking like white British settlers, 
they were believed by some to bring with them different values, political 
persuasions and lower moral standards. 
The case of Leo Frank highlights the importance of these distinctions. In 1913, 
a young white woman was found dead in a pencil factory in the US state of Georgia 
which belonged to Leo Frank, a Cornell graduate and part-owner and manager of 
the business. Frank was also Jewish. He was convicted of the murder based on the 
testimony of a black employee. When his sentence was commuted, a mob attacked 
the prison where he was held, and Frank was taken and lynched by outraged locals. 
During Frank’s trial, his Jewishness became part of the prosecution’s case. As 
Matthew Frye Jacobson puts it, ‘Leo Frank was inconclusively white’ and therefore 
subject to suspicion. Leo Frank’s story fitted with the stereotype of Jews as 
deceptively educated and civilized, appearing cultured but ‘actually perverse’, at 
which point he became the prime suspect of the murder and rape of a young 
                                                          
80
 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of 
Race (Cambridge, MA, 1999), pp. 2-4. 
81
 Maxwell, Colonial Photography, p. 7. 
82
 Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial 
Order of Things, (Durham, NC, 1995), p. 105, quoted in: Maxwell, Colonial Photography, p. 7. 
83
 Saul Friedländer, ‘“Europe’s Inner Demons”: The “Other” as Threat in Early Twentieth-Century 
European Culture’, in: Wistrich (ed.), Demonizing the Other, p. 213. 
142 
‘Gentile’ woman. Although the American South’s racial line was becoming more 
distinctly split along black and white lines, ‘Jews could be racially defined in a way 
that irrevocably set them apart from other “white persons” on the local scene’.84 
This imprecise racial definition of whiteness was also relevant to cases within 
imperial Britain. Firstly, the case of the Irish raised challenging questions about 
white identity. As Radhika Mohanram argues: 
The Irish are so problematic: their practice of Catholicism, the history of 
their colonization, their political sympathies all scandalize and 
problematize British whiteness, revealing the limits of its assimilative 
processes. Are they black or are they white? The visual index of 
difference is so minimally written on their skin that their presence 
causes a severe disturbance to the notion that race and the authority of 
whiteness becomes perceptible at a glance.85 
In her study of Rudyard Kipling’s Kim, Mohanram identifies the way that 
Kipling’s central character, Kim, an Irish man in India, raises questions about the 
concept of whiteness.86 This links with the work of Satoshi Mizutani, which explores 
the ‘so-called “domiciled” population’ in India, people who ‘were of white descent, 
permanently based in India, often impoverished and frequently (if not always) 
racially mixed’. These ‘domiciled’ people inhabited a more ambiguous role than 
strictly ‘white’ British.87 
Another space in which whiteness was contested was South Africa, where 
British and Boer hostilities, in both the Second Boer War (1899-1902) and after, 
impacted South African and imperial politics and brought definitions of race 
(including whiteness) to the centre of official debates. The Anglo-Boer war, which 
saw British forces attack the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, declared Boer 
settler territories, was just the most obvious manifestation of long-term racial 
tensions between the two groups. Moreover, the Boers and British competed 
against each other for dominance in a country with a black African majority, raising 
fundamental questions about racial superiority. The Boers resented British 
treatment of them as little better than indigenous populations, while the British 
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dismissed the Boers, traditionally a farming population and often illiterate, as 
unnecessary to British white dominance. As Steyn argues: 
Like ethnic working class whites and partially racialized groups in 
America [...] Afrikaners had to ‘fight’ for the status of first-class citizens: 
‘What was termed the “racial question” in early twentieth-century 
South Africa referred not to relations between Europeans and Africans 
but to the relationship between the Boers and the British. Relations with 
the Africans were termed the “native question” [...].88  
After peace was made at the end of the Boer War, the political system in South 
Africa continued to be influenced by a powerful and vocal Afrikaner group who was 
a consistent source of agitation against British dominance.89 The inherent fear this 
caused British officials manifested itself in the question of Jewish settlement in 
concern over potential Jewish ‘enclaves’, discussed below.  
Finally, in her study of Jewish refugees and the West Indies, Joanna Newman 
explores the West Indian response to Jewish immigration from both a religious and 
racial perspective. She concludes that: 
For many West Indians, Jews were an abstract image, an absent 
stereotype which connotated negative attributes. In addition to 
religious prejudice, there was a racial element to the reception of Jewish 
refugees: there was no way of distinguishing them from white West 
Indians, and no knowledge or understanding of Jewish religious custom. 
Accounting for black antisemitism in Martinique Kurt Kursten 
interviewed West Indians who claimed that if white people were 
persecuting Jews, and Jews were white people, Jews must indeed be 
deserving of their persecution. In other words, Jews were unwelcome as 
an additional white group, yet were also seen as inferior to other 
whites.90 
These observations suggest that the ambiguous nature of whiteness was not just 
the concern of the (perceived) colonial racial elite, but also a factor of influence 
across the colonial social and racial spectrum.  
Although the move to a more unified perception of ‘Caucasian’ took place in 
the 1930s and 1940s, there was still a prioritisation in perceptions. Jews remained 
an ‘other’, albeit white, and this was important in the racially codified world of the 
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colonies, where there were concerns about racial mixing and a desire to support 
and uphold British settler dominance. 
LAND SETTLEMENT IN KENYA 
Sherman has covered some aspects of the settlement of Jewish refugees in Kenya; 
however his observations are made from the perspective of the Foreign Office.91 
Broadening the investigation to the Colonial Office and the policy that unfolded in 
the colonies, we are able to distinguish the influence of specific ideologies including 
race. The following account will therefore outline Jewish refugee settlement in 
Kenya from a colonial perspective, focusing on racial perceptions and the policy that 
followed. An assessment of this issue highlights that racial thinking significantly 
impacted policy in several ways: the prioritisation of ‘white’ British over other racial 
categories; the perception of the Jewish ‘other’ as a potential problem and benefit; 
and the concern regarding the susceptibility of indigenous ‘others’ to Jewish 
influence. 
Land settlement in Kenya, including the settlement of refugees, was 
considered in relation to the needs and demands of three groups: Kenya’s 
indigenous African population; the small but powerful group of white settlers; and a 
vocal Indian settler community. In the spirit of trusteeship, the British felt that the 
African population needed protection from both economic hardship and the 
potentially dangerous influence of the wrong kind of European settlers. White 
settlers demanded government investment to generate more white British 
settlement in order to help secure their dominant and advantageous position. 
Indian settlers, who were denied settlement options in the White Highlands, 
reacted strongly against proposed Jewish settlement, seeing it as one more 
manifestation of inequality. The Indian response invoked the crisis in Palestine and 
highlighted the international consequences of an otherwise internal problem. It was 
thus the Colonial Office’s responsibility to balance: the political implications of 
Jewish settlement within the colony; the diplomatic imperative of British action 
towards the refugee crisis; the international reaction to Palestine; and growing 
international anti-imperialism. 
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Prime land in the White Highlands was reserved for the white settler 
community, and Indian settlers were denied rights by laws that prevented land 
passing between different races. Paskin explained that a ‘provision in the Crown 
Land Ordinance’ gave the Governor a ‘right to veto transfers of land in the 
Highlands between persons of different races, and the veto has invariably been 
exercised to prevent the acquisition of land by Asiatics’.92 
When it was learned that the proposed settlement schemes for Jewish 
refugees were to be based in the White Highlands, there was an outcry among 
Kenya’s Indian population, who argued that ‘by permitting the settlement of Jews in 
the Highlands, the Government’ was ‘departing’ from the established policy of 
white-only settlement in the Highlands. Paskin minuted that: 
[r]ecently the protests of the Indians have taken the line that it is wrong 
that in a British Colony access to the land should be denied to British 
Indian subjects while it is not denied to foreigners such as Germans and 
Italians. I am afraid that the decision to permit the settlement of a 
number of German Jews in the Kenya Highlands will add fuel to the fires 
of this controversy.93 
This complaint was linked to broader controversies over the fact that Indian 
settlers, citizens of the British Empire, were consistently denied rights afforded to 
foreign nationals. However, it was Paskin’s racial assumptions which framed his 
response: ‘The answer to such an argument would, of course, be that the Jews who 
are being allowed to settle in Kenya are European Jews who will be specifically 
selected for their personal suitability’.94 The refugees were European, not Indian, 
and therefore he saw no conflict of interest and no need for action. This highlights 
the fluid nature of racial identity in the minds of officials as well as the pragmatic 
nature of this sort of comparative identification. 
Indian settler interests, however, were not completely abandoned. The 
Colonial Office was prepared to limit non-agricultural Jewish settlers. It was argued 
that ‘Jewish artizans [sic] in any considerable number could [not] make a living 
without jeopardizing the interests of the existing residents’. These existing residents 
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were the ‘large Indian and Native population of Kenya’.95 Governor Brooke-Popham 
stressed this point further when he reminded Whitehall that his ‘Government has 
recently been urged by the East African Indian National Congress to enact 
legislation providing for a working week of a maximum of forty five hours for the 
purpose of mitigating the effects of rising unemployment’. Furthermore, he argued, 
‘there is [...] no shortage of labour in those trades and occupations in which German 
Jewish refugees are most likely to engage themselves’.96 
The stereotypes used to frame racial perceptions were directly echoed in 
policy. Brooke-Popham stressed the importance of: 
[j]udging [...] whether the settlers will be able to adapt themselves to 
rural conditions [...] whether they will be able to make out of agriculture 
a profit which will satisfy their ambitions, or whether they will tend to 
desert agriculture and compete uneconomically in other trades and 
occupations.97 
The Colonial Office was clear that Kenya’s Indian population would be protected in 
economic matters, if not over land settlement. 
Although Paskin described the issue as ‘essentially one of Kenya-India politics’, 
Brooke-Popham wrote to MacDonald to highlight the international political 
implications of unrest among the Indian population.98 Although initial reports 
argued that the Indian population was ‘not taking much interest in events in 
Palestine’, new ‘indications’ suggested this was changing. Therefore, Brooke-
Popham wrote, ‘any belief that we are encouraging Jewish immigration will give 
agitators a handle and possibly lead to some form of demonstration’.99 This view 
was re-emphasised by the Indian Overseas Association which warned MacDonald 
that ‘further difficulties’ could ‘arise in both Kenya and in India in connection with 
the vexed problem of differential treatment between the white and Indian settlers 
in the Kenya Highlands’.100 
An article in The Leader (India’s largest English-language newspaper in the 
interwar period) reported that the Bombay Legislative Council had seen a motion 
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for a message to be conveyed to the British government of ‘the emphatic opinion of 
the house that the proposed scheme was detrimental to Indian interests and that it 
should not be permitted’. The article, written after Winterton’s public speeches 
about possible Jewish settlement in Kenya at the Évian Conference, specifically 
asked, ‘Is it not curious that while Earl Winterton and his compatriots feel so deeply 
for alien communities, the grievances of Indians who are their fellow-citizens leave 
them unmoved?’ The article also adopted racial stereotypes used by British officials 
and, building on Chandrasekhar’s identification of German settlers as problematic, 
specified the Jewish aspect of the issue.101 
In regard to South Africa, the article cited Professor Arthur Berriedale Keith (a 
prolific historian at the University of  Edinburgh and a former Colonial Office official 
between 1901 and 1914, who was particularly involved in Dominion affairs) who 
claimed that ‘many of the Europeans who oppose the success of Indians as traders 
so bitterly are really Jews of very low and undesirable class’. In regard to the African 
population, the article reminded the Colonial Office of the ‘paramountcy of native 
interests which is supposed to guide their policy’ and asked, ‘Is it in accordance with 
that doctrine that not content with depriving the natives of their best land and 
transferring them to white settlers, those in power may now invite aliens to share in 
the loot?’102 The questions raised in The Leader exemplified how colonial 
populations (especially in India) were increasingly questioning the nature and 
legitimacy of colonial rule. This was an unsettling and unwelcome experience for 
the Colonial Office, particularly as the question of Jewish settlement in Kenya 
threatened to drag an African colony into a broader state of discontent that was 
starting to develop across the empire.  
Clearly, refugee settlement threatened to agitate already fraught 
international relations. With the prospect of ‘another Palestine in Kenya’ and the 
difficult questions raised about the nature of British colonial rule more generally, 
the conclusion was simply to limit Jewish settlement options. Therefore, while 
Kenya had seemed to be the most promising location of large-scale settlement at 
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Évian in July 1938, attention by November had been diverted to West Indian 
colonies, such as British Guiana, and the only settlement scheme pursued in Kenya 
was that of the PSA (see chapter two). 
The racial politics of land settlement was highlighted further by the fact that 
at a similar time to these discussions over Jewish settlement, there were calls from 
the white settler community for Colonial Office action to support, including 
financially, more British white settlement in the Highlands. Reference was made to 
the established policy, endorsed by the Empire Settlement Act, of funding white 
settlement in the colonies. Ultimately, a loan of £250,000 was approved to this end 
in July 1939.103 
When the request for financial assistance was originally received, MacDonald 
argued that attempts should be made to connect the question of white settlement 
and refugees. He felt ‘that “two birds can be killed with one stone” by encouraging 
the Jewish plan’.104 Months later, he noted, ‘I am very doubtful whether we shall 
get an adequate number of British settlers. Our people have somehow lost their 
inclination to go, in large numbers, to settle on land overseas. Even 150-200 may be 
hard to find’. Therefore, he argued, ‘I attach importance to settling refugees’.105 
However, other colonial officials thought that MacDonald’s aim of connecting white 
settlement with Jewish refugee settlement was unrealistic and unsuitable for the 
circumstances of Kenya. Paskin responded directly to MacDonald’s suggestion, 
minuting, ‘I am afraid that the two birds are of such widely different character that 
they will hardly fit into one scheme’.106 
The issue was also opposed by established settler groups. Strong white settler 
feeling against Indian settlement was exacerbated by the latter’s powerful lobby 
within Whitehall via the Indian Office. While the subject of Indian unrest was given 
considerable attention in Whitehall because of its connection to Anglo-Arab 
relations, white settlers often felt voiceless, despite their disproportionate amount 
of power. As Paskin observed:  
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The fact is that the present settler population is acutely conscious of the 
fact that they cannot possibly hope to retain the privileged position and 
the amenities which they now enjoy in the Highlands unless some 
means can be found to fill up that sparsely inhabited area with good 
honest British farming folk.107 
Many of the requests for government support for increased white British 
settlement were considered to be important enough that they were included in the 
letter to the Treasury which asked for approval of the £250,000 investment. The 
letter explained that: 
[t]he European community in Kenya is still in some sense a pioneer 
community. It has not reached a state of economic and social 
equilibrium. If it does not consolidate its position by increasing its 
numbers and strengthening its resources, there is reason to fear it might 
suffer decline.108 
Furthermore, the letter explained that: 
[m]any of the existing settlers having undoubtedly made their homes in 
Kenya on the strength of Government assurances about the future of 
the Colony, might contend that the Government of Kenya bears a 
responsibility towards these earlier settlers to continue the policy with 
regard to white settlement with the ultimate aim of establishing a 
British community strong enough to ensure its own future economically 
and socially.109 
The language of these appeals played on key stereotypes that helped confirm 
white superiority, especially in contrast to colonial ‘others’. The use of terms such as 
‘pioneers’ and ‘farming folk’ to describe those needed to fill ‘sparsely populated’ 
areas of land helped support the racial hierarchies of whiteness by creating an 
idealised image of white, hard-working British settlers in a land undeveloped by an 
‘absent’ colonial population. These idealised settlers embodied positive virtues, 
unobtainable by colonial ‘others’, at least not without the help of the British.110  
Colonial Office action towards white settler claims for practical assistance 
provides an interesting counterpoint from which to scrutinize the way colonial 
official perceptions of race guided policy. Although Jewish land settlement was 
more acceptable than Indian settlement, Brooke-Popham was still firmly against the 
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creation of a ‘Jewish enclave’ in the colony. He consistently argued in favour of 
keeping the British character of the White Highlands.111 Lord Dufferin similarly 
‘agreed that “nests of Jews” were very dangerous to all concerned’.112 Brooke-
Popham gave specific reasons for this: ‘The real benefit which the African derives 
from his association with the European farmer lies not so much in the financial 
return but rather in the education and experience gained’. In his letter to 
MacDonald, Brooke-Popham argued that:  
[b]elieving as we must to in our British ideals of freedom and justice, 
there would appear to be no better way of contributing to the 
advancement of the native peoples than by imparting these ideals to 
them. This can best be done by forming in their midst a British 
settlement where British principles may not only be preserved but also 
extended throughout Kenya and other East African territories.113 
Driving the point home, he concluded that: 
[f]or the reasons outlined [above] [...] it is in my view important, I would 
even say essential that white settlement should retain its British 
character, and I therefore urge that it is the duty of H.M. Government to 
do all that it can to foster the emigration from Great Britain to Kenya of 
the type of farmer-settler who will be not only an economic asset but 
also a guide to his African compatriots.114 
His ranking was clear: white British, white European (including Jews) and then 
Indian. This prioritisation was based on his perception of the groups: British values, 
the need of Africans to be ‘educated’ and the ‘questionable influence’ of Jews and 
Indians alike. Brooke-Popham had privately observed to Ormsby-Gore that: 
I have found a genuine desire amongst all classes for the betterment of 
the African natives. But the most difficult problem I feel is that of the 
Indians. There undoubtedly is amongst most of the settlers an intense 
hatred of the Indian which, being quite illogical, is very difficult to argue 
about.115 
Writing in The Spectator, Cleland Scott offered a summation of these racial 
perceptions. He argued that:  
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[n]umbers of Jewish refugees might very easily suffer [...] from an 
inferiority complex. If they did, they might not then be ideal people to 
come in close contact with the African, who can extremely easily be 
adversely influenced by too much ‘kindness.’ The Jewish refugee might, 
quite unintentionally perhaps, regard both the African and the Indian as 
‘oppressed’ races, which would do no good to any race in Kenya.116 
The prioritisation was clear, but the pressure for limiting non-British (i.e. 
Jewish) settlement was also clear. There were indeed concerns regarding the nature 
of Jewish influence, especially given Jewish stereotypes of association with the left 
and the fear that this might ultimately influence burgeoning nationalist movements 
in the colonies. In a colony where racial tensions were high and where there was 
already growing agitation, politically uncertain refugees were the last thing colonial 
officials wanted. 
INTERNMENT 
The centrality of racial perceptions was also evident in the policy adopted towards 
internment in the colonies. The internment crisis helps further illuminate two 
factors in contemporary racial frameworks: (1) the difficulty (and fluidity) of 
defining race and (2) entrenched perceptions of indigenous colonial populations as 
inherently vulnerable. Regarding the first, British officials had to decide whether 
Jewish people in the colonies were to be defined by their Jewish identity or their 
national identity. Regarding the second, British officials debated the way in which 
indigenous populations would respond to the internment policy, particularly 
whether they were capable of understanding a quick change in policy direction, and 
whether they were more or less at risk from potential ‘enemy alien’ fifth-column 
activity.  
The debate which took place on the first of these issues highlights how racial 
thinking (in connection with liberalism) defined official interaction with refugees 
and their plight: Jews were persecuted for being Jewish by the Nazis, but their 
Jewish identity was not enough to raise them above suspicion for British officials. 
For example, Shuckburgh wrote that he was: 
sceptical about the ‘anti-Nazi’ German, whether in this country or 
elsewhere. Germans are first and foremost Germans. Some of them may 
                                                          
116
 Cleland Scott, ‘Jewish Settlement in Kenya?’, The Spectator, 30 September 1938, CO533/497/8, 
TNA. 
152 
dislike the Nazi regime, but I would not trust a single individual among 
them not to help the German government [...] when it is fighting for its 
life.117  
A piece in The Spectator similarly asked: 
in what spirit would these Jews come to Kenya? Would they remain first 
and foremost German Jews whose heart and soul stayed with ‘The 
Fatherland’? Do they consider themselves persecuted by the Germans 
as a race, or by the Nazi regime? If they feel their exile is due only to the 
latter there always will be left with them their love of the Fatherland, 
and the longing to go back in more auspicious circumstances. Possibly 
they might set about trying to create a second Fatherland in Kenya, or 
aim to link up with the Germans, of whom there are many, by no means 
all Nazis, in Tanganyika Territory. Finally, do they feel Jews racially or 
Germans?118 
These concerns were evident in the treatment of Dr Gigliolo, an Italian doctor 
who had been researching in British Guiana for some years and was part of the 
commission that investigated possible refugee settlement there in 1938/39 (see 
chapter five). In June 1940, he was ‘arrested in his laboratory’ and ‘confined to his 
home, under police guard, for ten days and interned, ever since, as a prisoner of 
war’.119 A year later, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Moyne, who had 
been ‘greatly impressed by [the] value of his work’, enquired about his release, 
writing to the Governor of British Guiana: 
 I should have thought that, especially in view of small number of 
persons concerned in British Guiana, it would be possible for similar 
modification of policy to be made if suitable explanation were given 
publicity. 120 
The Governor’s response explained that: 
it must be remembered that he had not severed his connections with 
Italy and sent his children to be educated there and according to [the] 
report they came back with strong Fascist sentiments which have 
reacted unfavourably on opinion as regards the father.121 
However, the Governor ultimately justified the continued internment of 
Gigliolo ‘on grounds of effect on public feeling’, rather than ‘any harmful activity on 
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his part’. He observed: ‘[t]his might seem strange but it must be remembered we 
are dealing with an ignorant and excitable people amongst whom ideas and 
rumours [...] spread like fire’.122 This was a feeling mirrored by others, including 
those in Whitehall. K.E. Robinson noted ‘once you have interned people, the native 
mind is very likely to consider their release “defeatist”’. In other words, while the 
loyalty of German Jews could not be trusted, African people were not ‘educated’ 
enough to ‘accept a general change of policy’.123 
This last aspect, the assumption about the response of the native population, 
highlights the second issue raised by internment: whether colonial populations 
were more susceptible to fifth-column activity than the largely white population of 
Britain. Although widespread internment of enemy aliens was quickly reversed in 
the Britain, many questioned whether similar action should be taken in the 
colonies. Many colonial officials did not ‘agree with the idea that the UK policy is a 
proper guide for the action to be taken’. This, Arthur Dawe explained, was down to 
differences in population: ‘In [Britain] we have a united population all of the same 
flesh and blood and we can afford to take certain risks with enemy aliens in the 
knowledge that the general spirit of the population would make it very difficult for 
[them] to undertake any really dangerous activities’. On the other hand, ‘in Africa 
the situation is entirely different’, as ‘there we have large populations of alien blood 
who cannot be counted upon in the same way as the population of our own island’. 
This led him to the conclusion that ‘we cannot therefore, afford to take the risks 
which might be involved in the application of a liberal policy which may be perfectly 
safe’ in Britain.124 Colonial loyalty – based not on race but nationalist aspirations – 
proved to be a legitimate concern. As outlined, the loss of Far Eastern territories in 
December 1941 were a significant blow to the British and was, at least in part, put 
down to actions of local populations who aided the Japanese advance. 
The racial concerns, particularly in regard to issues of indigenous loyalty and 
trustworthiness, were also evident in the internment of the Japanese in America. 
According to Ben-Ami Shillony, European Jews and Japanese living in the US were 
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‘both victims of a similar kind of demonization by the West’. He argues that 
although the most obvious connection between the Jews and the Japanese was the 
help that certain Japanese authorities afforded Jewish refugees fleeing persecution 
in Europe, there were also important connections between the two groups. He 
argues that ‘[h]aving rejected Christianity, yet nevertheless having prospered in the 
Western world, the Jews and the Japanese have stirred similar racist phobias and 
have appeared as the two great threats to white Christian society’.125 While this 
argument perhaps oversimplifies (and is uncritical of) the relationship between 
Japanese and Jews – for example, new literature, specifically by Gao Bei, suggests 
that Japanese policy towards Jewish refugees was actually inherently antisemitic – 
there are clearly parallels to be made about how Jews and the Japanese were 
treated as internees.126 
When the Japanese government attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, 
those Japanese people living in America were soon associated with this act of 
violence and were viewed as a threat. Shillony explains that ‘[a]lthough no Japanese 
Americans were involved in acts of sabotage or treason, the Americans were 
gripped by the fear that the Japanese in their midst would become a fifth column 
and assist Japan in conquering the United States’. The government responded to 
this fear with a policy of internment. In the spring of 1942, 112,000 Japanese were 
ordered to be held in camps. This was despite the fact that two-thirds of this 
number were actually American-born and that no such action was taken against 
German Americans. Like those British officials, such as Shuckburgh, who questioned 
the loyalty of Jewish refugees both in the colonies and in Britain itself, many 
American officials, including those in the military such as Lieutenant General John L. 
De Witt, believed that ‘[a] Jap’s a Jap. You can’t change him by giving him a piece of 
paper’. Another argued that ‘[a] viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is 
hatched – so a Japanese American, born of Japanese parents, grows up to be a 
Japanese not an American’.127 The language used by both British and US officials not 
only highlighted the contradictions of liberalism – that foreign populations who 
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were expected to assimilate were inherently incapable of doing so – but also that 
race was the defining factor of their inability to do so. 
The issue was also of importance in the British Dominion of Canada, where 
after Pearl Harbour officials in the western state of British Columbia pushed for a 
strict policy against Japanese settlers. Although there had been general fear of the 
‘Yellow Peril’ since Chinese migration started in the nineteenth century, anti-
Japanese feeling started to solidify during the interwar years. As well as concern 
over the supposed economic threat they posed, increasing Japanese militarism 
raised fears, particularly on the west coast of Canada (and America). As a result, 
Japanese settlers in the Dominion were increasingly identified as a danger. After 
Japan declared war on the US and the British Empire on 7 December 1941, 
tightened immigration procedures were followed by more decisive action, with anti-
Japanese feeling peaking at key points between 1937 (the Japanese attack on 
China) and 1942 (after the fall of European colonies to the Japanese). By 1942, 
discussions were held about moving Japanese settlers from coastal areas. Total 
evacuation was ordered on 24 February 1942, and all Japanese in Canada were 
ordered to relocate away from ‘protected zones’.128 
In the official mind, Japanese Americans were first and foremost Japanese, as 
German Jews were first and foremost German. In each case, past action or current 
persecution did not change the way this was understood by the British or the 
Americans. The connections, particularly in ideas about the dangers of racial enemy 
aliens, between British and American internment policy highlight important ways in 
which race mattered in interwar years and during the war. The threat of fifth-
column activity raised fears of the enemy within, and therefore racial stereotypes 
and coding became ways of directing policy. The imperial dimension made the issue 
even more complex in the colonies, but again race was an important guiding factor 
for many officials. 
REFUGEE PERSPECTIVES 
Colonial racial hierarchies and tensions were experienced and understood by those 
who found safety right across the empire. The lived experiences of Jewish refugees 
confirm how pervasive racial thinking was in the colony, both by showing the ways 
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in which refugees did or did not adopt a position in the racial hierarchies as well as 
the ways in which they recall how their own Jewishness mattered. This section will 
consider the refugees’ adoption of the role of ‘quasi-colonialists’ as well as their 
experiences of arrival, schooling and internment in Kenya, Cyprus and Jamaica.129  
On departure, children had little or no knowledge of the places to which they 
were going. Jill Pauly recalls how, before they left Germany, her mother took her to 
the library to look at books about Kenya, perhaps aware just how different the 
children would find the British colony. Jill remembers only having seen one black 
person before her family fled to Kenya: a woman in Cologne, who was wearing a 
black dress, white polka dots and red accessories.130 Walter Zweig also suggested to 
his wife that ‘you will have to explain to [Stefanie] that not all people are white’.131 
However, this proved to be little preparation for the changes, and Stefanie 
describes herself on arrival in Kenya as a ‘stunned, frightened little girl – who until 
then had thought all people were white-skinned and everybody talked German’.132 
These reactions were not confined to those children who found refuge in Africa. 
Silbiger recalls that during their approach to Trinidad, black police officers came on 
board. He describes how ‘[t]he men were wearing sparkling white uniforms and 
helmets, which gleamed in the bright sunlight, but under those helmets their faces 
were pitch black, or so they appeared. I had never in my life seen a black person in 
the flesh, only in picture books like Little Black Sambo’.133 These childlike memories 
of racial encounters reflect the particularity of experience for young people who 
fled to the colonies and whose worlds soon came to encompass the centrality of 
race. 
These sorts of observations were not limited to children. Sara Frankel, a 
university-educated refugee from Poland, found safety in various African colonies 
via Siberia, Tehran and Pakistan. In an interview, Frankel contrasts the experience of 
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first seeing a black person at university with that of witnessing the large African 
population in Mombasa, Kenya, which she describes as ‘a black wall’.134 
Many of the memoirs and oral testimonies of refugees highlight the racial 
hierarchies that existed in the colonies, identifying the dominance of the white 
community, the middle position of the Indian settlers and that black Africans 
occupied the very lowest position. For example, Helen Berger, in an interview, 
describes her colonial refuge, Trinidad, as a ‘typical’ colony with a ‘very strict social 
structure’. Berger recalls that white people there were either employed in a 
government position or were wealthy merchants, military or worked in the oil 
fields. This, she summarises, meant that ‘there were no poor whites in Trinidad’. 
Helen also identifies another social structure at play on the island: race. She recalls 
in the interview that it mattered ‘how black you were’ and that ‘you could be black 
if you were rich’ but that most black people were very poor.135 
Furthermore, refugees often ended up adopting the language and the racial 
discourse of the empire. For example, Heinz Bauer discussed in his memoir the best 
way to interact with the African people: 
They were certainly not like children, a popular and patronizing 
misconception, but they were also not, at least in an employer-
employee relationship, quite like our idea of a typical adult. They 
needed the consideration one gave an adult, but coupled with the 
firmness and understanding so essential in any successful parent. Like 
children, they had a keen sense of justice, and like intelligent individuals 
of any age, they could be persuaded by discussion [...] To be accepted 
and respected as a person in authority, an order had to be firm, clear, 
consistent, and, except in rare and special circumstances, irrevocable 
[...]I learned this time-tested colonial and diplomatic attitude quickly.136 
Bauer, while rejecting the wholesale ‘patronizing misconception’ of Africans 
as ‘children’, nevertheless appropriated significant aspects of the racist stereotype 
into his own perceptions of black Africans. Just as British officials had questioned 
whether the indigenous populations could understand a reversal of policy (i.e. 
regarding internment), Bauer too believed that orders had to ‘irrevocable’, in order 
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to maintain acceptance and respect (i.e. the superior position) in the eyes of the 
Africans.  
Furthermore, Bauer’s recollections provide an excellent insight into colonial 
racial structures, especially in regard to the hierarchies involved in employment. 
From his senior position on several different farms, he observed:  
I have often employed native craftsmen for building, some masonry, 
brick making, carpentry and similar jobs. I preferred them to the Indian 
artisans who typically watched the hours more closely than their 
workmanship and who, unlike the Africans, focused their minds 
narrowly on the job with little grasp of, or interest in the overall 
objective of the employer.137 
Similarly, several refugees used the word ‘boy’ to describe African men. Bauer 
notes that ‘[t]he only strange thing was that these men were always called ‘boys’, 
which seemed peculiar at first, but we soon got used to it’. Likewise, both Jill and 
Inge recall their daily walk to school during which they were accompanied by 
Kenyan men who worked for their family. Jill explained that ‘white children were 
not walking alone, so there was always an African boy that accompanied us’. 
However, Inge reminds her sister in the interview that ‘they weren’t boys, they 
were men’. Nonetheless, Jill goes on to say that the ‘black boys’, who were ‘so 
protective’ of the sisters and ‘took pride in walking [them] and bringing [them] 
home’.138 
Zweig also engages with the colonial hierarchies in relation to Indian settlers. 
In Nowhere in Africa, she writes that ‘Patel, the Indian who owned the shop, was a 
rich and dreaded man’, who ‘had discovered very quickly that people from Europe 
were as avid about their letters and newspapers as his compatriots were about 
their rice, of which he never had a sufficient supply anyway’.139 This idea is 
elaborated further in relation to the hiring of black help. Stefanie notes that their 
Indian landlord’s ‘cleverly thought-out psychological coup’ ensured that his white 
European tenants were ‘still able to afford help, which an unwritten law required 
for the white upper classes’. This not only served the purpose of the British, who 
wanted to ensure strong racial boundaries, but it also maintained for the refugees 
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‘the illusion that they were on their way to integration and had the same standard 
of living as the English in the houses at the edge of the town’.140 The ‘psychological 
coup’ implicitly recognises that Jewish refugees needed access to certain resources 
to affirm their whiteness. The complexity of this is highlighted by the fact that it was 
an Indian settler who provided this, a British citizen excluded from the British white 
world. 
Natalie Eppelsheimer argues that Zweig’s Nowhere in Africa displays ‘an 
internalized colonial mentality’ and a romanticisation of colonial Africa.141 This was 
perhaps manifested most clearly in Zweig’s relationship with Owuor, the African 
farmhand who not only saved her father’s life before Stefanie and her mother 
arrived in Kenya, but who also became the family’s essential guide. In the account 
of her first meeting with Owuor, Stefanie describes that: 
Owuor was wearing a long, white shirt over his trousers, just like the 
cheerful angels in the picture books for good children. Owuor had a flat 
nose and thick lips, and his head looked like a black moon. As soon as 
the sun shone on the droplets of sweat on his forehead, the droplets 
changed into multicoloured beads [...] Owuor’s skin smelled of delightful 
light honey, chased away any fear, and made a big person out of a little 
girl.142 
Her language draws on racial stereotypes (especially about Owuor’s physical 
appearance) that would have been common in British writing at the time.  
However, Zweig is not the only example of this. Walter and Helen Amelie 
Easton, Austrian Jewish refugees who lived and worked in Kenya from the late 
1930s to the late 1940s, have also displayed evidence of this ‘internalized colonial 
mentality’. Walter Easton recalls a fondness for the British way of life from his days 
as a young man working and studying in England. When visa restrictions prevented 
him from remaining in England on his student visa, he determined to become a 
British subject in ‘one of the Dominions or Colonies’. Although he initially planned 
to move to Australia, he was offered work in Kenya and moved there. Helen Amelie 
joined him in 1938, after which they married. They both provide vivid accounts of 
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their lives in Kenya, where they enjoyed a relatively comfortable life, coming from 
Walter’s prominent business role in the coffee industry.143  
Commenting on colonial hierarchies, Walter recalls that before the Second 
World War, ‘the natives looked up to the whites and thought they were pretty 
good’. He describes British colonialism as a ‘a very benevolent dictatorship’ and that 
this was engaged with local populations. Walter explains, ‘There was no corporal 
punishment or anything like that because it really wasn’t necessary’. This was 
because ‘the natives had a great deal of respect for their elders and they 
transferred that to the whites’.144  
In the interview, Walter and Helen share an exchange about whether white 
women felt threatened by African men. Walter concludes that European (white) 
women did not ‘expose’ themselves ‘too much because they [the African men] were 
still male’. He continues, ‘But you wouldn’t expose yourself in front of an orangutan, 
because he’s male and you know, the instinct is there, and that’s how you regard 
the native’. Taking the analogy further, Walter explains that African men were 
known as ‘Branch managers’ as ‘they had just come off the branch of a tree’. 
Despite this, and the acknowledgment of ‘a very strict colour bar’, both agree that 
relations were ‘very, very friendly’, a clear indication of the paternalistic racial 
attitudes they mirrored from many British officials.145  
Despite the adoption, at least in part, of the racial hierarchies of colonial 
Kenya, refugee identity was connected with feelings of otherness. For young 
refugees, these feelings started even before the moment of departure from Europe. 
Even very young children understood that their Jewish status was problematic, and 
Jill and Inge and Alexander Silbiger all identify feelings of fear as they left Europe. 
While many refugee children recall positive memories of their time in exile, a sense 
of ‘otherness’ also permeates their recollections. In the case of Kenya, this was 
highlighted in two clear examples: the British school system and the experience of 
internment.  
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Schooling was deeply important for many Jewish families, and re-establishing 
education after they entered the colony was a top priority. However, in Kenya, the 
foreign boarding school system separated refugee children from the educational 
and cultural traditions of their parents and threatened the religious life of Jewish 
families. As a result, for most refugee children, schools became sites of inter-
cultural tensions. The boarding schools made no provisions for practising Jews; 
Sabbath was not observed, and kosher food was not provided. 
The Bergs countered these challenges by enrolling their children as day 
students, but this only highlighted their sense of otherness, something which both 
Jill and Inge identify. Moreover, Jill specifically recalls antisemitic responses from 
teachers and pupils in her school, including a teacher who told her class that there 
was a ‘[l]ittle German Jewish spy in our midst’. Another incident involved outright 
violence from a member of staff, who used a ruler to beat her on the legs.146 
Stefanie Zweig’s encounters were no less mixed. She recalls some of the areas 
of tension, including the type of uniform refugee children were likely to wear. She 
wrote that they ‘were made from inexpensive material and had certainly not been 
purchased at the appropriate store for school supplies in Nairobi: instead they were 
sewn by Indian tailors. Almost none of the children wore the school insignia’.147 
Stefanie speculates that the differences between the Jewish and English 
students must have been observable to the head-teacher at her school. Refugee 
children: 
hardly ever laughed, always looked older than they really were, and 
were driven by excessive ambition when measured by English standards. 
These serious, uncomfortably precocious creatures had barely mastered 
the language, and that had happened surprisingly fast, when, through 
their curiosity and drive, which even to devoted teachers could be 
annoying, they became outsiders in a community in which only success 
in sports counted.148 
Stefanie’s observations reflect her perspective on the differences between 
white British and refugee ‘others’. These recollections also adopt various 
stereotypes: Jews as ‘masters’ of language, ‘curious’ and with ‘drive’ and ambition, 
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in opposition to the more physically powerful British, to whom success in sport was 
most valued. This shows not only the ambiguous position Jewish refugees occupied 
in the colony (as part of the white world but never fully accepted) but also how this 
was internalised and understood by refugees.  
Internment was another experience that highlighted refugees’ precarious role 
in colonial society. Zweig recalls that ‘[t]he only important thing now was to protect 
the country from people who by birth, language, education, and loyalty might be 
linked more closely to the enemy than to the host country.149 This identity change 
particularly affected Jill Pauly who speaks passionately about the subject: ‘nobody 
there was bright enough to figure out that the Jews were being persecuted by the 
Nazis, that they were not spies for Germany’.150 Such feelings, again, were not 
limited to child refugees. Helen Berger recalls her father’s reaction at being interned 
in Trinidad: ‘He was so deeply hurt that the British could think of him as an enemy 
alien when he was a refugee’. Berger then explains that this limited his interaction 
with others in the camp and blinded him to the struggles others faced in the 
difficult conditions of the internment camp.151 
Refugee recollections attest to a contradictory experience: being forced to be 
part of the colonial community and yet always set apart from it was the reality of 
the lived experience of many refugees in colonial settings. No matter how fully 
refugees adopted their designated role in the colonies, they were always perceived 
as ‘other’, a consequence of both racial perceptions and the tensions over 
assimilation influenced by liberalism. The contested whiteness of the Jews forced 
the British to compromise some of the rigidity of the racial hierarchies of the colony 
to preserve the overall dominance of white over colonial ‘others’, including 
indigenous black African populations, as well as other colonial populations such as 
Indian migrants. The financial and ideological cost of ensuring that Jewish refugees 
conformed to the necessary functions of white settlers (e.g. having black servants) 
was a relatively small price to pay for maintaining (at least in the official mind) the 
British imperial system.  
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*** 
Rather than Richard Breitman’s observation that ‘British policy did not rest primarily 
on prejudice’ but was ‘rather, a question of priorities’, this chapter has shown that 
the two were in reality difficult to separate. In the British colonies, priorities were 
often based on racial assumptions. Ideas about different groups (i.e. Jews, 
indigenous black populations and Asiatic settlers, particularly Indians) formed an 
important context in which decisions were made.  
Specifically in the question of land settlement, the prioritisation was clear: 
white British over Indian settlers and black indigenous populations. These priorities 
were highlighted and tested when Jewish refugees became part of the discussion. 
On the one hand, Jews, distinctly not ‘British’, were white Europeans and therefore 
prioritised over Indian settlers in terms of land, largely because it supported white 
dominance in the colonies. On the other hand, Jews were also seen as a potentially 
malign influence, from which Britain sought to protect Indian artisans and black 
Africans. Finally, in all these discussions, the sense of British whiteness was affirmed 
and perpetuated. In the case of internment, the fear of negative Jewish influence, 
particularly in relation to fifth-column activity, as well as stereotyped images of 
local populations as particularly susceptible to negative influence, created the 
boundaries of policy. 
However, much insight is lost if we simply write off the Colonial Office as a 
racist institution; rather, as outlined in the introduction to this chapter, it is 
necessary to try to understand the intent of policy rather than just its 
manifestation. Louise London argues that while ‘prejudice against Jews was 
considered [to be] unacceptable if it formed an explicit part of a social or political 
programme’, ‘moderate indulgence in social anti-Jewish prejudice was so 
widespread as to be unremarkable’.152 This is a vital point. Those making policy did 
so in the belief that they were being helpful. Many were genuinely concerned that 
mass Jewish migration would cause more antisemitism and that uncontrolled 
immigration to the colonies threatened indigenous populations who were in British 
‘trusteeship’.  
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Moreover, by examining where these racial perceptions met and the 
prioritisation of one over the other, much is revealed about the complex ways in 
which race impacted policy. It offers new insights into the ambiguities and 
ambivalence of British refugee policy and their response to the Holocaust. Racist 
assumptions were part of a broader social framework in which colonial officials 
operated. It was not impossible for officials to feel genuine sympathy towards 
refugees, paternalistic instincts towards indigenous populations as well as holding 
(what we would identify today to be) racist attitudes. This chapter demonstrates 
that racial perceptions were key to colonial policy-making decisions. Officials 
understood the world in which they functioned in racial terms. This was not a 
simple division between black and white; even whiteness had shades. Jewish 
refugees were not simply European; they were considered to be something ‘other’ 
as well. The perceived otherness of Jews manifested itself in ways that are easy to 
label as antisemitic (which they often were) but more importantly, official actions 




Empire and Refugees: A Clash of Humanitarianisms 
 
In the previous two chapters, this thesis established that the extent and nature of 
British policy towards Jewish refugees were shaped by the contradictions and 
constraints of liberalism, which were also, in part, a response to racial perceptions, 
specifically of Jewish refugees, of imperial citizens and of white British policy-
makers. Liberalism and race also both helped define the British response to the 
wider question of humanitarianism that the refugee crisis prompted. This chapter 
will outline the tensions in British policy regarding various kinds of 
humanitarianisms. It will explore the conflict between immediate refugee relief 
(emergency humanitarianism) and longer-term colonial development (alchemic 
humanitarianism). Within this conflict, the influence of national and international 
relations will also be assessed, as humanitarian action was both a manifestation of 
domestic and national goals and a broader engagement with the world. Britain’s 
reputation, particularly in the US, was challenged by action (and inaction) in the 
colonies as well as towards refugees. These interactions will be assessed more fully 
through two case-studies: the British response to vessels carrying refugees towards 
British colonies and the policy of internment. A study of the clash of 
humanitarianisms provides the final stepping stone to understanding the policy of 
compromise that emerged among colonial officials – that of linking refugees to 
colonial development – which is the subject of the final chapter.  
For scholars who look to explain the Allies’ responses to the Holocaust, 
humanitarianism (or the lack of it) has featured highly in their assessments. 
Although much of this work makes important observations about the place of 
humanitarianism in policy-making, it presents action or inaction as a failure of 
humanitarianism, implicitly viewing the issue from our contemporary perspective. 
This chapter will avoid the issue of ‘presentism’, a potential danger in assessments 
of this nature, by seeking to understand more fully the international humanitarian 
context of the interwar years.  
Wasserstein criticises the lack of humanitarianism shown by officials (and 
governments) in response to the Holocaust when he argues that only ‘[a] few 
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flashes of humanity by individuals lighten the general darkness’ of British refugee 
policy.1 Both Marrus and Sherman outline that humanitarianism was prioritised 
below a number of other factors. Marrus argues ‘restrictionist and anti-immigrant 
sentiment’, ‘economic depression’, ‘nationalistic priorities’ and a ‘fear of foreigners’ 
all ‘blunted [...] humanitarian appeals’.2 Sherman, in regard to Britain, argues that 
high levels of unemployment in Britain, ‘anti-refugee’ attitudes ‘of certain organised 
professions and associations’, resentment caused by helping foreigners with 
government funds and the fear that offering help would establish precedents for 
aiding other groups in the future, all overrode ‘[t]he humanitarian issue’ as well as 
‘the older British tradition of asylum for the political refugee’.3 
Louise London also identifies an absence of humanitarian drive in British 
government policy towards Jewish refugees. Although ‘Nazi persecution of 
European Jews confronted the world with an unprecedented humanitarian 
challenge’, she argues ‘countries around the globe resisted the pressure to take 
special measures to relieve Jewish suffering’. Although London acknowledges that 
some action was taken to help and that, at an individual level, humanitarianism was 
sometimes the motivating factor for this action, she stresses that it did not form a 
central part of state policy-making decisions. London instead reasons that British 
policy was ‘an expression of the values of the society that produced it’ and that 
‘[r]adically different policies would have required a different set of values’. As such, 
London concludes that ‘humanitarianism was hardly one of the determining values 
of the political civilisation from which it sprang’.4 While London provides an 
unparalleled account of the British political and bureaucratic culture, her conclusion 
could perhaps be explored more fully by a deeper assessment of the ‘political 
civilisation’ she mentions, of which international humanitarianism was a part. 
Both Feingold and Kushner crucially identify the connection between 
humanitarianism and the interwar political environment. For Kushner, Realpolitik 
and international reputations were crucial: ‘The democracies engaged in 
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humanitarian one-upmanship while restraining their help to the Jews within 
increasingly narrow bounds’.5 Indeed, the perception of action, both at home and 
abroad, was a key factor in the development of ‘humanitarian’ policy in the 
interwar period. 
That said, Feingold identifies the difficulties of attributing political bodies with 
human (contemporary) responses. In relation to the US, he explains that:  
When there was no clear-cut legal responsibility, it proved difficult to 
elicit from the nations a voluntary response on humanitarian or moral 
grounds. Nation states like the United States are man-made institutions, 
not man himself. They have no souls and no natural sense of morality, 
especially when it concerns a foreign minority which is clearly not their 
legal responsibility. 
 
He takes the argument further, arguing that: 
It is difficult to separate the charge that the Roosevelt Administration 
did not do enough to rescue Jews during the Holocaust years from the 
assumption that modern nation-states can make human responses in 
situations like the Holocaust. One wonders if the history of the 
twentieth, or any other century, warrants such an assumption, 
especially when the nation-state feels its security threatened.6 
 
This chapter will unpack the assumption identified by Feingold more fully, 
exploring whether during the interwar years a nation-state could and should have 
acted against perceived national interests in response to humanitarian need. First, it 
will argue that international humanitarianism was at a particular stage in its 
development and, as such, judging its perceived failures by contemporary standards 
is as unhelpful as it is anachronistic. More broadly, it will argue that 
humanitarianism was not a singularly-defined idea, and therefore a consideration of 
different kinds of humanitarianisms is necessary to understand Britain’s response to 
the refugee crisis. These issues will be considered by assessing the history of 
humanitarianism, the place of humanitarianism in international relations and the 
connections between humanitarianism and empire. The colonial context adds 
complexity to the argument that humanitarianism simply failed in the 1930s; 
instead, it shows that various kinds of humanitarianisms existed and that action was 
a result of the prioritisation of these within a general framework of Realpolitik.  
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A HISTORY OF HUMANITARIANISM? 
The assumption that liberal democracies failed to act humanely towards Jewish 
refugees stems in part from the fact that humanitarianism in the interwar period 
has not been properly historicized. More generally, academic studies of 
humanitarianism focus on recent (particularly post-1990) events, while histories of 
humanitarianism have largely described events after the Second World War, 
although recently, a growing body of literature on specific events in other periods 
has developed.7 Furthermore, scholars such as Michael Barnett, Brendan Simms, 
David Trim and Johannes Paulmann have started a discussion on the longer history 
of humanitarianism as an idea and in action.  
For example, Barnett has identified three ages of humanitarianism: imperial 
humanitarianism (1800-1945), neo-humanitarianism (1945-1989) and liberal 
humanitarianism (1989-present).8 After examining these, Barnett offers the 
following definition of humanitarianism: 
We can certainly understand it as a form of compassion, but in practice 
it has three marks of distinction: assistance beyond borders, a belief 
that such transnational action was related in some way to the 
transcendent, and the growing organization and governance of activities 
designed to protect and improve humanity.9 
 
Barnett’s views are not fully accepted by all scholars. For example, Johannes 
Paulmann identifies a different way of mapping the development of 
humanitarianism. Paulmann identifies three ‘historical conjunctures’: (1) the 
changes produced by the First World War ‘when the collapse of empires on the 
European continent and its peripheries coincided with the establishment of the 
                                                          
7
 Simms and Trim make the observation specifically in regard to ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
(Humanitarianism Intervention, pp. 2-3), and Barnett focuses on the post-1990 period (Empire of 
Humanity, p. 7). Barnett is a political scientist, and he is potentially referring to works in that area. 
Historians have produced studies of humanitarianism for specific periods and in relation to specific 
topics. The interwar period, for example, has recently received more attention. See Keith Davis 
Watenpaugh, ‘The League of Nations’ Rescue of Armenian Genocide Survivors and the Making of 
Modern Humanitarianism, 1920-1927’, The American Historical Review, 115/5 (2010); Michelle 
Tusan, ‘“Crimes against Humanity”: Human Rights, the British Empire, and the Origins of the 
Response to the Armenian Genocide’, American Historical Review, 119/1 (2014); Antonio Donini, 
‘The Far Side: The Meta Functions of Humanitarianism in a Globalised World’ Disasters (2010). 
8
 Barnett, Empire of Humanity; Paulmann, ‘Conjunctures’, p. 221. 
9
 This definition of humanitarianism highlights what Barnett views as its essential elements. He 
recognises that ‘[t]his classification [...] differs from many books on the subject, which define it as 
the impartial, neutral, and independent provision of relief to victims of conflict and natural disasters’ 
(Empire of Humanity, p. 10). 
169 
League of Nations as a focal point for humanitarian efforts’; (2) the ‘[p]ostcolonial 
conflicts, the demise of large-scale development schemes, and societal mobilization 
in the West changes the humanitarian field’ in the 1960s and early 1970s; and (3) 
the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, which witnessed ‘increased dynamism’ in 
‘international humanitarianism’.10  
Whatever the periodisation adopted by historians, these more recent studies 
of humanitarianism highlight a much longer history than previously presented. 
Humanitarianism is an idea that has evolved over time, and the interwar years are 
considered to be a significant moment in the development of international 
humanitarianism. A brief overview of the development of humanitarianism, with a 
detailed assessment of the interwar years, helps illuminate why this period was of 
such importance and how shifting ideas about humanitarianism interacted with 
liberalism and views on race and helped to produce a distinct colonial policy 
towards Jewish refugees. 
Individual acts of compassion, motivated by religion or ideology, are as old as 
humanity itself. The traditional starting point for organised humanitarianism 
involves Henry Dunant, a Genevan businessman who stumbled across the horrors of 
war when travelling as part of his commercial endeavours in 1859. The battle he 
witnessed in Italy between French and Austro-Hungarian troops left Dunant 
appalled. In response, he established the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) in 1863, an organisation that was heavily involved with the development of 
the first Geneva Conventions.11 
The creation of the ICRC is representative of the broader origins of 
humanitarianism. The nineteenth century was a period of great change, when new 
political, social and economic forces were breaking down existing communities and 
connecting people across bigger distances. The horrors of war (and the fact that 
these were more readily known about away from the front line) as well as the 
growth in religious (especially non-conformist) groups are important factors in this 
change.12  
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The First World War marked an important turning point, when 
humanitarianism started to move away from voluntary, often religiously-motivated 
action. The violence and destruction of the First World War led to the development 
of an internationalism which sought political and economic integration in the 
pursuit of peace. However, this internationalism was based entirely on Western 
notions of civilization, which included liberal and racial ideas discussed in previous 
chapters.13 The League of Nations nonetheless made significant contributions to the 
development of international humanitarian aid on issues such as refugees, 
epidemics and famine.14 A particularly lasting legacy of this was the work of Fridtjof 
Nansen and the structures of refugee advocacy he helped create in the interwar 
years (see chapter one), including the creation of the role of High Commissioner for 
Refugees.15  
The League of Nations, while making some positive contributions to the 
humanitarian concerns of the interwar years, also represented one of the potential 
problems with an expanding international humanitarian community: an intrusion 
into state sovereignty. For many European states, the League was not a genuine 
tool for action but rather a forum in which they could appear to be taking action, 
while actually protecting national interests.16 This, when connected to the refugee 
crisis where international intervention on both the creation of refugees by nation-
states (e.g. when this was caused by persecution or expulsion) as well as the 
reception of refugees in other countries, challenged the cherished ideal of state 
sovereignty. Clearly then, in the interwar years, refugees were not simply a 
humanitarian problem, but also one of international relations.17 
The history of refugees bears this out. It was only in the context of the 
emerging nation-state that refugees became a problematic issue. Before the 
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widespread creation of political, economic and cultural hegemons, refugees did not 
exist in the same way; without a nation-state to which to belong, people simply 
crossed borders without becoming a legal, political or social ‘other’.18 In the 
interwar years, concepts of national identity and belonging became more rigid, and 
therefore immigration and refugee controls were issues that threatened national 
identity and challenged notions of ‘belonging’. It was this context that allowed 
refugees in humanitarian need to be seen as a dangerous ‘other’ with the charge of 
fifth-column activity or potential spies appearing frequently in the discourse. 
Non-governmental action also continued in the interwar period but 
increasingly took on a new international dimension. The creation of ‘Save the 
Children’ (SCF), established by Eglantyne Jebb and her sister Dorothy Buxton (co-
author of You and the Refugee) in the summer of 1919, exemplifies this. The 
movement, originally established to help the victims of war in Germany and Austria, 
soon expanded and offered aid to women and children victims of the 1921-22 
famine in Russia. However, SCF, an ‘explicitly populist and avowedly apolitical’ 
movement, helped formulate ‘one of the most potent arguments for international 
humanitarianism’ in the interwar years, particularly in Britain where it helped to 
‘expand the notion of British humanitarian responsibility to encompass not just 
relief but reconstruction’. Moreover, it was responsible for the Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child, which was ratified by the League of Nations in 1924 and was one 
of the first statements of its kind.19 
Similar organisations developed in response to other specific crises, for 
example in the context of the Near East. Near East Relief (NER) took action to help 
Armenian Christians, particularly children, by establishing orphanages, schools and 
training. Importantly, the methods used in this process came from experience of 
‘educational programs implemented in the Southern states’ of the US. Pointing to 
the embedded ‘paternalism and colonial stances’ evident in NER history, Davide 
Rodogno observes, ‘[t]he local context for NER activities was certainly different 
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from the American South, but nonetheless, NER saw the Near East as an under-
developed region to which American “modernity” could be brought’.20  
The fact that international organisations such as the League of Nations 
flourished alongside non-governmental bodies is suggestive of the different ideas 
about humanitarianism present in the interwar years. These included the 
(sometimes imperial) politics of the League of Nations, the social causes of charities 
(e.g. Save the Children and NER), and the religious motivations of missionary 
groups. While the commonalities between these organisations will be discussed in a 
moment, they also represented variations in the expression of humanitarianism. 
Indeed, the interwar years can most helpfully be viewed as a period of 
‘humanitarianisms’. Scholars have certainly noted this. Specifically, Barnett 
identifies two distinct strands of humanitarianism. The first, emergency 
humanitarian action, responds to specific events and seeks to alleviate suffering in 
an immediate sense. This would include intervention in the case of war or after 
natural disasters. The second strand, which Barnett calls ‘alchemic’ humanitarian 
action, seeks longer-term answers to humanitarian needs and, as such, intrinsically 
links ideas of development and social welfare (e.g. health and education) to bigger 
questions of state-building, including the creation of Western-style democracy.21  
These two strands are not completely distinct, as both emergency and 
alchemic humanitarianism share some fundamental beliefs, particularly in the 
interwar period. First, both of these strands assumed that Western intervention, 
whether in the short or long term, was the best way of helping those in need. 
Second, models of help were taken from Western experiences and often imposed 
on those in need with little reference to local needs, beliefs or cultures. The 
foundation of these fundamental beliefs was the view that ‘civilization’ was 
Western, and recipients of aid required guidance towards this end. This meant that 
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humanitarianism, particularly in the interwar years, was connected very closely with 
paternalism. Barnett outlines this in the following way: 
The humanitarian spirit also incorporated ideologies of paternalism. 
Although humanitarianism contained discourses of human equality, 
they also existed alongside discourses of Christianity, colonialism, and 
commerce that deemed the ‘civilized’ peoples superior to the backward 
populations. This superiority, in turn, gave them a moral obligation to 
assuage their suffering and help them improve their lot by ridding them 
of the traditions that had condemned them to a life of misery. 
Intervention, in other words, was intended to produce emancipation 
and liberation as defined by the civilized. In this way humanitarianism’s 
emancipator spirit also contained mechanisms of control.22 
 
These ideas underscored action across the range of humanitarianisms 
including the League of Nations mandate system (discussed below) as well as action 
taken by charities such as NER to help educate – on Western models – children in 
Eastern Europe. Although liberalism dictated a preference for meeting the needs of 
individual Jewish refugees, when it came to education, racial ‘others’ were grouped 
together and responded to with shared policies.23 
Moreover, the connections between humanitarianism and paternalism are 
relevant to the colonial sphere and warrant further investigation. The imperial 
context offers a unique framework through which to analyse the limitations of 
British action towards refugees through the study of a clash of two 
humanitarianisms: emergency and alchemic.  
HUMANITARIANISM AND THE EMPIRE 
Within the last five years, scholarly attention has turned to the connections 
between empire and humanitarianism. Michael Barnett’s Empire of Humanity is one 
of the first texts to explore the connections between the two ideas, but he is not 
alone in identifying the importance of looking at these issues together.24 The 
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connections between empire and humanitarianism are wide-ranging. They touch on 
both the imperial nature of the global humanitarian networks that have developed 
in our society, as well as how humanitarianism was both underpinned by and used 
to justify imperial rule, particularly in the interwar years. It is this second connection 
that this thesis explores more fully. R. Skinner and A. Lester outline the ways 
interwar humanitarianism and imperialism were connected: 
Empire remained a powerful reference point and model for 
international humanitarianism well into the twentieth century. The 
architects of international organisations following the First World War 
saw bodies such as the League of Nations as a means to secure imperial 
(which tended to mean British imperial) interests rather than undermine 
the power of empire. [...] While humanitarianism had begun to operate 
within an international arena, the ideological foundations of liberal 
internationalism were themselves shaped by the moral and political 
frameworks of empire.25 
British humanitarianism – and the impetus for action – was also frequently 
used as a justification for empire. Again, Skinner and Lester observe: 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the focus of metropolitan 
humanitarians had become fixed on the perceived need to protect 
indigenous peoples from the malign effects of imperialism and settler 
colonialism. To an extent, this might be interpreted as a result of an 
increasingly pessimistic view of the intractability of humanitarian issues, 
combined with a burgeoning popular support for biological explanations 
of racial difference. In the intellectual climate of the early twentieth 
century, the protectionist position of metropolitan humanitarians 
converged with developing ideologies of segregation and indirect rule, 
which seemed for some to offer a modicum of security against the worst 
excesses of imperialism.26 
 
These ideas played out in real imperial examples. In relation to humanitarian 
responses to leprosy in the empire, K. Vongsathorn argues that ‘[h]umanitarianism 
during the colonial period was grounded in the idea that the British, with their 
superior culture and civilization, had a moral obligation to improve the lives of their 
colonial subjects by drawing them out of backwardness through the teaching of 
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civilization: the civilizing mission’. As outlined earlier, this ‘civilizing mission’ (and 
the responsibility it implied) was, in the nineteenth century, linked to international 
prestige.27 
Another key example in which the empire met with humanitarianism was in 
the context of the League of Nations mandates. US President Woodrow Wilson 
challenged the traditional idea that territorial gains were the natural spoils of war 
when he called for the internationalisation of former German and Ottoman 
territories at the end of the First World War. The territory lost by the Germans was 
eventually divided between three categories: ‘A’ Mandates included ‘Arab 
provinces’ that ‘were on the threshold of independent statehood’; ‘B’ Mandates 
included Germany’s former territory in tropical Africa and was thought to be in an 
‘intermediate’ category of development; and ‘C’ Mandates were the least 
developed territories, including former German islands in the Pacific and territory in 
South-West Africa. Although there was opposition to League involvement from both 
Britain and France, they both ultimately agreed to the mandate system, largely as 
Wilson had imagined it.28 
As a result, the creation of the mandates was considered to be a victory for 
anti-imperialists and humanitarians who viewed the First World War as evidence of 
the failure of European imperialism. As Callahan argues:  
They were a departure from the nineteenth-century pattern of 
extending European national sovereignty into Africa. The Wilsonian goal 
of systematic accountability and international supervision for European 
imperialism remained intact despite two years of powerful and active 
resistance by some Europeans and passive resistance by many others.29  
While the mandate system did challenge traditional imperialism, the new 
mandates were still ‘predicated’ on the notion that Western powers (collectively) 
had the ability (and right) to guide others to ‘civilization’, and in this sense, the 
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justification for imperial and development forms of humanitarianism had not 
necessarily disappeared.30 
Mark Mazower takes this even further, connecting the ideological origins of 
the League as well as the subsequent United Nations to an imperial framework. He 
offers an assessment of the role of Jan Smuts, the South African politician and 
father of the apartheid system, who was a strong supporter of the League and 
infamously wrote the preamble to the United Nations Charter. The appeal of 
international bodies like the League (and then the UN) to Smuts was that he 
believed that they would bolster British imperial power and, with a 
characteristically racial angle, that it was the responsibility of white Europeans to 
guide the rest of humanity to civilization. He believed that the ‘Commonwealth’ was 
an ideal model for international co-operation, and his legacy can be seen in the 
resulting bodies.31 
The empire formed a crucible for the complex array of perceptions and 
differences that dominated British colonial policy, as well as providing some of the 
ideological foundations of how Western powers conceived their humanitarian role. 
Skinner and Lester argue that ‘European humanitarians’ political desire to change 
the world arose out of their colonial encounters and activities, while their desire to 
save individual lives in peril, outside the arena of politics, had more Eurocentric 
origins’.32 Thus, by looking at the empire and humanitarianism together, we are 
afforded the opportunity to analyse the true role of different humanitarianisms in 
the formation of policy.  
The clash of emergency and alchemic humanitarianisms in the context of the 
refugee question in the empire points to the conclusion that it was not so much a 
failure to engage in emergency humanitarianism but a prioritisation of alchemic 
humanitarian action which ultimately limited British action in the Jewish refugee 
crisis. This was particularly clear in the treatment of refugees who attempted to 
enter British colonial territory without the correct documentation. 
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ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION, REFUGEE BOATS AND EMPIRE 
The clash of emergency and alchemic humanitarianism is most dramatically seen in 
the way that colonial officials responded to the sailings of vessels carrying refugees 
who more often than not did not have the right kind of documentation to afford 
them legal entry into their destinations. The following examples from the West 
Indies and Cyprus show how liberalism and race played an important part in the 
way officials responded to this particular immigration and humanitarian challenge. 
The ill-fated sailing of the SS St Louis from Hamburg to Cuba and back to 
Europe again has become symbolic of British and American failure to help refugees 
and of the failure of Allied humanitarianism in response to the Holocaust more 
generally. Although there were many other vessels which carried refugees to places 
of safety only to be refused entry, it is this particular event that has come to 
represent ‘the failure of rescue before the Second World War and the unwanted 
status of the Jewish refugees’. Kushner argues that although ‘the Nazis are 
responsible for the urgency to escape [they] are rarely part of the main storyline 
once the ships left Hamburg’, which in turn has allowed ‘others to take their place 
as the villains of the piece’.33 These ‘villains’ have emerged as the British and 
American governments. Indeed, the story of the St Louis appears in numerous 
museums and, along with the suggested bombing of Auschwitz, has become 
symbolic of bystanders’ failure to help victims of the Holocaust.34  
The St. Louis, a luxury cruise ship from the Hamburg-American Line (Hapag), 
left Hamburg on 13 May 1939 with 937 passengers, many of whom were Jewish.35 
When the vessel arrived at Havana Harbor on 27 May, it was not allowed to dock 
and was forced instead to anchor in the middle of the harbour for six days. It 
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departed Havana on 2 June to travel slowly in the waters between Cuba and Florida, 
during which time negotiations took place over the future of the refugees on board. 
This included communication from the refugees to US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, to which he infamously remained silent. Although the American 
government was reluctant to approach publicly the Cuban government, an ‘informal 
conversation’ did take place between Ambassador J. Butler and the Cuban Secretary 
of State, in which ‘the humanitarian aspects of the situation and the danger of 
negative publicity for Cuba’ was stressed.36 
With no resolution forthcoming, on 6 June, the ship began its return to 
Europe. At this time, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Britain agreed to 
provide the passengers refuge. While even in the 1990s, it was assumed that many 
of those who returned to Europe had perished, work by historians at the USHMM 
uncovered individual stories of many of the passengers. In total, 620 passengers 
were returned to Europe and of these 365 survived the war.37 Like all those caught 
up in the Holocaust, the fate of those on board varied greatly. Clark Blatteis, for 
example, was a seven-year-old child when his parents left Germany for Cuba. After 
being returned to Europe (Antwerp), the Blatteis family began an odyssey that took 
them from Berlin (via Buchenwald and Dachau for Clark’s father Ernst [Elias]) to 
Brussels and Toulouse, through Spain and into Morocco. In 1948, the family 
received visas for the US. Less fortunate were Herbert and Vera Ascher, Naftali 
Begleiter, Arthur Blanchmann and Walter Friedman. Records note their arrival at 
Auschwitz, after which their names disappear, suggesting that they perished in the 
gas chambers.38 
Although it has been argued that those on the St Louis could have been 
allowed to enter America, Breitman and Kraut explain:  
The passengers of the St. Louis could not have entered the United States 
legally without new legislation or some kind of executive order. They 
could not be considered visitors or tourists, for both of these categories 
had to have a home country to which to return. They could not be given 
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immigration visas without depriving other German applicants, who had 
registered earlier, of their visas.39  
This final point is significant, especially when considering the role of 
humanitarianism in policy-making. As a result of the political culture (shaped by 
liberal ideas of fairness) and the economic circumstances of the 1930s, refugee 
entry was a question of priorities. Therefore, to allow the disembarkation of 
refugees on board the St Louis would have jeopardized the fate of others who were 
waiting in Europe for their quota number and the chance to leave for safety in the 
US. For example, historian Marc Aronson uses the example of his mother, who 
might have been trapped in Europe instead of being allowed entry to America on 
the quota number she had received.40 There was also a genuine fear among Allied 
government officials that the acceptance of refugees in circumstances like those of 
the St Louis would only encourage both further discriminatory action by Germany as 
well as more and more people to attempt illegal entry. This was not an unfounded 
concern, as Nazi attempts to hasten emigration led to their encouragement of the 
issuing of fraudulent paperwork by various South American and Caribbean 
consulates.41  
Moreover, the entry of large numbers of refugees (not to mention the illegal 
entry of such people) was believed by many officials to cause a rise in domestic 
antisemitism, creating difficulties for those refugees who had already been granted 
entry. In 1938, the British Cabinet was made aware of an M.I.5 report which warned 
that ‘the Germans were anxious to inundate this country with Jews, with a view to 
creating a Jewish problem in the United Kingdom’.42 In the case of the West Indies, 
Norman Bentwich ‘expressed the opinion privately that the German authorities 
were actively conniving at the departure of refugees to any country where the 
immigration laws permitted the entry of aliens upon payment of so many pounds 
deposit money’, and he agreed that immigration regulations should be tightened as 
a result.43 Bentwich was an important campaigner for European Jewry, and as a 
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former colonial official (with experience in Palestine) and League of Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees from Germany (1933-1935), was well placed to 
comment on the refugee question in the empire.44 
Whether or not the German government was actually trying to create 
problems for Britain through German Jewish immigration, or if it rather reflected 
officials’ own anti-Jewish sentiment, the question of generating a domestic (or 
colonial) Jewish problem featured in many written justifications of inaction.45 With 
hindsight it is easy to suggest that unlimited numbers of refugees should have been 
granted entry; however in the context of the 1930s, it was a dilemma for officials 
that required them to make a prioritisation of needs. Although not exactly the 
same, the dilemma was one that colonial officials also faced.  
By examining three examples of ships carrying refugees that specifically 
sought entry into British colonies, the realities and limitations of humanitarian 
concern are made clear. As these ships approached various colonial ports, officials 
were forced to make decisions which provide evidence of the tensions between and 
prioritisations of different humanitarian needs.  
THE SS KÖNIGSTEIN AND SS CARIBIA 
The SS Königstein, owned by the Red Star Line, was chartered to leave Hamburg for 
the British West Indies on 23 January 1939 with 297 (other accounts put the figure 
at 165) Jewish refugees. It was organised by a travel agency in Vienna, possibly 
under instruction from a local Jewish organisation.46 It was originally planned that 
the vessel would sail for Trinidad on 20 January, but when Trinidad’s newly-
implemented (see below) tight immigration restrictions were made known, sailing 
was postponed until 2 February, on which date it left for Barbados.47 The sailing of 
this vessel and those refugees on board were enough to prompt defensive action in 
destination territories across the West Indies. Several officials warned that should 
the Königstein be refused entry in Barbados, it would ‘try some other [West Indian] 
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colony’. The decision was therefore made to ‘warn them all’, providing colonies in 
the West Indies with the opportunity to take any action deemed to be necessary to 
limit entry in the event of the arrival of the Königstein.48  
There were already general concerns about refugee entry in West Indian 
territories, linked to unrest seen in the area in 1936, when economic difficulties 
manifested themselves in violent riots. The British government established a Royal 
Commission, headed by Lord Moyne, to report on the causes of the riots, which 
were a concern particularly because of the territories’ geographical proximity to the 
US. The commission’s report was considered to be so damning that its publication 
was postponed until after the war; however the problems that it raised reinforced 
for officials in Whitehall and on location the preference for restrictive refugee entry. 
In this case, the needs of the colonies, particularly in such a volatile area, were 
prioritised over the emergency needs of refugees. However, more fundamentally, it 
was the nature of the attempted entry of refugees on vessels such as the Königstein 
that also contributed to the decision for restriction. The attempt to ‘force’ entry 
challenged liberal principles of fair play, and therefore the Colonial Office 
maintained a firm line and encouraged those on location to do the same. 
The Trinidad government, which was warned of the impending arrival of the 
Königstein, had already accepted about 600 refugees and identified several 
resulting problems: a ‘serious shortage of housing accommodation’, which 
ultimately ‘constituted a danger to the health of the community’. As a result, it was 
argued that ‘the absorptive capacity of the Colony in regard to alien refugees had 
been reached’.49 Moreover, those refugees who had already arrived described how 
‘some 2,000 Jews in Germany had applied for passages to the Colony’, raising fears 
of a mass influx of refugees with which the colony could not cope.50 Bennett 
concurred, explaining that ‘[in] the interests of refugees themselves as well as of 
Trinidad I feel convinced that this indiscriminate immigration, which has gone far 
                                                          
48
 K.E. Robinson, minute, 10 February 1939, CO28/325/4, TNA. 
49
 MacDonald to Colonel H.L. Nathan, 13 March 1939, CO295/612/1, TNA; Other estimates placed 
the number of refugees to have entered Trinidad at 500, making the population density about 225 
per square mile (Robinson, minute, 10 February 1939, CO23/325/4, TNA). 
50
 Hibbert to Brooks, 20 January 1939, CO295/612/1, TNA. 
182 
beyond “infiltration” must be stopped’.51 In territories that had experienced 
economic hardship and unemployment problems, colonial officials felt a duty to 
solve alchemic problems, both for the sake of colonial populations and for Britain’s 
international reputation. These were both prioritised more highly than the 
emergency needs of the refugees, particularly as refugees not only threatened to 
diminish funds available for solving the (perceived) more pressing needs, but also 
fundamentally added to these existing problems.  
The policy was further endorsed when, only three days after the departure of 
the Königstein had been discussed, the Governor of Trinidad was made aware of 
the SS Caribia. The Caribia, also of the Hamburg-American Line, had learned that it 
would not be allowed to land in Belize and subsequently set course for Trinidad, 
due to arrive on 29 January. Many of its passengers had departed after learning that 
their landing permits were invalid. When the vessel arrived in Trinidad, only two 
female passengers (along with their babies) were allowed to disembark, a decision 
thoroughly endorsed by Malcolm MacDonald: 
I fully appreciate the unfortunate circumstances of these refugees but I 
am satisfied that the Trinidad Government have acted as 
sympathetically towards them as they could in the circumstances, 
having regard to conditions in the Colony and the impossibility of 
absorbing further refugees for the time being.52 
In this example, MacDonald placed social stability in the colonies above the 
immediate need of refugees. This once again illustrates the prioritisation of the 
imperial version of humanitarianism, developmental in nature, above emergency 
relief. Drawing on views of assimilation and race, MacDonald concluded that the 
colonies had acted sympathetically enough to refugees when considering the needs 
of the colony.  
The discussions surrounding the arrival of these vessels corresponded with a 
growing anxiety about the perceived open nature of the West Indian colonies’ 
immigration legislation. Indeed, in early January 1939 (coinciding with the proposed 
departure of the Königstein and Caribia for the West Indies), the Governor of 
Trinidad called for the enactment of emergency legislation that would ‘prohibit the 
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immigration of refugees for a period of six months from 15 January 1939’.53 This 
successfully reversed the situation in which the colony was open to any immigrant 
who had $250 for the ‘immigration deposit’.54 In so doing, it ‘declared that alien 
refugees would be deemed on economic grounds to be undesirable immigrants’.55 
Although technically approved by Whitehall, when changes were made by the 
Governor, officials in London were ‘a little surprised to find that the terms of the 
Order [...] discriminate against a number of countries by name’.56 These included 
‘Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Danzig, Memel, Lithuania, Romania 
and Italy’.57 Whitehall had thought that ‘the scope of any Order would be general’, 
but in the form it was presented, it was ‘by no means certain that the Order [...] 
may not conflict with commercial treaties and arouse justifiable protests’.58 The 
growing international community, both humanitarian and legal, placed obstacles in 
the path of complete government control. Nonetheless, limited refugee entry was 
still achieved.  
While the Caribia’s journey had ultimately ended in Venezuela, the 
Königstein, having postponed sailing for Trinidad, eventually set sail for Barbados in 
early February. Barbados was also keen to limit refugee entry. Again, this was 
justified by the problems in the region and the findings of the unpublished Royal 
Commission. It was explained that ‘the overcrowding of the island is the main 
problem [...] There are between 1100 and 1200 persons per square mile’. According 
to Robinson, this very fact ‘merits every justification for Barbados to restrict any 
influx of refugees’.59 Added to this concern was the Colonial Office’s warning that 
the: 
possibility of refugees being able to return to Germany if required is 
exceedingly remote and it is also very doubtful whether and if so, how 
soon, they could arrange to proceed to another country if accepted by 
Barbados as transmigrants. Further, there is grave danger that if any 
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substantial number of refugees is allowed to land, it would almost 
inevitably encourage the sending of further ship loads from Germany.60 
Overall, it was argued that ‘a serious population problem in Barbados unfortunately 
forces this Government to adopt the attitude that all immigrants to Barbados are 
unwelcome unless they come as visitors or as persons who will assist in the 
economic development of the Colony’.61 
Like Trinidad, existing immigration regulations in Barbados left entry open to 
those who could find ‘guarantees from local residents’. Again like Trinidad, this 
prompted Barbados to speedily generate new regulations that would afford the 
Governor ‘absolute discretion to prohibit the entry into the Colony of any aliens’.62 
Officials in Whitehall disagreed, arguing that existing regulations were ‘strict 
enough to deal with any attempted influx’.63 Indeed, as Trinidad tightened its own 
immigration legislation, applications to other West Indian colonies, including 
Barbados, increased. This points to the connectedness of the region and the value 
of examining at the area as a whole, particularly in relation to refugee policy.64 
While officials in London were not calling for unlimited refugee entry, 
complications caused by the changing international system meant that they 
preferred to work within existing parameters to solve refugee problems. This point 
is also made by Newman, who argues:  
Whilst the Secretary of State had concurred with the Trinidad 
legislation, justified in his view because of the large numbers present in 
the colony, he was unwilling to allow other colonies to specifically 
exclude certain groups be introducing new legislation. Existing 
legislation had already provoked protest from Chinese and Indian 
governments (over the amounts of deposits asked for) and given the 
international attention focused on Britain’s part in solving the refugee 
crisis, specific legislation barring refugees would provoke criticism from 
refugee bodies and foreign governments.65 
Ultimately, S.J. Waddington, the Governor of Barbados, made an explicit 
prioritisation of colonial needs over those of the refugees. He explained that: 
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while the Government would wish to bear its share in helping the 
refugees in their unhappy plight, I do not feel justified in suggesting that 
a policy, which I regard as essential for the well-being of the Colony 
should be relaxed in the special case of refugees.66 
When the Königstein arrived in Barbados on 18 February, no passengers were 
permitted to land, as none could produce the necessary landing permits.67 The 
Colonial Office supported the position taken by the Barbados government.68 
Although there were times when the Secretary of State would try to override local 
decisions, when it came to the well-being of the colony, refugee policy was always a 
lower priority. In fact, Robinson suggested that Barbados was a ‘special case’. He 
argued that restrictions should be implemented, even after MacDonald’s 
instructions to the colonies on 1 December 1938 to make every effort to help 
Jewish refugees.69 
The response to the Königstein and the Caribia evidence the tension within 
British policy over different kinds of humanitarianisms and how this was resolved. 
Many officials felt that the persecution of the Jews in Europe was wrong. However, 
as one official nonetheless stated, ‘it is absurd going off to the West Indies “on 
spec” and then trying to bludgeon ones’ [sic] way in on grounds of special 
hardship’.70 Clearly refugees, even those escaping persecution in Nazi-controlled 
Europe, were not believed to be entitled to special help because of their particular 
and difficult circumstances. Officials felt strongly that there was a right way and a 
wrong way to seek entry and that ‘jumping to the front of the queue’ was 
unacceptable. In this, we get to the heart of the reasons behind the prioritisation: 
the liberal indignation that Jews (not refugees) would try to gain unfair precedence 
in terms of entry. Added to this, officials, worried about the local problems in the 
West Indies, understood to be linked to population problems, responded by further 
limiting the entry of refugees. Attitudes towards Jewish refugees, while sometimes 
harsh, were constantly viewed in relation to the needs of the colony, highlighting 
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not a rejection of humanitarianism per se, but certainly a preference of one kind 
over another. 
CYPRUS AND ‘JEW-RUNNERS’ TO PALESTINE 
A similar prioritisation can be seen in relation to refugee entry into Cyprus. In the 
early summer of 1939, the British Colonial Office was asked to assess the 
possibilities of establishing a temporary camp in Cyprus for Jewish refugees that 
were stuck on board the SS Frassola, an illegal ‘Jew-runner’ bound for Palestine. The 
boat had left Sulaiva, Rumania for Haifa in April 1939, carrying approximately 750 
Czechs, of which about two-thirds were Jewish.71 Illegal immigration sought to 
bypass the immigration restrictions imposed by the 1939 White Paper. Although a 
source of tension since 1934, the problem reached new levels in 1938-1939. Indeed, 
in 1939, out of 27,561 immigrants to Palestine, 11,156 had entered illegally. From 
this point onwards, the British government worked tirelessly to reduce illegal 
immigration to Palestine, and Wasserstein argues that after September 1939 this 
amounted ‘almost to a war within a war’.72 Cyprus, geographically close to 
Palestine, became part of the frontline. 
The context of war only increased the feeling in the British government, 
particularly in the Colonial Office, that sailings of illegal immigrants into Palestine 
were part of German aggression, either by the infiltration of enemy agents or by 
provoking illiberal (and thereby politically and diplomatically embarrassing) British 
action. One Foreign Office memorandum described such illegal sailings as: ‘an 
organised invasion of Palestine for political motives, which exploits the facts of the 
refugee problem and unscrupulously uses the humanitarian appeal of the latter to 
justify itself’.73 Wasserstein emphasises that some colonial officials were especially 
‘paranoid’ about Jewish intentions when it came to Palestine and illegal entry. For 
example, Shuckburgh argued in 1940 that: 
I am convinced that in their [Jews’] hearts they hate us and have always 
hated us; they hate all Gentiles. [...] So little do they care for Great 
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Britain as compared with Zionism that they cannot even keep their 
hands off illegal immigration, which they must realise is a very serious 
embarrassment to us at a time when we are fighting for our very 
existence. 
 
In fact, Wasserstein identifies a ‘departmental view’ within the Colonial Office that 
not only favoured the White Paper but that took ‘every practicable administrative, 
diplomatic, and legal device to counter illegal immigration to Palestine’.74  
It is infamously known that the first British shots fired in the Second World 
War were at Jewish refugees fleeing persecution in Europe. The Tiger Hill, a vessel 
carrying 1,400 illegal immigrants from across Eastern Europe, was shot at after 
landing the immigrants on a beach in Tel Aviv.75 The action contravened orders that 
vessels carrying illegal immigrants were not to be fired upon.76 When MacDonald 
was questioned about the incident in Parliament, he explained: 
The ship in question attempted deliberately to ram and sink a 
Government patrol launch, which was therefore obliged to fire on the 
ship in self-defence. To authorise the indiscriminate landing of refugees 
in Palestine would worsen rather than improve the security position 
there, which is at present satisfactory [...].77 
 
However, the Tiger Hill was only the first of several vessels which attempted 
to land in Palestine and against which Britain took action. For example, in December 
1939, the Rudnitchar, a Bulgarian river steamer which had originated in Varna was 
unsuccessfully intercepted. It landed, and its 505 passengers were able to 
disembark. Even after those on board were captured, their deportation back to 
Bulgaria, as recommended by the High Commissioner, was deemed to be 
‘impracticable’, and many of them ultimately settled in Palestine. The British also 
attempted to intercept the S.S. Hilda, a Greek vessel which carried some 728 illegal 
immigrants, of which 675 were German or Czechoslovakian, supposedly bound for 
Paraguay. British officials were prepared to go to significant lengths to prevent the 
illegal entry of those on board, including the arrest and internment of the vessel’s 
passengers. Even after it was discovered that the British had no legal grounds for 
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this action, it was suggested by some that ‘retrospective legislation’ could be used. 
The Sakarya, which sailed under the Turkish flag and carried 2,176 refugees, 
including 801 women and children, had a similar experience.78 
After the failure of the interceptions of the Rudnitchar, Hilda and Sakarya, the 
Colonial Office resorted to ever more desperate measures, including the suggestion 
that assistance be withheld from ships carrying illegal immigrants which had 
become stuck in ice on the river Danube. Mass deportation to the country of origin 
was also proposed. Both of these ideas were never enacted, but the High 
Commissioner of Palestine called for stricter immigration regulations. These were 
approved by the Colonial Office and allowed for the issue of severe fines (up to 
£1000) and three years’ imprisonment for those responsible for any vessel carrying 
illegal immigrants. The illegal immigrants themselves were subject to a £100 fine 
and up to six months of imprisonment. Britain’s reaction to Jews’ attempted entry 
has been heavily criticised by some scholars.79 However, by looking at the question 
from the perspective of Cyprus, a clearer understanding emerges as to why Britain’s 
constructive policies were so limited and its obstructive ones so severe.  
The Frassola, having been refused entry into Palestine, ‘wandered from port 
to port, forbidden to land anywhere’. As a memorandum for the Colonial Office 
outlined, ‘[f]ood soon got scarce, drinking water became [...] unusable, there were 
no washing facilities, and the heat in the holds of an iron-built boat in the 
Mediterranean summer was indescribable’. In July 1939, scurvy broke out onboard, 
and the ship was temporarily allowed to dock in Beirut; the French doctors who 
examined the ship compared its conditions to slave ships. Towards the end of July, 
the vessel was asked to move on – a bomb had been thrown in the Jewish quarter 
of Beirut, signifying local dissatisfaction with the situation – but the ship was in such 
bad condition that they were once more allowed to renew their period of stay. It 
was nevertheless feared that those on board would ultimately be forced to return 
to Rumania.80 
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At this point, a group of concerned members of the Society of Friends who 
were all in Beirut appealed to Lady Astor (the first female MP in Britain, 1919-1945) 
to intercede on the refugees’ behalf. She complied and corresponded with colonial 
officials, including MacDonald, about the plight of the refugees.81 During this 
correspondence, Lady Astor passed on the powerful pleas for aid which explained 
that: 
It seems impossible to allow all those people to return to what may 
mean death and at best a miserable existence, not to speak of the waste 
of socially useful material: there are 26 doctors among them, a number 
of lawyers, of regular army officers and other highly trained people, 
including a former representative of his country at the League of 
Nations.82  
 
The phrase ‘socially useful material’ is jarring; more so as it was written by a 
group of people who fit the traditional profile of interwar internationalists and 
humanitarians. The appeal’s pragmatic discourse reflected at least the perception of 
what drove official British humanitarianism; the authors of the appeal sought to 
convince British officials not with moralist or ideological arguments for emergency 
relief, but with the practical benefits these Jews would bring to Britain and its 
empire.  
The plea also made specific reference to temporary entry into Cyprus: ‘If we 
mention Cyprus in the telegram, it is because of its nearness, and because we 
believe that there would be there plenty of room for a temporary refugee camp’. 
The letter acknowledged that Cyprus had already refused them entry but argued 
that this was for ‘ordinary settlement’ and that they hoped that Cyprus could be 
approached once again, this time on the basis of ‘temporary landing under strict 
camp conditions’.83 Essentially, they requested special treatment, because of the 
extreme difficulty of the refugees’ situation. 
When the Colonial Office referred the request to the Cyprus government, the 
Acting Governor replied that the establishment of such a camp was not possible. He 
argued that: 
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Refugees are feared by the Cypriot with such peculiar [...] force that 
assurance respecting [the] temporary nature of [the] proposed 
settlement would have little effect and it would certainly be felt that this 
was not only a breach of recent promise but [a] threat to destiny which 
would not have arisen if Cyprus had not been part of the British 
Empire.84 
 
The Cyprus government’s response, which clearly ignored the pleas for special 
treatment by and on behalf of the refugees, was welcomed by the Colonial Office. 
In fact, Bennett commented that ‘unless it was decided for reasons of high policy to 
press Cyprus further, offsetting the harm done there by the major embarrassment 
avoided’ was not necessarily worth it, and therefore the plan to settle refugees in 
Cyprus should be abandoned. Generally, therefore, the perceived political dangers 
for Cyprus and a broader reluctance to aid illegal immigrants to Palestine meant 
that the plan was never supported.85 Hibbert, in characteristically plain speech, 
wrote that: 
I do not think we could have expected any other reply from the Acting 
Governor of Cyprus, and I will say without making any bone about it that 
I am extremely glad he has taken the line he has. I imagine the Foreign 
Office will accept his views. If they don’t, I sincerely trust we shall insist 
upon their doing so. Otherwise we shall be in for a whole packet of 
trouble.86 
 
More broadly, the response highlights Colonial Office prioritisation of 
different humanitarianisms. Harold F. Downie (the head of the Colonial Office 
Mideast Department) and A.B. Acheson outlined their support for the Acting 
Governor ‘if only on the ground that we owe a greater duty to our Cypriot citizens 
than to alien Jews’. Those on board the Frassola were seen as ‘alien’ rather than 
‘refugees’, again reinforcing the view that they were not to be afforded any special 
treatment. Downie and Acheson went on to note that:  
If diseases break out on these ships it will no doubt be a terrible thing, 
but presumably the crew will dump their cargo into the sea and I cannot 
see that any responsibility can be attached to us because the 
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immigrants fail to survive what they well know to be a dangerous 
adventure.87 
 
This statement encapsulates the British colonial priorities: a recognition that the 
plight (and disease) suffered by the refugees was awful but that no special action 
could be expected of Britain in response to it. Moreover, the blunt terms in which 
this was stated highlighted the acceptability of this view.88 
Ironically, Cyprus did become an important location for post-war displaced 
persons camps, which held Jewish refugees who attempted to enter Palestine 
illegally. By 1943, refugees were accepted in significant numbers into Cyprus: 4,833 
extra persons, including 4,630 refugees from Greece. Cyprus acted ‘as a clearing 
station for refugees from the Balkans, taking up to 400 at a time, vacancies being 
filled as parties were dispersed to other areas’. During the war, political difficulties 
were compounded by practical restrictions: ‘beds, bedding, furniture and every kind 
of household utensil are in extremely short supply’. A report suggested that Cyprus 
‘cannot do more on account of shortage of materials, potential enemy action and 
politics’.89 
In the pre-war period the question of illegal immigration was one of liberal 
principle for officials, and because of the perceived risks it posed, officials were 
reluctant to allow refugees who sought to enter Palestine illegally to settle. In fact, 
over the question of illegal immigration, Bennett noted that ‘whatever may be the 
merits of individuals, the ship-load as a whole deserve no sympathy whatever from 
H.M.G.’.90 This feeling must have only provided further motivation to prioritise the 
needs of the local population (i.e. alchemic humanitarianism) over the needs of 
refugees (i.e. emergency humanitarianism). 
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INTERNMENT  
The question of refugee internment also presented challenges for officials in which 
humanitarian concerns for refugees were set against broader domestic (and 
imperial) concerns. Chapter three established that perceptions of race were central 
to the policy of internment both in terms of questioning Jewish identity and in the 
way that local populations responded to it. It was in this context that internment 
presented the most explicit clash of the emergency humanitarian needs of the 
refugees and the alchemic needs of the colonies. 
Internment also offers an insight into external factors that impacted 
humanitarianism, particularly the way that state sovereignty and international 
relations also helped tip the scales in the preference of one kind of humanitarianism 
over another. This is particularly clear in the details of the practical implementation 
of internment. Concern for the ‘emergency’ humanitarian needs of Jewish refugees 
who found themselves interned is evident in policy discussions. However, this was 
always placed alongside the specific needs of the colonies, both in terms of security 
during the war and regarding colonial populations. Ultimately, whether interned or 
left at liberty, the presence of Jewish refugees in the colonies, particularly during 
the war, presented officials with an humanitarian as well as political challenge, and 
this is evident in both the records of official policy and in the refugee experience. 
This section will explore these challenges by, firstly, outlining the internment 
crisis and the challenge to humanitarianism it represented in both Britain and the 
colonies. It will then use specific examples from the colonies and refugee testimony 
to illustrate policy in practice (i.e. prison uniforms, holding Jews and non-Jews 
together). The examples used here include refugee testimony from Kenya, Cyprus 
and Jamaica. Refugees place their experience in the context of a lack of 
humanitarianism in British policy and raise questions regarding how they, having 
escaped persecution (and sometimes captivity) once before, should find themselves 
treated as such once again. When these accounts are juxtaposed with official 
accounts, the clash of humanitarianisms becomes clear. Refugee internees were 
conceptualised by their relation to the colonies (i.e. as enemy aliens) rather than by 
their own personal status as refugees in need of help. This reality is telling of the 
period of transition in international humanitarianism and international relations 
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that this thesis covers and offers further evidence of how war can be a point of 
‘conjuncture’ (or not) for government-led humanitarian action. 
As established in chapter one, in May 1940 mass internment was called for in 
Britain following the fall of France and the fear of ‘enemy aliens’ in Britain. Many 
thousands of ‘enemy aliens’, including Jewish refugees, found themselves no longer 
at liberty. Although policy changed again by the summer of 1940, internment 
marked the former internees as well as British policy itself. However, internment as 
a policy in war was not unique to the Second World War. The British first used 
internment camps in the empire during the Boer War. In December 1900, it became 
official policy that Boer farmers and their families who had surrendered would be 
held in camps. However, because ‘Africans were part of the Afrikaner economy, 
lived and worked on Boer farms, the British were forced to create policy to 
accommodate thousands of displaced Africans as well’, resulting in camps for both 
black and white inmates.91  
At the end of the war, nearly 28,000 white inmates had died in the camps, the 
majority of whom were women and children. 14,000 black inmates also perished, 
with black victims dying at much higher rates than white inmates. Although the 
death rates shocked many, well-established views on race were evident in the fact 
that the much higher African death rate was hardly reported in the British press. In 
the South African War, when two white minorities fought each other in the context 
of a territory with a black majority, the fear of the ‘other’, especially when they 
looked so physically similar, was a turning point in how ‘other’ groups could and 
would be treated in times of war.92  
Although controversial, a policy of internment was also followed in the 
domestic context during the First World War when up to 30,000 people were held 
as ‘enemy aliens’. The action, however, points to a changing dynamic in British 
policy, marking a move away from a policy of refuge and asylum, to one of 
increasing restrictions for immigrants. Indeed, as Kushner and Cesarani argue, it 
represented ‘the surrender of a Liberal government to xenophobic public opinion 
                                                          
91
 Paula Krebs, Gender, Race and the Writing of Empire Public Discourse and the Boer War 
(Cambridge, 1999), pp. 35-36. 
92
 Ibid., pp. 5, 33, 52. 
194 
that articulated stereotypes of the foreigner as conspirator, criminal and 
degenerate that had been present in popular culture for decades’. Even after the 
war ended, ‘many thousands of “enemy aliens” remained interned and there was 
determination inside and outside of parliament to remove the alien presence 
altogether’, a push that was institutionalised in the 1919 Aliens Act.93  
In the later interwar years, as another war approached, officials once more 
contemplated how to deal with ‘enemy aliens’.94 Attitudes had clearly moved on 
since the end of the First World War, and internment was not initially envisioned, 
either for practical reasons such as cost or, for fewer officials, on humanitarian 
grounds. As a result, at the outbreak of war, wholesale internment was not 
adopted, and instead a series of tribunals were established which sought to 
categorise ‘enemy aliens’ according to risk they were believed to pose.95 However, 
when Britain felt most vulnerable, the general internment of enemy aliens was 
called for and took place in both Britain and the colonies. As Aaron L. Goldman puts 
it:  
After the disaster at Dunkirk at the end of May invasion and air attack 
became serious possibilities [...] during these months when invasion 
seemed likely [and] it appeared that the very existence of the country 
and its democratic system were endangered, tolerance reached its 
lowest point.96  
However, during the Second World War, British action towards internment 
was significantly impacted by concerns over its reputation with other international 
powers, particularly the US. Burletson argues that the Home Office ‘had to remain 
permanently aware of the allied and neutral countries’ attitude towards internment 
in Britain’ as ‘[a]n alienated American public could seriously affect Britain’s military 
                                                          
93
 Tony Kushner and David Cesarani, ‘Alien Internment in Britain during the Twentieth Century: An 
Introduction’, in: David Cesarani and Tony Kushner (eds), The Internment of Aliens in Twentieth 
Century Britain (London, 1993), pp. 2-3, 12. 
94
 Ibid., p. 3. 
95
 Richard Dove, ‘A Matter which Touches the Good Name of this Country’, in: Richard Dove (ed.), 
‘Totally Un-English’?: Britain’s Internment of ‘Enemy Aliens’ in Two World Wars (Amsterdam, 2005), 
p. 12. 
96
 Aaron L. Goldman, ‘Defence Regulation 18B: Emergency Internment of Aliens and Political 
Dissenters in Great Britain during World War II’, The Journal of British Studies, 12/2 (1973), p. 123. 
195 
position’.97 Internment , while not popular, did not generate as widespread 
discontent as did specific events, such as the infamous sinking of the Blue Star Liner, 
the Arandora Star, which was carrying internees from Britain to Canada. The 
Arandora Star had set sail for Canada on 30 June 1940, carrying 473 Germans and 
717 Italians, all of whom had been selected for deportation for security reasons. En 
route to Canada, the vessel was hit by a German torpedo and went down 
somewhere off the west coast of Ireland. Large numbers of those on board 
drowned, including 146 Germans and 453 Italians.98 
The Arandora Star was part of a larger movement of internees, refugees and 
civilians from the UK to the Dominions. This was undoubtedly connected to the 
more general pattern seen in this thesis of Britain displacing domestic issues to the 
colonies when possible. During the height of the internment crisis, when many in 
Britain feared imminent invasion and were concerned about fifth-column activity, 
the British government had asked Dominions including Australia, Canada, 
Newfoundland and South Africa to help by taking category ‘A’ internees, those 
considered to be most dangerous to Britain. Canada and Australia agreed to this. 
Refugee internees were also included in those to be relocated.99 
In total, Canada agreed to receive 2,633 German internees from category ‘A’, 
1,823 prisoners of war and 1,500 pro-fascist Italians.100 In July 1940, Australia 
accepted 2,732 male internees.101 Later, internees in Britain’s African colonies were 
moved to South Africa, an issue that was to present colonial governments with 
problems as war and internment persisted. The sinking of the Arandora Star, along 
with ‘scandals’ on other vessels transporting internees to the Dominions – including 
The Duchess of York (carrying 2,108 German and Austrian internees and 523 
prisoners of war) on which two men were wounded and one shot dead by a British 
officer, and the SS Dunera, which set out for Australia with 2,532 German and 
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Austrian internees and 200 Italians, all of which were kept in ‘appalling conditions’ 
and ‘were robbed and beaten’ – generated public anger at the policy.102 The 
movement of refugees between Britain and the Dominions was stopped, which also 
coincided with the reversal of the general policy of internment. In Britain, and also 
internationally, the mass internment of people, including many refugees, was 
growing increasingly unpopular and could no longer be justified by Britain which 
wanted to maintain its liberal, humanitarian reputation.  
While the main contours of British policy have been outlined, the question of 
how far these were replicated in the colonies has yet to be explored. When the 
decision was made for mass internment in Britain, the colonies were informed of 
this. A circular telegram sent to those territories considered to be in most imminent 
danger stated that ‘[i]n view of possible attack and similar enemy activities, [the] 
Home Secretary has ordered [the] internment of all male German and Austrians 
over 16 and under 60 years old (excluding infirm or invalid) in [the] Eastern Half of 
[the] United Kingdom’. It went on to explain that such ‘measures are defence 
measures taken as a matter of urgency in an area which must be regarded as a zone 
of possible operations’. Similar action was encouraged in the colonies where it was 
felt that ‘there is possibility that in the event of war with Italy parachute attacks and 
subversive activity might be attempted’. Therefore, the colonies were instructed, 
‘you should consider, in consultation with local service authorities, whether in that 
event it would be desirable that restrictions on similar lines should be placed in 
aliens resident in the territory with which you are concerned’. Although it was 
explained that ‘it is intended that measures will be relaxed should circumstances 
permit’, the feeling of panic was clearly conveyed to the colonies and the mass 
internment of enemy aliens soon followed. 103 In the context of the colonies, this 
decision for mass internment reveals the ways in which the perceived needs of the 
colonies, particularly in relation to alchemic views of economic and democratic 
development, were prioritised over the treatment of Jewish refugees who, in the 
context of the war, had become ‘enemy aliens’. 
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Refugees themselves note the change in circumstance that the war caused. 
However, refugee testimony suggests that internment was experienced much 
earlier in the colonies than in the UK. Although ‘Advisory Committees’ were 
established to check the credentials of ‘enemy aliens’, the recollections of Zweig, 
the Berg sisters and Bauer all suggest that they experienced internment very soon 
after the outbreak of war. Zweig recalls that: 
The war brought new challenges. The only important thing now was to 
protect the country from people who by birth, language, education, and 
loyalty might be linked more closely to the enemy than to the host 
country [...] Within three days, all enemy nationals from the towns and 
even those from the remote farms had been handed over to the military 
forces in Nairobi and informed that their status had been changed from 
‘refugee’ to ‘enemy alien’.104 
As established earlier in the thesis, refugees entered various colonies as 
immigrants rather than refugees, which made it easier for officials to prioritise local 
concerns over the humanitarian concerns of a ‘foreign immigrant’, especially one 
from an enemy country. Bauer, as an older male whose internment was 
inconvenient and relatively light, accepted the government’s decisions, whereas the 
Bergs and Zweig, as young children who had harder times vis-à-vis the British, were 
more critical. This highlights that there was no humanitarian framework established 
to identify and protect refugees by limiting government action against them. 
However, for other refugees, no humanitarian framework was needed to help 
them cope with their experiences. Hedi Heim, in her account of internment in 
Cyprus remembers emphatically that the very fact that they were in a British colony 
reassured her during her experience. In an interview, Heim recalls feeling ‘shock’ at 
her husband’s internment but that she ‘knew they would not treat him badly’ as 
Cyprus was ‘still a British colony’. Heim expands, ‘it was not the Germans who were 
there, it was the British Government’, emphasising ‘British’ in her oral testimony. 
Finally, Heim concludes, ‘And since the British Government had allowed us to come 
in, we were still under their protection. We were not at all afraid about it’.105 
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Similarly, Hertha Klinger, when asked if she was scared of internment while a 
refugee in the West Indies, responded, ‘not really, no, not really, because we knew 
the British would not do anything drastic’.106 Helen Berger, in reference to her 
internment in Trinidad directly linked the internee experience with Britain’s wider 
colonial humanitarianism, explaining the lack of support the refugees received 
when in camp by saying the ‘British colonies were something else in those days’ as 
‘they didn’t help their own people’.107 
It is clear that, unlike in the UK where mass internment was abandoned after 
‘the harshness of the government’s policy was being denounced’, the movement to 
a policy of release in the colonies was less quickly and less consistently adopted.108 
In a minute dated 5 April 1941, Robinson recorded that ‘the Secretary of State has 
recently discussed the whole question of internment policy in the Colonies and has 
expressed serious misgivings as to the extent to which policy in many Colonies has 
been allowed to diverge from the policy adopted in the United Kingdom’. Robinson 
went on to explain at length that: 
in some cases Advisory Committees had been presented with no 
evidence whatever in support of the detention of the individual and 
instead of reaching the proper conclusion, namely that the man should 
be released, the committee came to the extraordinary view that they 
were unable to make any recommendations.109 
Whitehall’s unease but ultimate acceptance of certain aspects of colonial 
internment policies was clearly based on their appreciation of the fact that an 
empire comprising fifty-five territories and ‘60,000,000 people of different races, 
religions, civilisations, in different stages of development’ required individual 
policies tailored to the specifics of each territory.110 In a meeting of important 
colonial officials (including Colonial Secretary Moyne, Parkinson, Dawe, and other 
senior colonial officials, Boyd and Calder), it was decided that the best way to deal 
with the ‘difficulties of bringing the Colonies into line with the more liberal policy 
adopted here since last autumn’ was for Moyne to send a telegram to ‘all colonies 
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[...] drawing attention to the change of policy [...] and indicating that he would wish 
serious consideration to be given to the possibility of similar action being taken in 
the colonies’.111 Examples from across the colonies clearly suggest that in the 
imperial setting the reversal of the policy raised problems for officials in terms of 
the way it was viewed by those outside of the government. Examples from three 
colonies – Cyprus, Kenya and Jamaica – illustrate in different ways that the 
implementation of internment in the colonies constantly saw the policy placed in 
the context of humanitarian concerns as well as political expediency.  
Documents on internment in Cyprus provide a telling starting point for this 
assessment. Given Cyprus’ location in the Mediterranean and in close proximity to 
Greece and Palestine, there were significant security concerns on and about the 
island. Nonetheless, officials in Whitehall were pleased with the efforts made in 
Cyprus to follow the example of British policy, noting that: ‘the Governor of Cyprus 
has made a real effort to apply the general policy’.112 As in Britain, the summer of 
1940 witnessed large-scale interment on the island, and 171 enemy aliens were 
interned. In official files, this total number was broken down and categorised by 
nationality and racial identity:  
Germans and Austrians Italians 
Jews: 84 Of pure Italian descent: 7 
Aryans: 22 Not of pure Italian descent: 58 
Table 1 – Cyprus Internees in summer 1940113 
By March 1941 ‘all but 46’ had been released after the cases had been 
considered by an Advisory Committee.114 Jewish internees were more numerous in 
the original internment, which was in part connected to the higher concentration of 
Jewish refugees on the island resulting from several years of small-scale refugee 
entry. However, figures from January 1941 show that of the thirty-six Jewish 
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internees still held in November 1940, twenty-five had since been released. Of the 
fifteen ‘Aryan’ internees held in November, none had been released by January 
1941.115 
Although later pressure ensured that attempts were made to release genuine 
refugee internees, no initial distinction was made between those who had fled to 
the colony seeking refuge and those who had migrated for other reasons. As one 
official noted: ‘[t]he chief difficulty in carrying out the investigations arose in the 
cases of Jews and Italians. The principle adopted in all cases of doubt was that the 
onus lay upon the internee to prove his sympathies and ties of association with the 
British Empire’.116 
Implementing internment in Cyprus in the summer of 1940 was initially a 
security concern, at which point the needs of the colony and the British war effort 
were placed above the needs of Jewish refugees. Later efforts to respond to 
individual cases were, for some, an expression of concern for refugees. Calder 
minuted in December 1940 that ‘Cyprus and Tanganyika have been able to 
investigate individual cases and release considerable numbers’ of internees. He 
pushed for other colonies including Kenya and Jamaica to do the same, in order 
‘that considerable hardship and injustice would [...] [be] avoided’ but in such a way 
that ‘the security of the territories in question would not [...] [be] adversely 
affected’.117 
Calder’s parameters exemplify the way that different kinds of 
humanitarianism (and practical politics) were in tension in the implementation of 
internment policy and points to the compromise that defined colonial refugee 
policy more generally. Liberalism was clearly an underlying influence, with the mass 
internment of ‘enemy aliens’ necessary on security grounds but the ‘hardship’ of 
individual Jews also a concern. Race was also present in the discussions, as seen in 
the use of ‘Jews’ and ‘Aryans’ to categorise groups in official documents.  
Frederick Wohl was interned in Cyprus and his experiences mirror the 
narrative established in official files. He recalls how he was interned when the 
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Germans occupied Greece. At this point, ‘every refugee and every person who had 
arrived [...] on Cyprus with German papers was interned’. An all-male internment 
camp was opened next to the prison in Athens and was populated largely by Jews. 
Wohl estimated that there were ‘maybe about twenty real Germans who were kept 
strictly to themselves’. Those in camp were forced to stay in tents, in dusty 
conditions, and had to decide between themselves what to eat from the food they 
were provided. Because of his language skills, Wohl was put in charge of creating a 
menu each week. He describes how: 
after about a month in that tent camp, the authorities realized that [it] 
was not a good place to leave us because people got sick. [So] they 
moved the camp to a hotel up in the mountains. [...] [I]t was naturally 
behind [a] wire fence; but otherwise it was just like a vacation. 
At this point, the government started to check individual papers. His father 
was one of the first to be released, and Wohl himself was released about three 
weeks later. Wohl also describes the impact internment had on the Jewish 
community: ‘the Jews, Jewish refugees – thanks also to [internment] – [...] got to 
know each other, and they drew together’. This reflects a pattern seen in other 
refugee memoirs that suggests there was a redefinition, or a reclaiming, of Jewish 
identity for many refugees. Jewish refugees did not just impact the colony; the 
place of refuge also impacted the refugee.118 
Wohl’s experiences foreground the practical difficulties that internment 
presented to following a policy that responded to the ‘emergency’ needs of the 
refugee internees. The initial camp was not considered to be suitable, and the 
refugees were therefore moved. This points to the fact that internment was a 
hastily constructed policy that resulted from the changing nature of the war as 
much as genuine feeling against all enemy aliens. That the refugees were 
subsequently placed in a hotel and that the experience ‘was just like a vacation’ 
suggests that the needs of the refugees were not so much as ignored as shifted in 
line with the difficulty of implementing internment policy. Likewise, the presence of 
‘real Germans’ in the camps seems to have been a rather minor issue for Wohl; 
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despite the fact that they were identified as different in official files, the status of 
the refugees did not necessarily impact their treatment. 
Kenya’s record of following Britain’s internment policy was not as strong as 
that of Cyprus. For a particular group of internees in Kenya, the story became more 
complicated still when they were, along with others from various British African 
colonies, transferred to South Africa in 1941. The continued internment of these 
‘enemy aliens’ included those classified as Jews, or of Jewish descent, and 
generated much debate in the Colonial Office. This was acknowledged at a senior 
level. Shuckburgh, who had written passionately about the nature of German 
‘enemy aliens’, articulated this in a minute from the summer of 1941, when he 
explained: 
The general trend of opinion in this Office during the last few months, if 
my impression is correct, has been in the direction of a more lenient 
attitude towards these interned enemy aliens; and there seems to be 
the feeling that, in many cases, Governors acted harshly and hastily 
during the crisis of 1940 and that the time has come in which the 
balance ought to be redressed. I know that I am in a minority, possibly in 
a minority of one, but I should like to record that I have not the least 
sympathy with the sentiment to which I have referred. I have always 
been profoundly sceptical about the “anti-Nazi” German, and I believe 
that, in nine cases out of ten, he is just as dangerous as the men who 
does not pretend to be anything but the Hun he is. We are dealing with 
a race of savage beasts, and the fact that some of its members whine 
and fawn when in captivity does not mean that they can safely be set at 
large.119 
Other officials called for a more open-minded response, including Calder who, 
as discussed in relation to Cyprus, felt that the continued policy of internment 
‘causes unmerited hardship in individual cases’.120 Calder once again expressed the 
tension within liberalism that made the treatment of individual internees more 
problematic for officials that the principal of general internment. Other views 
centred on the changed security situation in the Mediterranean and Africa. 
Although initial concerns about African territories’ security had prompted the call 
for internment in the colonies, by 1941 Moyne felt that ‘the situation in Kenya had 
changed as Kenya was now far removed from an operation area’, and therefore 
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officials there must be pressed ‘strongly to consider on their merits the cases of 
their German refugees’.121 
As late as 1942, the Colonial Office was still dealing with unresolved cases of 
‘anti-Nazi’ internees, and they received many enquires about individuals who were 
yet to be released. Although these came from a variety of people, officials in 
Whitehall were keen to provide information and often prompted officials in the 
colony to take speedier action in order to provide this. However, it was not just 
concerned citizens who raised the issue of the continued internment of enemy 
aliens with the government. 
For example, the Joint Secretary of the Central Council for Jewish Refugees 
contacted Emerson (the League of Nations Commissioner for Refugees) about a 
group of twenty-four male detainees who had been moved from British African 
colonies to South Africa, and who, at the end of 1941, remained interned. The 
group was of ‘Jewish or partly Jewish descent’, and ‘at least fourteen’ were 
practicing Jews. While their anti-Nazi credentials were not in doubt, they had 
become entangled in a bureaucratic web which meant they were yet to be released. 
A Colonial Office memorandum explained that South Africa acted as a ‘custodian’ of 
the refugees on behalf of the African territories from where the refugees 
originated. It was explained that South Africa had no objection to their release, 
‘provided they would be re-admitted immediately to the territories where they 
lawfully resided prior to their internment’. However, ‘[i]t appears that the 
Administrations in question equally have no objection against the release, provided 
they remain in the Union [of South Africa] for the duration of the War’. Thus the 
refugees remained interned, caught in the middle of these debates. As the 
memorandum summarised: 
From this it appears that these men suffer prolonged internment not on 
account of their activities or sentiment, but chiefly as the result of legal 
and administrative difficulties. Had they been interned in their 
territories, or would they come under the jurisdiction of the Union, in all 
likelihood they would have been released long ago.122 
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Like with the movement of internees from Britain to the Dominions, the 
displacement of internment questions from Kenya to South Africa was a 
problematic policy. Refugees were caught in official limbo and raised humanitarian 
questions that officials in Whitehall then had to answer and justify once attitudes 
turned against mass internment. Once again, the challenges posed by the continued 
interment of individuals were in tension with general security concerns, and the 
policy that resulted was one of compromise.  
The testimony of refugees who experienced internment in Kenya highlight 
other aspects of internment policy that challenged policy-makers. The Zweigs, Bergs 
and Bauer tell of a sudden internment, a brief spell of captivity and then release. 
Given European refugees’ role as ‘quasi-colonists’,123 internment presented 
practical challenges for those administering the policy, such as where to hold the 
‘enemy aliens’ and what they should wear. 
For example, Zweig observes that there had been no white inmates in Kenya’s 
prisons, which raised questions about where to keep European Jewish (and other) 
internees and how to dress them. Specifically, Zweig writes that ‘[i]n Kenya [...] it 
was immoral as it was tasteless to put whites into the same clothes as black 
inmates’. However, this resulted in ‘the interned men [...] wearing the same kind of 
khaki uniforms as their guards. In military circles, especially, the unwanted but 
necessary similarity in appearance between the defenders of the homeland and 
their potential aggressors created a lot of annoyance’.124 
These observations highlight just some of the challenges internment 
presented officials who perceived the world in racial categories. British policy-
makers were less concerned with the confusion caused by dressing ‘enemy aliens’ 
like British guards and more concerned with undermining the racial foundation 
upon which their colonial power was based. For black indigenous populations, the 
message was clear: even as ‘enemies’, white people were racially superior. For the 
Jewish refugees, the message was less clear: their status as refugees fleeing 
                                                                                                                                                                    
British Jews), 12 November 1941, enclosure of: Stephany (joint secretary, Central Council for Jewish 
Refugees) to Emerson, 23 December 1941, CO968/36/7, TNA. 
123
 Eppelsheimer, Homecomings, p. 8. 
124
 Zweig, Nowhere in Africa, pp. 44-45. 
205 
persecution only mattered in certain situations and even then did not guarantee a 
sympathetic, or humanitarian, response.  
More generally, the episode of internment shows, particularly in Kenya, that 
British action was dictated by several issues: how the action was perceived to 
outside parties, including its own citizens, as well as other international powers; 
how the practical details of internment impacted colonial hierarchies; and finally 
the concern for those interned. Humanitarian concern for refugees was the last in 
the list of these priorities. The legal and administrative difficulties that were so 
frequently discussed shows that the internees, whether Jewish refugees or not, 
were a problem for the colonial system and that solving it would have required a 
humanitarian prioritisation that was conceptually impossible in a time of war.  
Like in Cyprus and Kenya, the implementation of internment policy in Jamaica 
was a source of tension where the needs of the refugees were prioritised against 
security concerns, the needs of the colony and Britain’s wider (changing) war aims. 
Jamaica’s association with refugee issues, and specifically internment, was (and is) 
closely linked to the Gibraltar Camp, established in 1940 to hold civilian evacuees 
from Gibraltar, a small area of British territory off the Spanish coast. In May and 
June 1940, the approximately 13,000 Gibraltarians were taken to French Morocco. 
However, after the fall of France, a new destination was necessary. Various parts of 
the British Empire were considered, but the changing context of a Europe at war led 
to the arrival of almost 11,000 evacuees to Britain. By August, it was decided that 
the evacuees should be sent to Jamaica, where a camp to house several thousand 
people had been constructed in just seven weeks. However, by the end of 1942, the 
camp was only occupied by approximately 1,700 people. During the war, the camp 
housed several Dutch Jewish refugees as well as about 200 Polish Jews, who Britain, 
with working with the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the Polish 
government-in-exile providing the financial backing for their move from Lisbon, 
Portugal to Jamaica.125 Along with these groups, the Gibraltar Camp also housed, in 
a separate location, German prisoners of war. 
                                                          
125
 Newman, Nearly the New World, p. 72; London, Whitehall, p. 180. See also, Bartrop, ‘From Lisbon 
to Jamaica’. 
206 
The arrival of Jewish refugees and, as a result, ‘enemy aliens’ was supported 
by officials in London, who, Newman argues, pushed the colony to build the camp. 
However, she also argues that the camp is an ‘example of how a compromise could 
be reached between enabling British Government objectives and satisfying local 
conditions’. She continues: 
The camp was erected in Jamaica because of the priority placed by the 
British Government on evacuating the civilian population of Gibraltar, 
and was carried out with scant attention paid to local opinion (as we 
have seen, its building was completed in a very short time). Yet the 
Jamaican Legislature was appeased by two factors, that the building the 
of the camp benefited the local economy, contracting local construction 
firms and employing Jamaican labour, and that none of the inhabitants 
could seek employment or residence in Jamaica. The camp was, in a 
sense, off Jamaican limits: its inmates were not immigrants to Jamaica 
but temporarily housed for the duration of the war; their status as 
evacuees under Defence Regulations meant that the boundaries 
between the camp and the island were absolute.126 
In 1943, it was recorded that the additional population totalled over 3,058 
people, including 558 refugees and 1,500 evacuees from Gibraltar, who were in turn 
made up of 572 prisoners of war and 588 civilian internees.127 Despite the 
implementation of increasingly tight immigration restrictions before the war, at the 
height of the worldwide conflict, Jamaica hosted a significant number of refugees 
and internees. Although Newman identifies this seeming contradiction as ‘ironic’, 
this policy outcome was actually in complete alignment with wider tensions in 
British policy between domestic needs, colonial priorities and humanitarian 
concerns.128 The camp environment indeed offered a ‘safe’ space in which these 
competing needs could coincide. As we shall see, the refugee perspective on the 
‘camp experience’ was not ignored, but was also not the most important 
consideration for policy-makers. 
Despite debate about the impact that the camp had on the island’s economic 
and material resources, it without doubt had important political consequences. Sir 
Arthur Frederick Richards, the Governor of Jamaica, was aware of negative 
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portrayals of the situation, particularly internationally. He even informed Colonial 
Secretary Cranborne in October 1942 that: 
among various other mis-representations of Jamaica now being given 
currency in the United States of America are references to Gibraltar 
Camp as a sort of ‘Concentration Camp’, not widely different from 
similar institutions in Germany. There is no doubt that this campaign has 
been instigated by Polish Jews who have left the Camp for the United 
States of America, and who hope by telling harrowing and untruthful 
stories to persuade the United States Authorities to grant entry permits 
to a large number of Polish Jews now in Gibraltar Camp.129 
While the Gibraltar camp offered the facilities to accommodate refugees and 
internees in a way that was suitable for the colony, the fear of how this was 
perceived by others, particularly the US, was central to British action. As the war 
progressed, British reliance on the US increased, and by 1943, attention was turning 
to post-war planning. However, Britain was keen to both assert itself and maintain a 
strong line in regard to colonial internment policy, particularly at the Anglo-
American Bermuda Conference. Randall explained to the conference:  
that Jamaica would be prepared to take a share of refugees if other 
people would participate. If Jamaica took more refugees from Spain 
without their being vetted, they would have to be put in a concentration 
camp for security reasons. There was also a problem of accommodation 
and supplies.130 
Although action, like that taken in Jamaica, was sometimes more severe than 
some colonial officials preferred, they ultimately allowed it because it seemed that 
the decisions were based on the interest of the colony.131 It remained Colonial 
Office policy that the release of internees and other issues about the treatment of 
refugees were decisions ‘for the Governor subject only to the right of the Secretary 
of State to invite the Governor to reconsider his decision’.132 Clearly, a significant 
amount of control remained with the local administrators, but in the case of 
Jamaica, this was sometimes to the benefit of refugees seeking entry.  
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For example, in 1941, the Governor requested to establish a married-person 
internment camp in his territory. After receiving the request, colonial officials in 
Whitehall turned their attention to the camp established on the Isle of Man, and 
the Home Office was asked to provide advice. Although the correspondence 
suggests that people were ‘all in favour of the establishment of a similar married 
camp’ in Jamaica, it was felt that the obstacles facing the Governor ‘appear to be 
almost insuperable’.133 Nonetheless, the Governor was sent ‘a copy of a letter from 
the Home Office explaining the arrangements which have been made in this country 
[Britain] for the accommodation of married aliens who have been interned 
together’.134 He was not instructed to abandon the plan; however, progress was 
slow, and as late as 1943, Jamaican policy was still being discussed. Lord 
Wedgewood stated in the House of Lords that: 
Just consider [...] Jamaica. There you had a number of Jews (I think 34 
altogether) who were interned who were no more guilty than those 
interned here and who of course were unable to give any assistance to 
Hitler, even if they wished to give it. Here I should think two-thirds of 
these people who were interned have been got out. They have been 
examined by board after board and some 4,000, I should say, have been 
released in this country. But in Jamaica these 34 have remained year 
after year in prison. After exhaustive inquiries extending over two and a 
half years, ten have been released and it is hoped to complete inquiries 
soon about the other 24.135 
Clearly, the more liberal policy hoped for in London had not yet been fully 
adopted in Jamaica. Nonetheless, as the plan for a married camp demonstrated, 
this did not mean a complete lack of compassion on the part of the colony or a 
complete separation from London. Rather it is illustrative of the complex 
connection between the two and forms part of the explanation for a distinct 
colonial policy. Moreover, individual agency also clearly mattered. Richards (as 
opposed to the Governors of Trinidad, Barbados and Cyprus) was keen to make 
some allowance for refugees. 
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Despite Richards’s concerns, the experience of internment in Jamaica was not 
easy for refugees. For example, Silbiger’s recollections of his time in the camp strike 
at the very heart of the refugee experience. Upon arrival in Jamaica, he recalls that: 
After coming ashore, we were transferred to a set of buses. Soon we left 
the colourful chaos of the town behind and headed into the mountains. 
We must have been driving for perhaps an hour when a wide valley 
surrounded by mountains came into view. Suddenly several people in 
our bus started to scream. We seemed to be heading for a large 
complex of unpainted wooden barracks surrounded by fences. It 
resembled all too closely the nightmare we thought we had left behind: 
a concentration camp. This was the Gibraltar Camp, where the Jamaican 
authorities had decided to house us.136 
Silbiger’s experiences are confirmed by other refugees. Another Jewish 
refugee from the Netherlands, Johanna Zeelander, stayed at the Gibraltar Camp for 
six months. Although she recalls in her interview that ultimately the camp and the 
barracks where they stayed were ‘nice barracks’, she also makes the observation 
that ‘[b]ut you come from Europe, you see those barracks, you think what are they 
going to do with us?’.137 Jenny Lieberman had a similar reaction. Lieberman arrived 
in Jamaica with her mother having initially found safety in Portugal before moving 
on to the West Indies. They were ‘besides ourselves’ upon hearing that they would 
be placed in camps when they arrived in Jamaica. She explains that ‘[w]e had heard 
so many bad things about camps’. Although they did not know about extermination 
camps, her father had died in Dachau, understandably leaving traumatic 
associations for the young Lieberman.138 
Silbiger also describes the restrictions imposed on the refugees: 
Movements in and out of the camp were carefully controlled. Everyone 
received a passbook that had to be brought along to the exit gate and 
within which leaves and returns were recorded. One could go out of the 
camp only during the day and had to be back before the night-time 
curfew. To stay out overnight required special permission. No one was 
allowed to search for a home or work outside the camp. The only way to 
be released from the camp was to be granted residency in another 
country. 
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He, like others, questions the legitimacy of such a policy: ‘while the camp provided 
safe refuge for a group of people who had fled from persecution in their homeland 
and who had nowhere else to go, it at the same time violated their basic human 
rights. We were detained without being charged with a crime’.139 
His memories of this time, however, were not all bad. He recalls the friendship 
of other children his age and the community that soon developed in the camp. He 
describes how ‘[a]mong the adults, councils and committees were formed and 
friendships were established, some which were to last long after everyone had 
scattered across the world. A Dutch flag was permitted to be flown, near which 
ceremonial gatherings took place’. Moreover, he describes a one-week holiday in 
Montego Bay as a ‘highpoint’ of the family’s internment. This was paid for by the 
Dutch exiled government. Silbiger asks, ‘Was it to soothe its guilty conscience for 
failure to get us admitted to its colonies?’ Either way, it was considered to be a real 
treat and was much enjoyed by those families who experienced it.140 
The experiences of Jenny Lieberman also suggest that, despite some 
difficulties, the camp experience in Jamaica was not an entirely negative 
experience. For example, Lieberman recalls that she was allowed to attend business 
school and fashion school, for which she had to leave the camp. Like Silbiger, 
Lieberman also recalls a curfew. However, Lieberman was told that it was for her 
own protection, as it was believed that some areas of the island were dangerous 
because Jamaicans would ‘kill you’ or ‘knife you’. Whether or not it was true, 
Lieberman’s acceptance of this justification shows some internalisation of colonial 
ideas, where personal restrictions imposed by the British have been remembered as 
protection against colonial ‘others’.141 
*** 
Historians often fail to acknowledge the complexity of the decisions made by 
officials regarding refugees or judge them by post-1945 standards. This chapter has 
shown that the interwar years were a time of transition. A growing international 
system emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires and 
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Britain, at the greatest extent of its empire, was at the centre of this change. 
International humanitarianism was changing in nature too, and Britain had to 
grapple with old forms of religiously- and ideologically-motivated humanitarianism 
as well as humanitarianism manifested through the forum of the League of Nations. 
In this specific interwar context, Britain’s relative inaction was not simply a failure of 
humanitarianism, but the prioritisation of one humanitarianism over another. In the 
colonies, humanitarianism was just one ideological framework through which 
officials conducted policy.  
Alchemic humanitarianism, or development of the colonies, was prioritised 
and shaped by the contradictions of British liberalism, where refugee groups were 
deemed to be less deserving than colonial peoples. This contradiction was justified 
by racial ideas and attitudes of paternalism, which ensured British officials viewed 
their colony policy less as one of exploitation than of guidance and aid. That there 
was some kind of prioritisation undertaken by officials is suggestive of the nuance 
so often discernible in British policy more generally but less often assessed. 
Therefore this study of rival humanitarians in the colonial setting adds shade to an 
otherwise black and white understanding of British action.  
More specifically, while post-1945 international reputations became 
intrinsically linked to human rights records and humanitarian responses, the 
interwar years saw the continuation of earlier imperial traditions. The very nature 
of international co-operation was conceptualised from a Western, Eurocentric, 
imperial perspective. Both emergency aid and alchemic humanitarianism were 
dominated by paternalism. The idea of the ‘civilizing mission’ and the absolute right 
of Western, particularly British, modes of government were well established and 
therefore guiding principles for action.  
Within the empire, it simply does not make sense to assume that 
governments would have acted contrary to perceived national interest. Emergency 
relief of refugees, particularly in reference to unlimited refugee entry into the 
colonies, was seen as a risk, threatening security, causing economic strain and 
unsettling local communities. These things were a clear contravention of national 
(imperial) priorities. However, alchemic humanitarianism, an expression of what 
was undoubtedly the focus on colonial development and welfare in the colonies, 
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offered potential benefits. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the Colonial 
Office, especially its Secretary of State, Malcolm Mac Donald, envisaged, and in 
some cases implemented, a synthesis of humanitarianisms, by carefully selecting 
Jewish refugees for their skills and/or finance to aid the development of a particular 
colony. Thus Colonial Office officials could justify emergency relief of refugees 
because it ultimately benefited the empire.  
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Chapter Five: 
A Policy of Compromise: Colonial Development and Jewish Refugees 
 
Having outlined the international context in which British colonial immigration 
policy was formulated as well as the ways in which three central intellectual 
schemas – liberalism, race and humanitarianism – influenced policy, this final 
chapter turns its attention to the specific policy initiatives and directives adopted by 
the colonies towards Jewish refugees. Rather than large-scale re-settlement 
projects, small targeted policy initiatives emerged, reflecting the compromise 
necessary to respond to the international refugee crisis as well as to specific British 
and British colonial concerns. Jewish refugees were welcome in the colonies as long 
as they at most added something to the territories, or at least did not create an 
extra burden. While an open policy of refuge was never adopted, several officials 
tried to expand the opportunities for refugee entry by linking it explicitly with 
colonial development. These attempts, including the use of refugee doctors and the 
possible colonisation of British Guiana, are the subject of this final chapter. 
In the context of the problems facing colonial policy-makers, linking Jewish 
refugees and colonial development appeared to be a mutually beneficial exercise. 
There was undoubtedly precedent for such action, both in colonial policy itself and 
in the domestic sphere. A new language of ‘development’ emerged in the interwar 
years, in both the international and colonial contexts. In the latter, development 
was directly linked with questions of demography and the movement of people into 
and between the colonies.1 However, as has been established, developmental (and 
emergency) manifestations of humanitarianism were undertaken in a way that 
served the interests of the state most directly. Driven by the work of Colonial 
Secretary Malcolm MacDonald, plans for utilising refugee skills and assets were 
pursued across the empire, some more successfully than others, and these provide 
evidence of a clear colonial policy agenda towards refugees.  
This chapter will first outline the history of colonial development and welfare 
policy from the late 1800s to the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act. This 
will provide the context in which attempts to link refugee settlement and colonial 
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development were made. The chapter will also examine the role of MacDonald 
who, as well as taking an active role in the formation of colonial development 
policy, was also pivotal to other colonial issues such as Palestine, tensions in the 
West Indies, economic uncertainty and geopolitical concerns. Finally, the nature of 
the compromise between the emergency needs of Jewish refugees and the 
perceived developmental needs of indigenous colonial populations will be 
examined through two case-studies: refugee doctors and the development of 
British Guiana.  
The question of utilising refugee doctors in the colonies is illustrative of the 
way in which colonial officials took direct action in order to connect the refugee 
question and development. It was a small but successful example of what could 
have been achieved. In contrast, British Guiana and the grandiose plans it prompted 
were never realised, but that they were pursued as actively as they were tells us 
something important about how the issues of re-settlement and development had 
taken hold in the interwar years. Moreover, these examples highlight the 
emergence of a distinct colonial policy towards refugees that was not simply a foil 
to domestic or foreign policy concerns, but rather a genuine attempt, at least by 
individuals such as MacDonald, to connect the recognised needs of the empire with 
those of refugees.  
A HISTORY OF COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE 
Changes in the 1930s followed a longer evolution of colonial development policy 
and framed (and challenged) the older idea that colonial development should serve 
the metropole (seen in earlier attempts to utilise colonial development to tackle 
Britain’s domestic problems, particularly unemployment). These changes, which 
ultimately shaped the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, took place in 
parallel to the refugee crisis, and debates on both issues occupied the minds of 
officials. Therefore, a brief overview of this earlier policy sets the stage for an 
exploration of colonial development and refugee policy in the 1930s and 1940s. 
From the late 1800s until the outbreak of the First World War, colonial 
development policy had been piecemeal, essentially ad hoc. Even in the 1920s, 
there was little in the way of government funds for economic development in the 
colonies. For some at the Colonial Office, including Lord Milner, Leo Amery and 
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William Ormsby-Gore, this was an unsatisfactory state of affairs. These men 
stressed the importance of colonial development and, as economic difficulties 
increased, did so by linking it to unemployment in the metropole.2 This had also 
been, in part, the rationale behind the Empire Settlement Act. Discussed earlier in 
the context of the influence of liberalism on re-settlement plans, the Act was also 
connected to ideas about colonial development, as the movement of British settlers 
to the Dominions was supposed not only to help reduce domestic unemployment, 
but also to provide a work force for the development of agriculture and industry in 
the empire.3 Both of these examples also highlighted a precedent of officials looking 
to the empire to help solve domestic economic and demographic concerns. 
Although the Colonial Development Act of 1929 passed with the explicit 
intention to help domestic unemployment by creating a higher demand for British 
exports, this was not a particularly successful endeavour. Opposition to the changes 
at a local level within the empire meant that opportunities for business 
development were not always taken. Officials on location feared that changes 
brought by development projects (e.g. industrialisation) would threaten ‘indirect 
rule’ and the existing status quo.4 Moreover, the onset of the economic depression 
and resulting unemployment ensured that colonial development was in no way 
commensurate with the level of need. Statistics bear this out. For example, the Act 
directly ensured employment for 13,000 men, when around 2,671,000 were 
unemployed.5 More generally, the economic climate was dictated by those who 
argued ‘expenditure should be reduced, budgets rigidly balanced, and a natural 
recovery of trade awaited’. In this context, the 1929 Colonial Development Act and 
the £1 million a year that it made available to dependent imperial territories made 
little difference to the British economy.6 
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However, by the mid-1930s, old policy motivations came under review. 
MacDonald, during his first tenure as Colonial Secretary between June and 
November 1935, observed that: 
Our policy had sauntered along as if the world had not altered at all. I 
felt concerned, for instance, that we were doing very little to aid the 
economic, social, educational and other related advances of the people 
for whom we were trustees [...] I soon decided that we must make a 
widespread review, and in some cases an overhaul, of our whole 
attitude to the Colonial Empire, to be followed by a practical expansion 
of our creative activities throughout it.7 
These observations reflected the changing context of the 1930s: recovery 
from economic depression, a growing international humanitarian community and 
changes in (and deterioration of) international relations. British action in the empire 
was open to closer scrutiny than ever before, especially as a member of the League 
of Nations and a mandatory power. Criticism was particularly strong from the US, 
despite the fact that it never joined the League. Even within the empire itself, 
growing discontent was evident in important territories such as India and the West 
Indies. The prospect of ‘advances’ in social, educational and economic issues 
offered the potential to quell many of these emerging problems.  
Moreover, as the geopolitical context of the 1930s evolved, Britain’s imperial 
actions became a defining feature of Britain’s projected image. Fascist Italy’s 
colonial claims in North Africa and Nazi Germany’s demands for the return of its 
pre-1914 colonial possessions (several of which Britain now ruled as League of 
Nations mandates) raised questions about the nature British imperial rule. Although 
some form of colonial appeasement was considered between 1936 and 1938 (see 
chapter one), a large-scale return was never envisioned, and Italy’s and Germany’s 
colonial claims were repeatedly rebuffed by criticism of their domestic racially-
discriminatory policies. In order for Britain’s claims to hold weight, amendments 
were deemed to be necessary, by some, to their own imperial policy, which was 
increasingly open to criticism on issues of race and oppression. In the face of League 
and American interest, Britain was encouraged to adopt a new position on colonial 
questions, including development and welfare policy. 
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Growing labour unrest in West Indies had developed since the early 1930s but 
reached new levels in 1938 when riots ensued after claims of ill-treatment by a 
group of men seeking work at the Tate and Lyle Sugar estate. Four men were killed 
in a week, and later protests broke out in the Jamaican capital of Kingston. 
Ultimately, eight people were killed and 170 injured in the course of the protests. 
Low wages and a general level of ‘workers’ frustration’ were at the root of the 
problems.8 Not only were Britain’s responsibility for and reaction to these events 
now open to international scrutiny, the disturbances prompted within the Colonial 
Office itself a genuine debate about the future direction of colonial policy.  
MacDonald, whose return to the Colonial Office in 1938 coincided with these 
debates, moved to the centre of the issue and made three key decisions in response 
to the problems in the West Indies. He established a Royal Commission, under the 
chairmanship of Lord Moyne to investigate the riots in the West Indies. The 
Commission was not only charged with dealing ‘with the immediate disorders’ but 
was also asked to investigate ‘underlying causes of discontent’, including ‘bad 
working conditions and low wages, unemployment, poor housing, and 
overcrowding’. His second decision was to establish a committee within the Colonial 
Office to review funding for colonial development and welfare. The work of this 
committee laid the foundations for the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act. Lastly, MacDonald attended a summer school at Oxford University, where 
colonial administrators on leave heard him declare self-government as the ultimate 
aim for Britain’s colonial dependencies.9  
The new Colonial Development and Welfare Act was presented for approval 
to the House of Commons on 2 May 1940. MacDonald had the opportunity to help 
its passage before he was moved to the Ministry of Health as a result of 
Chamberlain’s resignation and Churchill’s assumption of the premiership. That the 
act survived the change in government at this pivotal point in the war highlights, to 
some extent, the acceptance of its general premise, but also the ideological value 
seen in the change it represented. The change in direction was evident in the Act’s 
allocation of funds and can be seen as a serious attempt to develop the basic 
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infrastructure and needs of the colonies. Between July 1940 and October 1942, 
nearly £2 million was spent under the terms of the Act. Significantly, the allocation 
breaks down as follows: forty-five percent of the projects granted money aimed to 
develop agriculture, forestry and veterinary services; thirty-six percent was 
dedicated for social amenities such as education, health, sanitation, water supply 
and housing; and nineteen percent was awarded to schemes for transport and 
communication.10  
Although this change in direction can be connected to alchemic 
humanitarianism, colonial development policy was, of course, not entirely altruistic. 
Without doubt, it served political ends, and as will be discussed later, development 
schemes were conceptualised in a way that would not compete (particularly 
economically) with Britain. This was why agricultural development was often 
preferred to industrial schemes (see below). In many ways, Britain successfully 
adapted its earlier brand of repressive and exploitative colonialism to a progressive 
and developmental kind. By doing this, Britain could therefore justify the continued 
existence of its empire, quell rising colonial nationalism and counter growing 
international criticism. Moreover, although it is important to understand the change 
in views that the passing of the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act 
represented, it cannot be said to have reversed the latent paternalism which still 
formed the foundation of colonial rule. The League of Nations mandates as well as 
other forms of humanitarian action were based on the assumption that Britain was 
responsible for those in need of ‘civilizing’ and that this meant action was taken on 
an explicitly Western model.  
MACDONALD, COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT AND JEWISH REFUGEES 
MacDonald was at the centre of many of the key debates that were underway at 
the Colonial Office during the interwar years. Not only did his return to office in 
May 1938 coincide with the West Indies crisis, the following months saw a rapid 
deterioration in international relations, particularly with Germany (i.e. the Munich 
Agreement) as well as the ever-growing difficulties in Palestine that led, a year later, 
to the passing of the 1939 White Paper. 
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MacDonald was, in the tense and emotive months of 1938-39, initially 
believed by many Zionists to be supportive of their cause, particularly because of his 
role in the 1930 Passfield White Paper (which sought to clarify Britain’s position on 
Jewish and Arab claims to Palestine) and the ‘[s]trong and personal working 
relationship’ he had developed with Chaim Weizmann during the 1920s and 
1930s.11 His oversight of the 1939 White Paper was therefore the source of much 
disappointment and criticism.  
Martin Gilbert argues that MacDonald supported Arab claims to Palestine 
over those of the Jews. As evidence of this, he cites MacDonald’s views as 
expressed in a Cabinet meeting on 14 November 1938 (just after Kristallnacht): 
The government has to choose between its commitments to the world 
of Jewry and [...] to the world of Islam. [...] [T]he British Empire [...] was 
to a very considerable extent a Moslem Empire, some 80 millions of our 
fellow subjects in India were Moslems. From the defence point of view it 
was literally out of the question that we should antagonise either the 
Moslems within the Empire or the Arab Kingdoms of the Near East.12 
In later personal reflections, MacDonald fleshed the opinions he expressed in 
Cabinet out: 
We could not let emotion rule our policy; we must accept the facts of 
the extremely dangerous prospect with absolute, unsentimental, and 
some would say even cynical, realism. The Jews would be on our side in 
any case in the struggle against the tyrant Hitler. Would the Arab 
peoples of the Near and Middle East adopt the same attitude?13 
MacDonald was a pragmatist torn between a Jewish lobby at home (several of 
whom he counted as friends, as well a moral imperative to help those facing Nazi 
persecution) and a major Muslim population in the empire (upon whose goodwill 
colonial stability and thereby British imperial power was based). He wrote that: 
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A considerable number of its [Parliament’s] Members in both the House 
of Commons and the House of Lords were Jews, whilst other non-Jewish 
Members of the former House had large numbers of Jews among the 
voters in their constituencies. Many of those M.P.s were therefore 
ardent champions of the Zionist cause in debates and in the division 
lobbies at Westminster. But not a single M.P. was an Arab, and the Arab 
electors in the constituencies were negligible in numbers. Some non-
Arab members did earnestly advocate the Arabs’ case; but they were 
very few. So a considerable balance of prejudice in favour of the Jewish 
case existed in Parliament, which increased to some extent my problem 
in seeking to maintain an impartial policy as far as possible towards both 
sides.14 
This observation suggests MacDonald was aware of the domestic political 
ramifications as well as international political consequences of the policy adopted in 
Palestine. He therefore constructed policy in the knowledge that he could not 
please all those involved but tried to balance more vocal Zionist views with those of 
the Muslim populations of the empire. His comments do, however, also display the 
undertones of the ambivalence towards Jews as a group which were generated 
within a liberal democratic framework.  
However, in other ways, MacDonald worked hard to find ways to help Jewish 
refugees. In his unpublished autobiography, MacDonald explains that: 
I felt profoundly sad that, in fairness to the local Arabs, we could not be 
far more helpful to the Jews. They were suffering the appalling tragedy 
of the Nazis’ imprisonments and massacres of their kith and kin in 
Germany. Deep in my heart I wished that we could allow much larger 
numbers of those who escaped to enter Palestine; but we British were 
duty bound to honour our pledges to the long settled Palestinian Arabs 
as well as to the incoming Jews. So we had to urge the diversion of 
shiploads of the refugees elsewhere. I arranged for many of them to 
settle in several of our underdeveloped colonies, whilst many others 
came to Britain itself.15 
The influence of MacDonald’s personal views appears throughout various 
examples discussed in this thesis. As MacDonald noted, the comments he made on 
contemporary files ‘contain my spontaneous views on events and people at the 
moments when my opinions on them were fresh; and so they describe as accurately 
as is possible the essence of my contemporary thoughts and actions in each given 






situation’.16 Despite the failure of many ideas, it is clear that MacDonald took 
decisive action to aid the entry of refugee doctors in the colonies and offered 
unwavering support for settlement schemes in British Guiana. 
More broadly, MacDonald was a key advocate of colonial development. His 
claim – that he ‘felt concerned [...] that we [the British] were doing very little to aid 
the economic, social, educational and other related advances of the peoples for 
whom we were trustees in such places as the Caribbean Islands, Ceylon, Malta, 
numerous lands in Africa, and many other under developed countries’ – was borne 
out by action, particularly in his leading role in pursuing a more active colonial 
development and welfare policy and the final passing of the 1940 Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act.17 
 Understanding MacDonald’s views on Palestine and Jewish refugees, as well 
as colonial development, help to contextualise the policy of compromise he pushed 
in colonial refugee policy. As Colonial Secretary, MacDonald had a voice at the 
highest levels of British power, including the Cabinet. Therefore, the ideas he had, 
the way these were responded to and how they were ultimately expressed (or not) 
in policy offers an important insight into British colonial and refugee policy more 
generally. In the specific cases of refugee doctors and development in British 
Guiana, MacDonald’s views and the challenges he met provide an insight into the 
contradictory ways liberalism, race and humanitarianism helped form policy.  
JEWISH REFUGEES AND DEVELOPMENT 
MacDonald’s desire to link Jewish refugees and colonial development had 
precedent in British domestic policy where efforts to link refugee entry to the needs 
of the metropole were already underway. British domestic policy had always given 
priority to talented or powerful émigrés, but in April 1933, Sir John Simon made this 
preference explicit when he argued in the House of Commons that ‘Britain could 
combine self-interest with sympathy by encouraging the selective immigration of 
economically active refugees’. This involved the targeted selection of certain groups 
such as scholars, domestics and technicians.  






 In the case of scholars, Britain was the first place of refuge for about half of 
the 2,200 refugee academics who emigrated from Germany by 1938. Created in 
1933, the Academic Assistance Council (AAC), which became the Society for the 
Protection for Science and Learning (SPSL) in 1936, helped find work for academics. 
One of those ‘displaced scholars’ was Heinz London, the father of historian Louise 
London. He was a physicist working in the area of low temperature physics and was 
able to come to Oxford University with a fellowship to continue his work.18 More 
generally, evidence suggests that the targeted selection of refugees by the AAC was 
successful, with eighteen of those chosen for entry going on to receive Nobel Prizes, 
fourteen were knighted, and over 100 became Fellows of the Royal Society or the 
British Academy.19  
James G. McDonald, the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
Coming from Germany, similarly called on member governments to open their 
doors to displaced academics. McDonald worked with ‘several organizations 
assisting intellectual refugees, including the Academic Assistance Council in Britain 
and national committees in France, Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and 
the United States’. Largely because of McDonald’s advocacy, these committees 
raised some £250,000 and by October 1935, facilitated the settlement of nearly 700 
German academic refugees, ‘including 212 in Great Britain, 143 in the United States, 
and 47 in France’.20 
Elite professions were not the only sought-after type of refugee. For example, 
the continued demand for domestic servants was partly met by implementing a 
scheme of rescue for domestic servants from Nazi-controlled Europe. Although this 
scheme was biased in gender and age, over 20,000 refugees were employed as 
domestic help in Britain between 1933 and 1939.21 
Kushner argues that the use of refugees in domestic service reveals ‘the 
generosity’ and ‘the selfishness’ as well as ‘the ambivalence of the liberal 
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democratic response to the Jewish crisis before World War II’. Even before the 
onset of the refugee crisis, Britain was part of an international movement of women 
for domestic service. However, as a result of the persecution of Jews in Germany 
(and later Austria), increasing numbers of Jewish women sought safety in Britain in 
the role of domestic servants. In discussions before and after the Évian Conference, 
refugees entering Britain as domestic servants were considered to be more 
desirable than other migrants, as the former suited, in the words of the Refugee Co-
ordinating Committee, the ‘policy of selected admission [Kushner’s italics]’ that 
dominated British policy-making circles. In the case of domestic workers, the 
argument that ‘demand for labour is vastly bigger than the supply’ was used by the 
Central Office for Refugees to procure a large number of entry permits for Jewish 
women. After Kristallnacht, regulations from 1931 on domestic service were relaxed 
for refugees, lowering the age restrictions on refugee girls from eighteen to sixteen 
as well as allowing a (still limited) number of permits for married couples. In the 
first three weeks of January 1939, these changes resulted in the issuing of some 
1,400 permits.22  
However, this was not an example of emergency humanitarianism; such policy 
changes were ‘more designed to meet the demands of the middle-class women of 
this period’. This was further confirmed when regulations were implemented that 
meant ‘refugees could only enter on condition that they remained as domestic 
servants’.23 For many of those that came to Britain as domestic servants, the 
transition to this kind of labour was hard and outside their previous middle-class 
experiences. (Indeed, some of those working as domestic servants had employed 
their own domestic help in Germany). The regulations to ensure that those who 
entered Britain as domestic servants remained in that area of employment further 
confirm that ‘[f]illing the gaps in the British labour market and the possibility of 
disguising the refugee presence were more important factors than satisfying the 
personal aspirations of the refugees’.24 
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Domestic service was the most significant but not the only case of utilising 
refugees’ skills and money in order to serve British interests. In April 1933, 
‘ministers recognised the potential gain’ from moving Leipzig’s fur trade to Britain. 
Although this was ultimately dismissed by the Cabinet committee, it is nevertheless 
suggestive of the way in which those skills and trades associated with Jews were 
linked to the benefit of the metropole. Similarly, Sir Maurice Hankey, a minister 
without portfolio in the War Cabinet, was keen to save the machine tool industry in 
the Netherlands and Belgium or at least deny it to the advancing German army. 
Efforts were made to remove both material assets, such as tools and diamonds, as 
well as those people with the skills to work them. These efforts had direct benefits 
to the war effort, as these refugees often had knowledge of utilising diamonds for 
military purposes. Moreover, this action laid the foundations for establishing a post-
war diamond industry in Britain. Louise London argues that despite the difficulties 
raised by this group of refugees, the government ultimately decided to act in order 
to benefit, both militarily and economically, from their diamond stores.25 
Despite liberalism’s inherent rejection of preferential treatment (which was 
often used to counter pressure to grant entry to greater numbers of refugees), the 
British government was willing to prioritise profit over principle when it directly 
benefited the state. Targeting scholars, domestic servants and tool and diamond 
workers made sense militarily and economically; that these individuals were 
German Jews fleeing persecution mattered primarily because it justified 
domestically the amendment of immigration regulations and could be heralded 
internationally as part of Britain’s humanitarian response.  
Along with the precedent in British domestic policy, MacDonald was not alone 
in identifying the benefits of trying to link refugee assets with colonial needs. In 
January 1939, Emerson, the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
suggested the potential benefits of linking colonial development with a solution to 
the refugee problem. He believed that although the refugee was ‘a liability’, this 
was only the case until the latter was ‘placed in a position at least to support 
himself and his dependents’. In reality, Emerson observed, refugees were ‘an asset 
of great potential value’, as ‘[a]mong the refugees almost every profession, interest, 
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trade and occupation are represented’, and ‘[t]here is an unparallelled [sic] supply 
of brains, enterprise, industry and skill on which to draw’. Emerson argued that 
these skills and talents could be directed towards colonial development, claiming 
that ‘[t]here certainly exists almost unlimited material for Colonial Development on 
a scale which has not been possible for many years’. This meant that the British 
Colonial Office had the potential to ‘convert a present liability into a potential 
asset’, as such a scheme would ‘give an immediate stimulus to private endeavour’ 
by promoting ‘the ultimate interests of the colonies and will encourage other 
countries and the Dominions to follow this example’.26 
Emerson’s suggestion was based on his view that the then current scheme of 
aiding refugees through private funds alone could not be sustained and that 
government intervention was therefore necessary. Emerson suggested that 
government funds used to help refugees could also be connected to colonial 
development in two main ways: the more conservative assimilation of agricultural 
settlement and the more radical idea of industrial settlement. Emerson’s 
suggestions were based on a report produced by Political and Economic Planning 
(PEP). Established in 1931 by a group of academics, businessmen, civil servants, 
economists and journalists, the organisation viewed ‘planning as a means of solving 
the nation’s social and economic problems’.27 PEP’s report outlined plans for 
potential industrial development in countries including Malaya. Emerson doubted:  
whether the initial stages of industrial settlement will be traversed 
much more quickly than those of agricultural colonisation, but if both 
met with success in the beginning, the subsequent acceleration would 
be greater in the industrial settlement which could absorb greater 
numbers at lower individual cost.  
He concluded that a ‘controversy of the nature of agricultural versus industrial 
settlement is, however, to be deprecated. There is ample room for both’.28 
Emerson warned that in the case of agricultural settlement, ‘financial return 
to Government will be rarely satisfied’ and that ‘experience shows that for a big 
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agricultural settlement to be even moderately successful it must have a very 
considerable measure of Government support in the way of direct financial backing, 
or, indirectly in the provision of certain services, or in both’. Emerson’s comments 
present the success of potential settlements judged, in part, on the potential 
financial reward (which had, to some degree, been disproved by the PSA in Kenya). 
Moreover, the effort he deemed to be necessary for the success of an agricultural 
settlement reflects the inherent view that, apart from in Palestine, Jews were not 
agricultural settlers.  
In considering possible industrial settlement, Emerson recognised that it was 
not a widely-supported option. The colonies had traditionally produced raw 
materials in a ‘complementary’ relationship with industrialised countries like Britain 
which then manufactured the goods. However, with the change in the economic 
situation in the 1930s (specifically as a result of the abandonment of free trade and 
the Ottawa Agreements), the colonies became open to competition, and concern 
developed over the creation of industries, particularly in colonies such as Malaya. 
Official attempts to resolve some of these problems were still incomplete in 1938, 
and therefore must have been part of the contemporary colonial world in which 
officials responded to ideas of connecting industrial development with Jewish 
refugees.29  
Another important context was, of course, the pre-existing attitudes towards 
Jewish refugees. As outlined in chapter three, many officials viewed Jews as 
essentially urban. While the Jewish Kibbutzim in Palestine had produced a thriving 
export market for citrus produce and a strong domestic industrial sector producing 
household goods, this was a success bought at a heavy price, both in terms of 
finance and labour. Therefore, many felt that Palestine was a ‘special case’, with the 
success achieved there unlikely to be repeated away from the Jewish spiritual 
home.30 Furthermore, the importance of large-scale investment to the development 
of Palestine as well as the twenty years of hard work that had ensured its success 
suggested colonial development would not produce an immediate solution to the 
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pressing refugee problems. Perhaps even more ominously, the more immediate 
concerns of officials would have focused on the major political problems caused by 
Jewish settlement in Palestine, along with the potential of powerful and 
troublesome settler groups in other territories such as Kenya and Northern 
Rhodesia.  
Emerson must have presented a compelling case. Although pre-occupied with 
the problem of Palestine, MacDonald was keen to discuss the issue and agreed to 
meet with Emerson. MacDonald minuted that ‘I have read all these papers with 
great interest’ and asked for Lord Dufferin and other members of the Colonial Office 
to read the papers too. He stressed that they should consider them ‘as 
sympathetically as possible from the point of view of Colonial development’.31 
However, many were critical. For example, Campbell was sceptical about the scale 
of possibilities outlined by Emerson, writing: 
I have no solution. I doubt if the problem admits of any. The only line of 
hope seems to me to be infiltration where that is politically practicable; 
agricultural settlements, on organised lines, where the climate and 
conditions otherwise promise reasonable success; possibly industrial 
settlements in a very few rare cases where again the circumstances 
permit. I see no hope of harnessing this question to the problem of 
colonial development except in a few – I am afraid a very few – 
individual cases.32 
Immigration and refugee practices were built around what those seeking 
entry could offer the country of settlement. Suitability was judged either by specific 
skills and trades or financial independence. These requirements were underwritten 
by the preference for assimilation. Therefore, adopting a quid pro quo attitude in 
refugee affairs in the 1930s was hardly a new or radical departure. However, the 
way this was encouraged in the empire had a very specific application; refugee 
entry was targeted to meet the needs of the emerging colonial development and 
welfare plan. In the examples of refugee doctors and the large-scale settlement 
plans for British Guiana, the balancing of liberalism, racial thinking and 
humanitarian concerns resulted in a policy that actively sought to connect the 
needs of the colonies with refugees.  
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REFUGEE DOCTORS 
Utilising the skills of refugee doctors offered a particularly helpful way of aiding the 
colonies. It suited the shift in focus of colonial development policy towards 
enhancing social services rather than investing in big business initiatives that would 
benefit the metropole. That is not to say that these actions were wholly altruistic; 
rather, it was hoped that, by developing the colonies, new markets and consumers 
would emerge. Improved health services were an important prerequisite for this. To 
this end, MacDonald wrote to the colonies on 30 September 1938 that:  
I am sure that you will agree with me that the possibility merits careful 
consideration, of making use of this reserve of professional talent [i.e. 
Jewish refugee doctors], where this can be done to the advantage of 
Colonial communities.33 
MacDonald sold the idea to the colonial governments not in terms of 
emergency humanitarianism for the benefit of the refugees but rather in terms of 
developmental humanitarianism for the benefit of the colonial populations and 
(implicitly but more importantly) the colonial governments. He wrote that: 
there is much to commend the idea that an excellent opportunity is 
here afforded of utilizing the services of these practitioners (many of 
whom are very highly qualified) to supplement the existing medical 
organization in the Colonies where there is admittedly much that could 
be done, but for shortage of staff and funds.34 
MacDonald’s active support for this plan successfully navigated the 
contradictory frameworks created by liberalism, race and humanitarianism. The 
individual, case-by-case nature of the policy fitted within the limits of liberalism. 
The policy also played on Jewish stereotypes, this time in a positive way, 
highlighting the unusual skill and talent of many Jewish medical practitioners. Such 
a policy also helped Britain’s humanitarian reputation (which often translated to 
power in the context of the League of Nations) by aiding two groups who were 
understood to be in need – Jewish refugees and colonial subjects.  
However, legal restrictions meant that only qualifications from Britain or Italy 
were recognised in the colonies. Italian qualifications were accepted as the result of 
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an agreement between Britain and Italy in 1925 to regulate the professional 
practice of medical staff in their respective territories. The relevant clause of this 
agreement provided that medical practitioners holding diplomas issued in Italy 
could be included in the ‘foreign list’ of the register of British medical practitioners 
and thus undertake work in Britain, the colonies, India, British possessions and the 
Dominions.35 This meant that refugee medical practitioners from Germany, Austria 
or Czechoslovakia were therefore ineligible to work in the colonies and were 
refused entry, at least in part, on this basis. 
For example, in April 1938, Dr Bernhard Bauer, a ‘thoroughly scientific doctor’ 
and ‘a highly experienced surgeon’ from Austria, applied to enter Kenya to practice 
medicine.36 E.B. Bowyer, a Colonial Office official, explained that Bauer ‘is not 
qualified for registration in Kenya’. While acknowledging that it would ‘presumably 
be legally open to the Kenya Government [...] to appoint Dr. Bauer to the Medical 
Service of the Colony without requiring him to qualify for registration in the United 
Kingdom’, Bowyer believed that such action ‘would probably be highly inexpedient’ 
for a number of reasons. Specifically, he outlined that:  
It would violate our invariable practice of appointing only persons of 
British nationality to Government posts, it would cause an outcry from 
the Kenya Branch of the British Medical Association (BMA) which would 
no doubt be supported here, and it would moreover be an evasion of 
registration provisions which must be presumed to have been enacted 
in public interest.37 
Colonial officials were obliged to balance the development of the colonies 
where there was a need for improved medical facilities with domestic political 
pressures, including objections from the British Medical Association. In fact, as 
Bowyer also commented, ‘it will be inadvisable in any case to take up the general 
question [of medical practitioners] with regard to the Colonies, until it has been 
settled in regard to the United Kingdom’.38 
The employment of refugee doctors and dentists had proved problematic in 
Britain. The differences in attitudes and action adopted towards the same issue in 
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the domestic and colonial spheres offer an important point of comparison. The 
BMA ‘opposed the admission of more than a small number of refugee doctors’.39 As 
a result of anti-refugee sentiment, the Home Office ‘undertook to consult the 
medical organisations if the number of refugees studying medicine threatened to 
become too large’. However, the BMA, by applying restrictions to its licensing 
procedures, were able to limit the number of refugees allowed to enter Britain to 
work in medicine. Even in 1938, the BMA ‘adamantly refused to agree to the 
admission of more than a very limited number of refugee doctors, some of world-
wide repute, streaming out of Vienna’ and even established ‘a committee to advise 
the Home Secretary on the conditions under which such refugees were henceforth 
to be allowed into Great Britain’. Dentists, who were actually in short supply in 
Britain in 1933, faced similar challenges. Attempts to limit medical practitioners 
entry into Britain were obviously successful, as in May 1937, it was recorded that 
only seventy-eight dentists and 183 doctors had been allowed to practice.40  
Moreover, in the case of Bauer, racial attitudes were also important, as the 
deference to the BMA shows that Britishness was still considered to be best. Lastly, 
despite Bauer’s direct reference to the difficulties for ‘nonarian [sic] physicians’ 
caused by increasing legal persecution, amendments to the law were not initially 
made, an expression of the prioritisation of domestic and colonial needs, over the 
emergency needs of refugees.41 
Dr Jakob Wilczek (who sent a letter of application addressed to King George 
VI) received a similarly negative response from the Colonial Office: ‘I am [...] to 
inform you that for Government appointments in the Colonial Service[,] preference 
is given to applicants of British nationality. The Secretary of State regrets therefore 
that he can see no prospect of his being able to offer you such an appointment’.42 
Bowyer explained the standard response to individual applications from Jewish 
medical practitioners:  
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we usually reply to the effect that the laws governing the registration of 
medical practitioners in the Colonies vary from Colony to Colony as do 
the immigration laws which have to be complied with, and we, 
therefore, suggest that the enquirer should communicate direct with 
the Colonial Secretary or Chief Secretary of any Colony or Colonies to 
which he specifically thinks of proceeding.  
He went on to explain that ‘this is perhaps not a very sympathetic way of dealing 
with the problem, but with the enormous number of enquiries we receive it would 
be quite impossible to deal with them in any other way’.43 
Bowyer framed the decisions made in bureaucratic, ‘common sense’ terms, 
and does not reference other factors of influence. Again, the Colonial Office’s 
general preference for British doctors, as with land settlement in Kenya, was an 
expression of their understanding of ‘white British’ and what this meant, 
particularly in comparison to a Jewish (European) ‘other’. Moreover, that requests 
were re-directed to individual colonial governments allowed those on location to 
make the decision based on perceived local needs and limitations. This followed a 
liberal preference for individual entry in which the benefits to the colony could be 
assessed in the context of other humanitarian concerns.  
At the time of MacDonald’s circular telegram, only the Bahamas, Barbados, 
Bermuda, British Honduras and Tanganyika recognised foreign qualifications.44 For 
example, in Tanganyika, the law provided that the holder of any medical diploma 
would be allowed to practice as long as the local authorities were satisfied that he 
or she possessed ‘the requisite knowledge and skill for the efficient practice of 
medicine, surgery and midwifery’. Following MacDonald’s lead, action was then 
taken to expand this to other colonial territories. In early 1939, the Governor of 
Nyasaland was informed that the Secretary of State, due to ‘the special 
circumstances’, wished that ‘the law should be amended to correspond with [...] 
Tanganyika’.45 Gambia was put under similar pressure, where it was ‘becoming 
more and more difficult to obtain British doctors’ and ‘increasingly difficult to bear 
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the rising cost of them’.46 Colonial Office officials therefore agreed to ‘go ahead and 
suggest to the Gambia that they should alter their law’.47 
Across the empire, attempts were made to follow MacDonald’s call to action. 
In the Bahamas, there were ‘three temporary vacancies for Medical officers in the 
Government Service in the Out Islands’ that the Governor considered ‘filling by the 
appointment of refugee doctors’. Although it was stressed that the positions were 
‘only [temporary] for one year’ and employment came with the restriction that 
medicine could not be practised privately, there were still reservations.48 For 
example, Poynton noted, that ‘any Colony taking a Jewish refugee from Germany 
has got to be prepared to keep him – at any rate as long as the Nazi regime lasts’.49 
Nonetheless, attempts to fill medical vacancies with Jewish refugees showed that 
the principle of linking colonial development and refugees became active policy, 
even if only in an informal capacity. 
Closer inspection of this offer, however, reveals the limited nature 
(particularly in terms of scale) of its implementation. The Bahamian Out Islands, 
which comprised 700 islands dotted over 15,000 square miles of the Atlantic Ocean 
(only a handful of which were inhabited), were an unpopular destination for 
professional Britons. The inhabitants of the Out Islands suffered ‘isolation and 
poverty’, had ‘limited occupational options available’ and were divided between a 
number of (often blurred) ethnic and racial lines.50 The one-year time-frame of the 
posts was included to meet a specific need while protecting long-term local, 
especially white British professional interests. Poynton’s point that such a 
restriction was folly was not a humanitarian suggestion (i.e. to persuade the 
government to keep the refugees in safety for as long as possible) but a warning 
that refugee entry was a long-term cost. 
Similar appointments in the Leeward Islands are also illuminating. The 
Governor contacted the Colonial Office about a temporary opening for a medical 
practitioner at the Cunningham Hospital at St Kitts. After several different people 
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were considered for the role, the Colonial Office, along with M. Stephany of the 
German Jewish Council, recommended Dr. E.V. Strisiver, an Austrian doctor who 
had previously worked in Jamaica before gaining British qualifications in Edinburgh 
in 1938. Strisiver’s character reference came from Dr Lightbourne, a ‘coloured 
woman doctor with whom [he] worked for some months in Jamaica’. Beside the 
fact that officials needed to identify Lightbourne as black and female (highlighting 
many of the racial and gender preoccupations prevalent at the time), her report 
also illuminates other frameworks, both ideological and practical, that helped shape 
policy. Her report pointed out that Strisiver had been unable to practise medicine in 
Jamaica as he did not have the correct qualifications (a practical limitation). 
Lightbourne explained that Strisiver: 
was not a registered Medical Practitioner in this country, and could do 
nothing except under my immediate personal supervision. Independent 
action was therefore denied to him, but from his ability to offer me 
valuable suggestions and from his general bearing I have no hesitation in 
pronouncing him thoroughly competent. He had sound anatomical 
knowledge, and seemed especially well versed in Midwifery and 
Gynaecology. He assisted in the operating theatre [...] on occasions 
when I was myself present [...]and he certainly seemed to know what he 
was about.51 
Importantly, Strisiver’s appointment fitted with influential frameworks; his 
appointment was carried out on an individual basis and with a time limit. Moreover, 
he had worked in the colonies before and shown himself to be capable and willing 
to function in a tropical climate. Although there was some concern regarding his 
inter-personal skills, this was not deemed to be enough to disqualify him. More 
broadly, agreement to filing this position with a refugee might have been, at least in 
part, because of the limited number of candidates for the job (there were only 
three), in a location hardly desirable for a British applicant.  
Ann Hugon’s investigation of Jewish refugees and medical practitioners in the 
Gold Coast highlights how the needs of the colonies were always given precedence, 
even if this meant going against the general trend in policy. Hugon explains that in 
West Africa the use of refugee doctors was unpopular as it was felt that to employ 
Jewish refugees in medical positions would threaten a local project to establish a 
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medical school for African students. It was argued that filling medical jobs with 
Europeans in the short term would discourage African people from taking up 
medical study in the long term.52 Although there were clearly differences between 
the expectations of development in East and West African territories, when the 
emergency needs of refugees were juxtaposed with the developmental needs of the 
empire, the latter was always prioritised. As a result, colonial policy adapted to local 
need. 
In the minds of British officials, African medical practitioners were generally 
perceived to be less able. This was most evident in the response to complaints 
made by three German women (the records do not state whether they were Jewish 
or not) held in an internment camp in Northern Rhodesia after the outbreak of war. 
They were unhappy with their medical treatment by ‘African medical staff’. The 
Colonial Office explained that ‘on the two occasions mentioned it was necessary to 
make use of African medical staff, as no European or Indian medical practitioners 
were available.’ The ‘African medical staff’ involved an orderly and an ‘African 
Hospital Assistant’, and it was explained that:  
these men have all had systematic training in medicine and are often 
put in charge of small district hospitals. In cases of urgency in which it is 
not practicable to obtain the services of a fully qualified European or 
Indian medical practitioner, they are accustomed to treat Europeans.  
With ten and twelve years’ experience respectively, they were described as ‘men of 
exceptional ability and the highest character’.53 This reveals an implicit ranking of 
race in terms of ability to practice medicine – European and Indian were viewed as 
better than ‘African’ – by both those held in the camp (whose attitudes may well 
have been entirely racist) and many officials. This is suggestive of the importance of 
racial and humanitarian perceptions in the formation of colonial refugee policy.  
The example of amending legislation to facilitate the employment of refugee 
doctors shows that the Colonial Office pursued independent policy initiatives in 
response to refugee issues. In Britain, domestic pressure was such that refugee 
doctors represented a threat, while in the colonies they were sometimes 
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considered to be a potential asset, although this did vary from colony to colony. 
While the colonial response to refugee doctors helped a small number of refugees, 
the action must be seen in the context of Colonial Office concerns. Increased levels 
of persecution did not induce the adoption of a completely open immigration or 
refugee policy. Within the frameworks established in this thesis, officials did try to 
adopt a variety of policies that were more helpful to refugees while still conforming 
to existing liberal, racial and humanitarian ideas. This response clearly centred on 
the pragmatic (economic benefits) that Britain derived. However, that they were 
encouraged and legislation actively changed is evidence of a response prompted by 
sympathy but manifested in the ideological context of the empire and interwar 
concerns.  
BRITISH GUIANA 
The benefits and limits of large-scale settlement were outlined in chapter two, 
where the impact of liberalism on British domestic and colonial immigration policies 
was assessed. British Guiana was arguably the most practical locations of large-scale 
re-settlement of Jewish refugees in the empire, at least in the minds of officials in 
the 1930s and 1940s. This was because it offered not just potential safety to 
refugees but also benefits for the British government, which wished to develop the 
territory. The following section will outline the progression of the idea of Jewish re-
settlement in British Guiana, the role of MacDonald and why large-scale settlement 
plans were ultimately unsuccessful. It will further emphasise the specific nature of 
British colonial policy that was defined in both its conception and implementation 
by questions of liberalism, race and humanitarianism.  
British Guiana, which measured some 83,000 square miles, was one of 
Britain’s largest ‘undeveloped’ territories from the 1850s until the 1950s. During 
this time, eighty-five percent of the country was still virgin forest.54 The colony 
nonetheless had an active local population, which by the interwar years, was under 
increasing control from Whitehall. British Guiana was a former slave colony, and a 
significant number of its population were ancestors of slaves brought from Africa. 
After slavery was abolished in the 1830s, the constitution allowed for the 
emergence of a more diverse colonial elite. For example, a significant East Indian 
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population was present on the island, many of whom first arrived in the colony as 
indentured labour. The impact of the First World War and a fall in sugar prices 
encouraged greater control from London, and in 1928, despite protest from locals, 
the constitution was amended to bring it in line with many other crown colonies.55  
Despite the presence of different established communities, as well as its 
import and export markets, British Guiana was perceived in the West as an 
‘undeveloped’ territory, ripe with potential. This was a long-standing view. For 
example, after a visit to the colony in 1859, author Anthony Trollope was very 
hopeful about the development potential of the territory. A little later, in 1896, 
Joseph Chamberlain presented a plan to the Cabinet to use the profit from the Suez 
Canal shares to develop British tropical colonial territory, specifically British 
Guiana.56 In a debate in the House of Commons in 1928, the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, Leo Amery described the territory in the following way: 
It is a country as large as the United Kingdom, possessing very great 
natural resources, a soil of extraordinary richness [...] great mineral 
resources and immense resources in timber. Yet, somehow, that colony 
has, in the century and a quarter of British occupation [...] made no 
appreciable progress. Its record is one of almost continuous stagnation 
[...] In spite of the immigration into British Guiana of over 350,000 
people in the course of a century, the population today stands at only 
300,000 [...].57 
Amery’s description is suggestive of the view that British Guiana was 
undeveloped, with untapped natural resources and a limited local population. In the 
1930s, official and unofficial attention turned to the development of British Guiana, 
particularly in relation to refugee questions. Along with the official investigations 
that were conducted in British Guiana (discussed below), interested outsiders also 
identified British Guiana as a place of possible settlement. For example, W.S. 
Barclay, the secretary of Tower Hill Improvement, was in regular contact with the 
Colonial Office on the issue. He argued that settlement in British Guiana had the 
potential to do ‘more than merely “open up” the country’. He argued that sending 
Jewish refugees to British Guiana would also ‘give England a positive and not merely 
an absentee-landlord interest in South America’, be ‘a gesture of help to outlawed 
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and suffering innocent[s]’ and prompt praise from ‘every citizen in the Americas and 
the Empire’.58 
Barclay was not alone; a piece in The Times in November 1938 commented:  
In British Guiana, for instance, a great country the size of Britain, with 
less than half a million inhabitants and only the coastal regions 
developed, an invasion of Jewish brains, energy and capital similar to 
that experienced in Palestine would be a godsend, and thus developed 
there would be room also, and work, for the surplus population of the 
West Indian islands.59 
The potential of re-settlement in British Guiana was often discussed in 
grandiose terms. For example, another article by the same author, W.E. Simnett , 
made reference to a 1826 speech by Foreign Secretary George Canning, which 
called ‘the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old’. Simnett 
wrote:  
With capital and energy, and above all, people, it could become the New 
Palestine, a daughter settlement looking towards the ancient Zion for its 
spiritual and cultural ideals. Now that the prospects of Jewish 
development in Palestine are unfortunately restricted, it would be a 
compensating gesture on our part [...] to redress the balance of the old 
world by calling in the new.60 
These positive views of the potential for Jewish settlement in the British West 
Indian territory, particularly as a proposed alternative to Palestine, was, naturally, 
anathema to Zionists, both inside and outside of the Jewish community. For 
example, Chaim Weizmann opposed the settlement in British Guiana. He told Lord 
Lugard in January 1939 that ‘[w]hat the poor refugees require is immediate help 
and that will take a very long time with an exotic country [...] We could receive a 
fresh many thousands in Palestine, but the doors are closed’. Lugard responded in a 
more positive light: 
I am sorry that you think that the British Guiana project would take 
years to mature. I had hoped that in view of the remarkable work of the 
colonists in Palestine, and the terrible position in which the refugees 
find themselves, the project might have been put through with the 
assistance promised by the British Government without great delay. It 
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would be a great thing to have a self-governing Jewish State, even 
though not in Palestine. 61 
The correspondence is revealing on a number of levels. Lugard’s response to 
Weizmann foregrounds the importance British officials placed on the Jewish 
response to settlement plans, particularly in the context of a liberal expectation of 
self-help. Essentially, he argued that, particularly given the awful situation in 
Europe, Jews should be ready and willing to take immediate action on any 
opportunity given to them. Furthermore, both Weizmann and Lugard made 
reference to racial stereotypes. Weizmann played on the very British stereotype 
that Jews (and other Europeans) were fundamentally unsuited to tropical living as 
an argument in favour of removing restrictions on entry to Palestine, while Lugard 
used Jewish success there to promote the feasibility of a speedy settlement in 
British Guiana. Finally, the whole discussion was prompted by the tension between 
the need for emergency humanitarian aid and the longer-term benefits of state-
building. While Lugard referred to British Guiana as potentially being a ‘Jewish 
State’, the British more generally were hopeful that it would be developed as a 
British colony first and foremost.62  
Despite this long-standing and sometimes contentious interest in the 
potential of the colony, Jewish refugee settlement in British Guiana was not 
investigated fully in preparation for the Évian Conference in July 1938, although it 
had been on the Colonial Office’s radar as a possible place of settlement since the 
early 1930s when the territory was discussed in relation to Assyrian refugees.63 This 
was not in deference to Zionist concerns, but rather more likely due to the riots that 
had recently erupted in the British West Indies over economic hardships. The 
Moyne Commission’s examination into the causes of these riots resulted in a 
cautious attitude toward settlement projects in the area. One of the main causes of 
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unrest identified by the Commission was overpopulation. Unsurprisingly then, 
colonial officials felt that ‘if suitable schemes can be devised for settlement in that 
area, prior consideration must be given to the needs of the surplus population of 
the more overcrowded West Indian Islands’.64 In fact, when settlement plans for 
another West Indian territory, British Honduras, were discussed in 1939, it was 
decided that ‘any opportunities for settlement [...] should be reserved for West 
Indians’.65 Thus, it was considered to be ‘desirable that the question of any 
possibilities of Jewish immigration into the West Indian Colonies or the adjacent 
territories, namely, British Guiana and British Honduras, should be excluded from 
the discussions’ at Évian.66 
While local considerations in the summer of 1938 were enough to ensure 
British Guiana was excluded from discussions of possible refugee settlement, in the 
aftermath of Kristallnacht in November, MacDonald announced at an inter-
departmental meeting ‘the necessity’ of ‘making a further examination of the 
possibility of settling Jewish refugees in the British Empire’, and British Guiana was 
one of the options discussed at length.67 As a concession to previous concerns, it 
was decided that the Royal Commission would need to be kept informed. 
Nonetheless, serious examination of the options for settlement was thereafter 
undertaken. While restriction of refugee entry remained at the heart of British 
action, the shift in attitude over British Guiana shows that the clash of emergency 
and alchemic humanitarianisms was not static, but rather was in constant flux 
which ultimately impacted the specificities of policy towards refugees in the 
colonies. 
In early November 1938, a telegram was sent to the Governor of British 
Guiana, Sir Wilfrid Edward Francis Jackson, asking him to outline possible 
settlement options in the colony. The Governor’s response was reasonably 
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balanced, focusing on the perceived positive as well as the negative consequences 
of refugee settlement. He wrote that: 
I am profoundly sceptical as to the possibility of establishing self-
supporting agricultural or pastoral settlements in either Rupununi or 
[the] north west district and consider careful survey from agricultural, 
economic and health standpoints would be an essential preliminary but 
if His Majesty’s Government feel impelled in view of the urgency of the 
situation to offer these areas for examination[,] I consider local 
opposition should not be allowed to stand in the way as these areas 
have remained for many years undeveloped and there is no immediate 
prospect of their development by the people of the colony.68 
The Governor’s response articulates the contradictions present in the 
discussions and ultimate failure of large-scale settlement in the colonies. Although 
Jackson was not opposed to the idea of Jewish settlement in principle, he was not 
optimistic about its success. This, it seems, had little to do with local opinion. In fact, 
Jackson was willing to dismiss local opinion, almost as punishment for their 
supposed inability and/or unwillingness to develop land on their own and on British 
terms. Jackson’s concerns were practical, although these were rooted in racial 
perceptions. He emphasised the need for agricultural development and was also 
keen to assert in the same telegram that Jewish settlement in coastal towns would 
not be welcome. The government’s support of Jewish settlement was based 
specifically on the development of the land, and, thereby, the infrastructure and 
economy of the colony and his scepticism was based on his assumptions about the 
(in)abilities of Jewish refugees.  
In London, however, Jackson’s gesture was met with hesitation. Hibbert 
wanted to ‘be very careful what we say because there is a very real danger at the 
present time of arousing false hope’.69 Nonetheless, there was the realisation that 
settlement plans reduced domestic as well as international pressure on the Colonial 
Office, a powerful motivating factor in Britain’s humanitarian actions. Shuckburgh, 
who agreed with Hibbert that expectations should not be unduly raised, also argued 
that ‘there may be more advantage in reminding the world that we are being active 
on the Colonial side’.70 
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Other colonial officials condemned the idea outright. In a private letter to 
MacDonald, Arthur Creech Jones (Labour MP and co-founder of the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau) wrote that although ‘Jewish capital and enterprise may contribute 
substantially to the economic well-being of the colony, and therefore help any West 
Indian people who may be transferred there later on’, the more immediate impact 
of refugee settlement had to be checked. He reiterated ‘the problem of surplus 
population in the West Indies and the lack of outlet in these days for these people’. 
He concluded that:  
It seems to me that British Guiana is one of the possibilities for dealing 
with the problem of poverty, unemployment and surplus population in 
the West Indies and I am only anxious that in the popular agitation in 
respect to the refugee problem, there shall be no development which 
will seriously prejudice the opening out of land for the absorption of the 
people our forefathers took to the West Indies who cannot now be 
usefully employed.71 
Creech Jones’s view, that development should be solely for the benefit of 
local populations, did not just concern British Guiana. His letter to MacDonald also 
mentioned Kenya and the ‘irony’ that land could be found for ‘German subjects’ but 
not for ‘our own wards in respect to their ancestral lands’. MacDonald clearly 
believed that the emergency needs of refugees and the development of the 
colonies could be resolved in a mutually beneficial way. However, Creech Jones did 
not. This seems to stem from the tensions within liberalism that rejected the idea of 
special treatment of Jewish refugees, for he explains that ‘[i]t is most important that 
the exclusive principles of colonisation in Palestine should not be repeated there 
and that a condition should be made that West Indian labour should also be found 
employment in any scheme’. While Palestine was an example of development for 
some, Creech-Jones and his strong left-wing politics ensured that an equality of 
treatment for all who sought space to live, including local populations, was a top 
priority.72  
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After British Guiana was specifically mentioned by Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain during a House of Commons debate on refugees on 21 November, the 
Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees looked to arrange for experts to visit the 
colony and investigate the possibility of settlement. They ultimately accepted an 
offer from the US President’s Advisory Committee on Refugees ‘to nominate a 
Commission of American experts to visit and report on any areas that might be 
available for the settlement of refugees, and that this Commission, whose expenses 
would be defrayed from American sources, would be able to proceed to the Colony 
almost immediately’.73 MacDonald agreed but insisted that Britain was represented, 
which was motivated by two factors. American-led international pressure for action 
on the refugee question could be quelled by British involvement. Moreover, British 
candidates on the committee would have offered some reassurance that British 
interests were represented and protected.74  
Ultimately, two British representatives were appointed. Sir Crawford Douglas 
Jones (a former Colonial Secretary of British Guiana) and Sir Geoffrey Evans (an 
economic botanist at the Royal Botanic Gardens at Kew and a former Principal of 
the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad) joined an American 
delegation made up of six experts. One of those experts was Dr. Joseph A. Rosen, 
who was described as a ‘Jewish colonisation specialist and agronomist’ and was 
heavily involved with the Jewish settlement in the Dominican Republic.75 Rosen 
proved to be controversial. A known territorialist, it was feared by some, including 
pro-Zionist Jews, that the Committee would not produce a fair assessment of 
settlement potentials, a tension that played out at the time of the publication of the 
report. 
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In February 1939, MacDonald discussed a supplementary estimate (i.e. to 
seek additional capital for Colonial Office expenditure) for the purpose of paying for 
the two British representatives. He explained that ‘[w]e are all aware of the 
seriousness of the problem of the refugees in Central Europe, and Parliament and 
the Government have been anxious that the British Empire should make the 
maximum contribution which it can towards a solution of this refugee problem’. He 
emphasised the importance of having ‘an expert opinion as to the numbers of 
refugees which might be taken, and the kind of settlement which we might give in 
future in the case of other settlers’. After outlining that Douglas-Jones and Evans 
had been appointed to the roles, he requested £1,000 to cover ‘personal expenses 
and subsistence allowances’.76 
This capital investment in the commission is important to note. It highlights 
the level of involvement Britain sought in the project and serves to confirm the 
interest in its ultimate success. However, Whitehall was also keen to ensure that 
this initial financial involvement would not commit Britain to further finance later 
on. This was specified on several occasions. For example, Sir John Simon, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, wrote to MacDonald in January 1939 that ‘meeting the 
expenses of these two members of the American Mission’ should not ‘commit [...] 
public funds to financing any ultimate settlement in British Guiana’. He believed 
that ‘[i]t will indeed be a very serious business if the British taxpayer, in addition to 
paying everything else which he is asked to pay for just now, has to pay for the 
settlement in various parts of the world of enormous numbers of foreign 
refugees’.77 
Simon’s concerns were obviously domestic, and his use of ‘various parts of the 
world’ to describe part of the empire is telling of this perspective. His concern for 
the ‘British taxpayer’ also eludes to his role as a member of Parliament, where he 
was answerable to ordinary British citizens more than the needs of colonial ‘others’ 
in far-flung tropical territories. Unsurprisingly, policy-makers approached the 
question of colonial refugee settlement with a mind to their own concerns, and this 
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must be taken into consideration when looking at the varying views expressed in 
official documents. 
Douglas-Jones and Evans left England on 4 February, arriving in British Guiana 
on 14 February, and stayed for three months. Their task was to: 
To study and report upon the suitability and practicability of large-scale 
colonisation in British Guiana for involuntary emigrants of European 
origin, from the physical, climatic and economic points of view; to 
estimate the approximate numbers that might be settled there (a) 
immediately [and] (b) over a term of years; to calculate the probable 
cost of such settlement; if mass colonisation appears feasible, to 
recommend a general plan of settlement.78 
This official remit of the Commission’s investigations is telling of the inherent 
difficulties in attempts to link refugee settlement and colonial development. There 
was clearly a difference between the nature and extent of schemes that could be 
achieved immediately (as the scale of the refugee crisis warranted) and those that 
could be pursued if time and finance were not an issue. Indeed, the stated purpose 
of the Commission almost sealed its own fate; refugee advocates could push for 
smaller, immediate settlement plans while officials in Britain (who were less keen 
on such schemes) could, within the frameworks of liberalism and race, claim no 
special allowances for Jewish settlers and therefore stall plans based on how long 
they would take to implement. 
The main area that the Commission examined was the Rupununi savannahs, 
some 40,000 square miles that the British had offered for agricultural refugee 
settlement, which ‘was within five degrees of the equator and 250 miles from the 
sea’. The Commission was asked to ‘discover whether large areas of good soil 
existed, whether health and climatic factors were favourable, whether 
transportation routes could be developed at reasonable cost, and whether sources 
of power and materials for industrial development existed’.79 After examination, 
several key issues emerged, including access to the area: ‘[m]eans of transportation 
to the coast, obviously crucial to any proposed settlement, were limited to airplane, 
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a canoe and motor launch combination in the wet season, and a crude cattle train 
suitable for horses and pack animals’.80 
While the Commission was asked to study potential options for agricultural 
settlement in the Rupununi area, it also examined possibilities for industrial 
development. There was support for this action from Jackson, who wrote to the 
Colonial Office explaining that the committee was somewhat: 
more impressed with the idea of industrial development[,] possible in 
forest areas using local wood as raw material for manufacture of various 
kinds now carried on in Central Europe. They recognise that very large 
capital outlay would be required to finance this and [the] agriculture 
scheme and that no remunerative return on capital could be expected 
but appear to consider that very large funds might be forthcoming on 
these terms.81 
Jackson went on to stress how this idea was received within the colony. He wrote:  
I have tentatively sounded the Executive Council on the subject and 
their feeling was that we should not stand in the way of any project 
promising large industrial development which would secure 
employment for any surplus local labour and also probably offer 
considerable openings for immigrant labour from the West Indies, as 
under climatic conditions here local labour would be required for many 
operations.82 
The Colonial Office agreed with the governor’s argument that: 
the commission should be encouraged to investigate possibilities of 
industrial development referred to in your telegram especially as they 
are likely to secure employment for surplus local labour and offer 
openings for immigrant labour from West Indies in addition to refugee 
settlement, but I hope that they will be under no illusion regarding the 
various difficulties which are likely to attend such developments.83 
Support for industrial development would have been a meaningful concession 
on behalf of the Colonial Office which, as established earlier, was not keen on 
industrial development in the colonies due to the potential economic impact this 
would have on domestic markets. However, several aspects of the telegram suggest 
that the response was not necessarily a concession. The possibility of providing 
employment for ‘immigrant labour from West Indies’ would have been appealing in 
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the context of recent local unrest. However, the reference to the ‘various 
difficulties’ associated with such action and the caution at the end of the 
communication that ‘[y]ou will no doubt make it clear to [the] commission that 
over-riding consideration must necessarily be interests of existing inhabitants of the 
Colony’ are important to note.84 Although concentration on the needs of the colony 
and local populations was sometimes a manifestation of real, alchemic 
humanitarianism, it was also an easy political tool with which to maintain the status 
quo. With the concern for ‘existing inhabitants of the Colony’, policy-makers had a 
powerful veto for action they were not keen to pursue.  
In April 1939, the Commission presented its report. It contained four key 
recommendations. First, trial settlements for between 3,000 and 5,000 ‘carefully 
selected young men and women’ should be established in the first place in ‘properly 
chosen locations’. Second, ‘competent leadership’ should be appointed to offer 
assistance in all ‘technical, financial’ concerns. Third, the settlement should consist 
of settlers with knowledge and skills to make the settlements self-sufficient. Finally, 
the report estimated the cost of ‘establishing and maintaining’ these kinds of trial 
settlements to be about USD3,000,000.85 
After the report was received, the government organised its response, 
outlining that it was ‘prepared to offer the fullest facilities for such settlement on 
the lines indicated’. They also confirmed that the land deemed to be suitable for 
settlement would be ‘leased on generous terms’ and that ‘the Government of 
British Guiana would be prepared to appoint such administrative officers as may be 
necessary and otherwise to cooperate to the fullest possible extent’. Enquiries into 
potential ‘industrial employment’ in ‘other areas in the interior of British Guiana’ 
were also outlined. Finally, it was decided that ‘His Majesty’s Government envisage 
the settlement of refugees over the whole of the interior of British Guiana in so far 
as it may prove practicable save in areas as have already been alienated or in 
respect of which rights have already been granted’.86 The Commissioner’s report 
indicated that the best time for settlement to proceed was in October, and 
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MacDonald was eager to have plans in place for the first group of experimental 
settlers to arrive in the late autumn of 1939.87 
Despite these positive developments, there was concern among some of 
those responsible for implementing the action outlined in the report, specifically 
regarding ‘the equatorial climate and the danger of tropical diseases’.88 Afraid to 
commit fully to settlement in the Rupununi district, attention turned to other areas 
considered to be more suitable for immediate settlement, including near the 
Berbice River and Anchor Ranch. Evans (one of Britain’s appointed representatives 
on the Commission) felt that an experimental settlement on the Berbice River 
‘would provide some indication of the possibilities of European settlement in [the] 
climate; it would demonstrate the agricultural possibilities of the savannah while it 
would be a convenient base for parties to explore the agricultural and industrial 
possibilities of the interior’.89 Indeed, he viewed settlement in the Berbice River 
area as an ideal short-term option, a sort of ‘base camp’ to be ‘used as a jumping off 
ground for settlers proceeding to the Rupununi’.90 
However, the Berbice River settlement was not in the area outlined for 
investigation by the Commission and was much nearer to the coast, an area that the 
Governor had placed off-limits in earlier communication. Hibbert echoed Jackson’s 
fear that ‘German Jewish refugees are not fitted by training or environment for an 
agricultural life. Their heart will not be in it. And they will inevitable tend to drift to 
the towns where they feel their real metier can find scope’.91 This was a real 
concern, especially given the vocal objections raised by Asian migrants who would 
be particularly threatened by Jewish settlement in towns. 
These concerns highlight the tensions between those who sought to link 
colonial development and refugees for the sake of the refugees and those who 
wanted to do so for the benefit of the colonies. The basic assumptions of refugee 
committees which were expected to fund planned settlement were different to 
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those of colonial officials. For example, in August 1939, Rothschild’s refugee 
committee requested that the British government pay for the medical and 
veterinary services that were needed in a prospective settlement. He went on to say 
that: 
I venture to remind you that, as the benefits of the knowledge acquired 
from the experimental farm and the experience gathered by the medical 
and veterinary experts will inure to the permanent advantage of the 
whole colony, the cost of such a farm and services could properly be 
borne by the Colonial Development Fund or other appropriate fund.92 
While many in the Colonial Office had assumed that outside funding (largely Jewish) 
would be utilised for the colony’s benefit, the committee challenged this by 
requesting development funds to aid refugee settlement in recognition of the long-
term benefits that Jewish settlement would bring to the colony. 
Similarly, the response of the Colonial Office to enquiries made by the Marudi 
Mountain Goldfields Company regarding the possibilities of settling Polish settlers in 
the colony highlight the emphasis that the Colonial Office put on the benefits of 
refugee settlement. J. Robert Robinson, an MP and supporter of the company, 
lobbied MacDonald on the benefits of the scheme in direct relation to Colonial 
Development. Robinson wrote: 
From the Colonial point of view the emigration of a hardworking body of 
men backed by adequate capital will be invaluable in developing the 
undeveloped resources of a long neglected area of the Colony. Their 
work should open up this section of the interior, for they will have to 
build their own roads and develop their own communications. 
Agriculture will be developed and furthermore geological evidence 
indicates a successful mining venture which should make a substantial 
contribution to the resources of the Colony in the future.93 
Moreover, this was connected to the government’s own investigations into possible 
refugee settlement. Robinson continued: 
Here is an opportunity of making a practical experiment with similar 
labour at the expense of private enterprise. The Government cannot 
lose by it, and will acquire without cost valuable information which in a 
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most practical way would show the potentialities of settling Jewish 
Refugees in the interior of the Colony.94 
Indeed, the possibility of shifting the cost of developing transport links to the 
interior, a major concern of the Commission in regard to settlement in Rupununi, 
must have been appealing. However, concerns regarding the financial viability of 
the company (and its proposals) meant that the Colonial Office would not support 
the scheme. Clauson minuted his two main concerns: 
(1) to British Guiana, to see that the Colony does not get loaded up with 
a lot of indigestible non-returnable refugees; 
(2) to the Polish Jews, to see that they do not get involved in a swindle 
which may cause them losses which they can ill afford [and] suffering 
which they ought not to be allowed to undergo under our auspices.95 
Clauson expressed concerns for both alchemic and emergency 
humanitarianism and the order given to these shows that attempts to connect 
refugees with colonial development was a way of expressing the humanitarian 
concerns for refugees in a constructive way in the context of the empire. The 
influence of liberalism and race were also once again clear, evidenced in the 
reference to ‘indigestible’ refugees, which implicitly raised questions about the 
nature and ability of Jewish assimilation. Connecting colonial development and 
refugees was indeed a policy of compromise that that saw officials work hard to 
make it as mutually beneficial as possible.  
Plans for refugee settlement in British Guiana were ultimately disrupted by 
the outbreak of war. Although not the sole reason for the failure of settlement 
schemes, the war played a pivotal role in changing the focus of government support 
and resources. As mentioned earlier, timing was important. The need to find quick 
and workable answers to the refugee question meant long-term development 
(probably in the best overall interest of the colony) could not easily be reconciled 
with this aim. This context of war gave those who questioned the benefits of 
connecting the two issues the cover needed to divert attention towards the loftier 
aim of winning the war and thereby defeating the Nazis and ending Jewish 
persecution. War, however, did not stop the process immediately, and it was still 
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planned to send the first 500 settlers to British Guiana by June 1940.96 Relations 
also soured between Rothschild’s refugee sub-committee and the Colonial Office. 
Tension over the financing of the scheme was the main problem, specifically 
concerning ‘the cost of setting up and maintaining the experimental farm which 
they want to establish at the refugee base in the Berbice district, the cost of import 
duty on goods or material required by the settlers, and the cost of medical and 
veterinary services’.97 By 13 November 1939, Mayle minuted that: 
I gather that no proposals for carrying out the British Guiana project are 
likely to materialise [...] and that there is still no prospect of the 
voluntary organisation here proceeding with their proposals. These 
proposals have not been finally abandoned but their suspension clearly 
creates a new situation which seems to involve some modification of 
the policy regarding proposals for the development of the interior of the 
Colony.98 
Wyman outlined that by November 1941 ‘a small refugee settlement had 
been planted 50 miles from the coast’, and this really ‘marked the end of the dream 
of a major refugee haven in this tropical region’.99 Nonetheless, some officials 
believed that settlement schemes might take place after the war. While studies of 
the Allied response often dismiss colonial settlement attempts as a government 
manoeuvre to relieve pressure or dispel criticism, the longevity of such plans, such 
as those in British Guiana, suggests some sincerity in the ideas behind them.100 
Refugee settlement in British Guiana received MacDonald’s active support, 
and in his prominent role as Secretary of State for the Colonies, he pushed for 
government action on the matter. Even as the scheme was put on hold due to the 
outbreak of war and as Rothschild informed the Colonial Office that the Refugee 
Committee would not be taking the project any further, MacDonald commented, 
‘[b]ut I think we should proceed with the scheme as soon as conditions permit. The 
refugee problem may get worse, not better’.101 
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However, MacDonald did not just advocate for the refugee settlement in and 
of itself; he was also keen to deepen the connection between refugee settlement 
and colonial development in any such plans. To this end, MacDonald felt that ‘[i]f 
the British Guiana plan developed and if similar settlements were set up in other 
Colonial areas’, he was keen to set ‘up a special department in the Colonial Office to 
deal with this’.102 This was also noted in the Colonial Office record of the meeting, 
where it was explained that MacDonald was ‘prepared to advocate further 
machinery being set up in the form of a special Department in the Colonial Office 
with a whole time senior officer in charge of it’.103 
MacDonald’s motivation must have included the desire to ‘dispel the doubts 
which are understood to exist in American circles as to His Majesty’s Government’s 
attitude towards refugee settlement in the Colonial Empire, and in particular in 
British Guiana’.104 Mirroring a preference for experts and scientific planning that 
had developed in the Colonial Office, MacDonald was keen to support settlement 
‘experiments’ for the potential mutual benefit of colonies (both in terms of 
development and international relations) and refugees, not simply humanitarian 
motives.  
In reality, settlement in British Guiana was no more successful than that 
proposed for other territories. The plan’s failure was caused by an array of issues. 
While, even at the highest level, there were those who believed in the potential of 
linking refugee settlement and colonial development, other concerns restricted 
possibilities of success. Ultimately, the need for quick responses would have 
necessitated policy-makers making exceptions for Jewish refugees, something that 
contravened liberal principles. Potential areas of settlement were linked to racial 
perceptions of Jewish refugees as inherently urban, and the concern that arose 
from this pushed officials to either genuinely prioritise the colony or use it as an 
excuse to limit plans, including the development of industry, to suit domestic and 
colonial concerns.  
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REFUGEE PERSPECTIVE 
The importance and value of refugees providing skills or finance was not lost on the 
refugees themselves. Indeed, refugees were keen to highlight their assets in their 
attempts to enter the colonies. The thesis has so far primarily included the 
perspective of the refugee through the use of memoir or oral testimony. However, 
in this chapter, the most telling evidence is found in Colonial Office files. These 
contain many personal (and painful) details of Jewish people and families seeking 
safety, utilising their resources to ‘sell’ themselves to the new developmental 
ideology of the Colonial Office and the British Empire.  
Dr. Ludwig Reinheimer sent his particulars to the Colonial Office in reference 
to medical openings in the Bahamas. In early spring of 1939, Sir Charles Dundas, the 
Governor of the Bahamas, was keen to fill a one-year temporary post with a refugee 
doctor. The Bahamas recognised all foreign medical qualifications, and Reinheimer 
was viewed favourably. He was well-qualified, provided a pre-paid ticket, and 
confirmed that his relatives in America were willing to finance his move. In his letter 
to the Governor of the Bahamas, he explained that his ‘irreproachable but unlucky 
family’ were ‘eager for assimilating as soon as possible’ into life in the colony. He 
explained that he was a public health official, ‘of course a specialist’ and keen to 
‘work further in this territory, if possible’. He also listed his other skills:  
I have a sound knowledge of medical massage and orthopedic 
gymnastics, of all the photographical technics [sic], of the working in 
chemical, bacteriological laboratories, of the field work and other 
methods of public Assistance and Health Surveying, of the technical 
Hygiene (Water Supply, Prevention of the Tropical and other Epidemic 
diseases etc. etc.). 
Finally, Reinheimer added, ‘I write and speak rather fluently English and perfectly 
French’.105 
British officials, however, were sceptical that he would be able to leave 
Germany. Thus, more serious consideration was given to two applicants who were 
already in Britain. This would also have appeased the Home Office’s calls to 
prioritise moving refugees already in Britain over allowing entry to those in other 
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countries. Ultimately, and rather unsurprisingly, Reinheimer was not given the 
position in the Bahamas.106 
Records at Yad Vashem, Israel’s memorial and museum of the Holocaust, 
holds records of many of the victims of the Holocaust. Among these, it shows that 
Reinheimer died on the 15 February 1945 at Flossenbürg camp in Germany. The 
information was provided by his daughter, Dr. Wilma Reinheimer in 2000.107 With 
the help of colleagues at the USHMM, it was possible to find Reinheimer on the 
German ‘Minority Census’ for 1938-1939 where it detailed that his wife, Helene 
(née Lange) was not Jewish.108 The 1935 Nuremberg Race Laws institutionalised 
Nazi racial ideas and excluded Jewish people from citizenship in Germany. The laws 
made great efforts to define who exactly was considered Jewish. The Nuremberg 
Laws also forbade sexual relations and marriage between Jews and non-Jews. 
Although many Jews and non-Jews remained married (e.g. the famous diarist and 
academic, Victor Klemperer), other families did split up. However, Jewish spouses 
and relations of German citizens remained one of the most challenging group for 
the Nazis to include in the implementation of the Final Solution. The records 
available for the Reinheimer family do not provide the full details of their story, but 
the fact that Helene Reinheimer was not Jewish perhaps explains why other family 
members, including his children, survived the Holocaust and were able to bear 
witness to his death.  
Reinheimer’s story also shows the means by which some Jews utilised their 
skills and assets to apply for entry into British colonies by appealing to official 
concerns, for example, by highlighting skills, finance, and/or a willingness to 
contribute to and assimilate in the colony. These attempts reveal much about their 
plight as well as their understanding of the restrictions that were in place. This 
reality was to have a lasting impact on some refugees, especially on those who 
sought to enter the colonies as children. For example, Alexander Silbiger recalls 
that: 
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[t]he life lesson was that one must choose a profession that will always 
be in demand, no matter where one ends up. Engineering obviously fills 
the bill. Music, for instance, does not. It was because of this doctrine 
that I, my brother, and also my cousin Tommy started out with degrees 
in physical science or engineering, although all three of us subsequently 
earned degrees in less transportable fields (music, psychology, and law 
respectively).109 
The refugee response serves to highlight recognition, and perhaps even 
internalisation, of Britain’s economic, racial and liberal valuation of non-British 
human life. It is also powerful evidence of the way that attitudes towards liberalism, 
race and humanitarianism allowed refugees to be discussed in relation to their 
relative benefit to an existing policy agenda rather than as individuals in need.  
*** 
The attempts to link colonial development and the refugee question did not result 
in the saving of a large number of refugees. Often doors to the colonies remained 
firmly shut. However, the fact that attempts were made reflects that the Colonial 
Office pursued its own policy objectives and should be studied as a branch of 
government separate to the Foreign and Home Offices (although, at the same time, 
intimately connected to them). Indeed, domestic policy followed similar patterns of 
targeted entry; academics and scientists, diamond workers and domestic help were 
all allowed entry because they offered something to the metropole. However, entry 
into Britain for refugee doctors was limited because they seemed to threaten the 
status quo for existing doctors. This was in direct contrast to the colonies and 
highlights that colonial priorities were different and specific to the context of the 
empire in the interwar years.  
Moreover, MacDonald’s role offers important insights into policy formation. 
MacDonald’s conflicting priorities, his public support for the Arab view in Palestine, 
his private encouragement and support of attempts to place medical workers in the 
colonies, and his support of settlement in British Guiana all present a challenge to 
the historian. Without question, they show that MacDonald consistently prioritised 
the welfare of the empire and British colonial subjects over refugee concerns. In this 
context, it is less difficult to marry the two very different views held by MacDonald. 
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There was clearly an attraction to using the colonies as a way of easing some of the 
pressure for increased immigration to Palestine; refugee entry into the colonies, 
even on a very small scale, helped lessen a problem that threatened to engulf 
Britain’s Arab empire, including India. 
The racial ‘traits’ attributed to Jewish people by officials also played a 
significant part in the latter’s perception of the ways in which Jewish settlers could 
help colonial development, for example, as either particularly skilled medical 
professionals or, based on Palestine, a skill for colonisation. Finally, as in the case of 
Ludwig Reinheimer, British officials could dismiss personal applications for practical 
reasons. His skills and suitability were not enough to overcome official perceptions 
of Jewish refugees and the preference for one kind of humanitarianism over 
another that was so pervasive in British, especially colonial, thinking. 
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Conclusion: 
Race, Liberalism and Humanitarianism 
Kushner argues that the lack of nuance in bystander studies is ‘dangerous’ because 
rather than advancing ‘our understanding of the complexity of human responses 
during the Holocaust, the bystander category is in danger of aiding the tendency to 
see the subject in Manichean terms, as a symbol of mass evil alongside much less 
prevalent absolute good’.1 These black and white distinctions allow no room for 
Primo Levi’s ‘gray zone’ and much less room for a holistic understanding of the 
motivations behind Allied (in)action, which was in fact full of ambiguities and 
ambivalence.2 Nowhere were these ambiguities more clear than in a colonial 
setting; nowhere is nuance more necessary. Britain’s colonial responses to the 
interwar refugee crisis ranged from unrealised grand plans (e.g. large-scale 
settlement in British Guiana), unbending rejection (e.g. towards illegal refugee 
boats) to cautious compromise (e.g. refugee doctors), and included the actions of 
individual activists (e.g. MacDonald) to individual obstructionists (e.g. Brooke-
Popham). 
Rather than arguing that Colonial Office policy was restrictive, anti-Jewish 
and/or unresponsive to the humanitarian needs of refugees, this thesis offers a 
more nuanced explanation. It has argued: that restrictive policy was a manifestation 
of the contradictions of liberalism; that Jewishness mattered, especially within 
officials’ constructed racial hierarchies; and that humanitarianism was not 
completely rejected but prioritised according to various colonial and domestic 
interests. Colonial development was the policy produced in response to these ideas. 
Although individual policy-makers were sometimes anti-immigrant, racist or 
uncaring, more often than not they were those things only in part. The refugee 
question engaged with other profound issues in the UK (and US), and policy-making 
must be assessed in these contexts. While we, with hindsight, might wish more had 
been done, hindsight can be misleading. For most of the period under study, the 
events that have become known as the Holocaust were not yet underway. Officials 
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were not knowingly abandoning Jewish refugees to the fate of Auschwitz, but 
rather were acting, as governments still do, by adopting policy to fit their broadest 
domestic, colonial and foreign policy needs. 
 In exploring these important issues, this thesis makes important 
contributions to both Holocaust studies and imperial history. By looking at the 
Jewish refugee crisis of the 1930s in the context of the British Empire, a new 
dimension has been added to the story of Britain’s response to the Holocaust, 
providing explanations and nuance to British limitation and restriction. For imperial 
studies, British policy regarding the Jewish refugee crisis highlights important 
developments in the understudied inter-war period. This was a particular moment 
in imperial policy-making in which the long-held desire (and practice) of officials 
displacing domestic concerns to imperial spaces was increasingly challenged. The 
tensions this caused, expressed in questions regarding liberalism, race and 
humanitarianism, offer new insights into important areas of colonial history.  
Although the importance of liberalism (in its broadest sense) has been 
identified by Kushner and other scholars (including Bill Williams, David Feldman and 
John Garrard), this thesis, by placing the question in the colonial setting, has taken 
the assessment further. The contradictions and tensions within Britain’s liberalism 
were nowhere clearer than in its empire, where British authority was based on the 
‘benevolent’ oppression of others. The influence of liberalism on immigration and 
refugee policy was particularly evident in the discussions that emerged regarding 
policy for individual entry and large-scale settlement schemes. Refugee entry into 
colonies like Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and Cyprus were all judged by the ability of 
refugees to assimilate into the established racial and social order. In Kenya, this 
meant refugees had to walk a fine line between adopting standard ‘white’ 
behaviour without challenging the place and role of black Africans or Indian imperial 
subjects. In Northern Rhodesia, refugees’ ability to assimilate was judged in the 
context of a powerful white British settler community. In Cyprus, Jewish refugee 
entry was influenced by political concerns that made it hard for them to be viewed 
as anything other than a potential problem.  
Large-scale colonisation plans were at the forefront of both official and public 
imaginations; interest in them was undoubtedly connected to the growing 
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importance placed on questions of population and demographics by the Colonial 
Office. This was reflected in the numerous large-scale settlement plans discussed 
(specifically for Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and British Guiana). However, these plans 
rested on liberal exceptions being made for refugee groups as well as plans being 
rushed through in order to provide the immediate places of safety required by 
refugees. This went against liberal ideas and challenged expectations of 
assimilation, necessary (but complicated) in the imperial context. Clearly, it raised 
ideological as well as practical difficulties which ultimately meant large-scale 
settlement plans failed to develop beyond the stage of discussion or investigation. 
Still, the records left for them provide vital information for scholars who wish to 
understand how Britain’s liberal identity impacted refugee policy. 
The connection between liberalism and imperialism has been emphasised by 
other scholars. This thesis’s focus on the inter-war period moves the established 
historiography into the twentieth century and provides new ways of understanding 
how Britain’s liberal identity impacted important issues of the past, including 
questions of importance to the imperial centre (the metropole) and the periphery 
(the colonies). For example, although Jewish, black, and Chinese migrant groups had 
challenged British domestic policies by their presence during the nineteenth 
century, it was only after the end of the Second World War when colonial migration 
to the UK started to increase that questions of how to engage with different racial 
groups was brought fully into the domestic context. Some ten years earlier, the 
proposed entry of Jewish refugees into divided and different racial orders in the 
colonies raised new questions of multiculturalism, and the imperial response to 
these offers insights into how policy-makers would respond to the challenges of 
decolonisation (and increasing indigenous power) as well as domestic immigration 
and race questions in the post-1945 world. 
Although, as has been stressed, antisemitism alone does not explain British 
inaction towards Jewish refugees, this thesis has shown the value of assessing the 
issue from the colonial perspective, because in this particular space, it is clear that 
understandings of Jews (along with many other groups) were racialised and that 
this impacted policy. In the empire, Jews challenged the rigid racial hierarchies on 
which British power was based, and it is evident that Britain’s liberal form of 
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antisemitism was active. It is not enough to say that racial thinking in the 1930s was 
not monolithic or simply ‘racist’. Rather, official perceptions of different racial 
groups in the empire were varied, complex, multifaceted, and based on a 
comparison to each other. Understanding these aspects of racial thinking is crucial 
to furthering our understanding of British refugee policies (or the lack thereof).  
The arrival (even in theory) of white European Jews (and the accompanying 
multitude of antisemitic and pseudo-scientific stereotypes) into a social hierarchy 
defined by skin colour created considerable problems for colonial officials. From 
prison uniforms to hiring black help, officials went to extreme (and explicit) lengths 
to protect first and foremost the imperial system in the face of these problems. In 
the course of debates and policy formation, officials connected whiteness to 
national identity, class and politics. 
This definition of whiteness was not just something understood and 
experienced by the policy-makers. Not only did refugees experience, interact with, 
and internalise British racial views (e.g. the Berg sisters’ experiences at school in 
Kenya or Silbiger’s views of ‘usefulness’), they also challenged and reinforced racial 
hierarchies, especially official (and local) perceptions of whiteness. Indeed, it was 
through the challenges the refugees presented to white imperial identity that we 
are afforded important insight into areas of relevance to British colonial studies, 
including whiteness. As established in chapter three, the refugee question did not 
just prompt discussion of Jewish refugees, but also of indigenous populations and 
white settlers.  
In its focus on humanitarianism, this thesis has shown that the needs of 
Jewish refugees were ignored or marginalised not simply because they were Jewish, 
but rather because their humanitarian needs were considered to be less important 
than other concerns. This is important for both Holocaust historians and imperial 
scholars. For the former, it helps steer them away from assessments of the actions 
of liberal democracies in the 1930s and 1940s based on contemporary expectations 
of national and international responses to humanitarian emergencies. Such 
expectations were not present in the interwar years, when a growing 
internationalism was consistently and effectively challenged by the geopolitical 
convulsions seen in Europe and the Far East, and ideas of help were still firmly 
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rooted in Western (imperial) conceptions of development, society and culture. 
Prestige was a central part of the equation, but this was the case in an imperial 
context, where might (and white) was believed to be right. The failure to help 
persecuted Jews and the firm line taken with refugees on board vessels sailing 
illegally are perhaps jarring now but were hardly surprising then. They were justified 
by a liberal, imperial understanding of the world.  
In the official mind, Britain’s responsibility to the development and welfare of 
its imperial citizens (dictated by liberal and racial ideas as well as political and 
economic self-interest) was a far greater humanitarian priority than that of offering 
refuge to persecuted European Jews. This prioritisation offers important insight into 
colonial policy formation during the interwar years. Undoubtedly, allowing the 
unrestricted entry of Jewish refugees into the colonies would have appeased 
international pressure and saved thousands from persecution (keeping in mind that 
officials had no idea of what was to come in Nazi-occupied Europe). However, 
British colonial officials determined that the impact of refugee entry on existing 
colonial racial and social hierarchies – by supposedly threatening the trade of Indian 
artisans (as well as raising questions over the rights of Indian ‘citizens’ or ‘subjects’) 
and ‘confusing’ or undermining the welfare of black Africans – were too 
problematic to compete with the emergency needs of an outsider group like Jewish 
refugees.  
Therefore, the preference given to developmental and alchemic concerns for 
the colony over the emergency needs of the refugees was a choice based on 
contemporary understandings of the world rather than a rejection of 
humanitarianism generally (or Jews specifically). Or put another way, the needs of 
the state were the central justification in any action taken on behalf of refugees by 
officials. Even when genuine expressions of humanitarianism were made (e.g. by 
MacDonald), the potential benefits to the state or to the larger ‘imperial project’ 
were central to the suggested response (e.g. linking the entry of refugee doctors to 
colonial development needs).  
Together, these three influences – liberalism, race and humanitarianism – 
helped lay the foundation for the policy that was ultimately adopted towards 
refugees in the empire: linking refugee settlement with opportunities for 
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development. This, however, was a policy of compromise, in which officials found 
ways around the limitations and agendas set by liberalism, race, humanitarianism 
and pragmatic state interests. On the one hand, refugee doctors fitted the 
preference for controlled, individual migration, while also offering the potential to 
develop colonial social services which were increasingly sought after in a time of 
changing understandings of colonial welfare and development. On the other hand, 
while there was support for the refugee colonisation of British Guiana both in the 
territory and Whitehall, such large-scale settlement schemes were ultimately stifled 
because of the importance attached to the specific selection of the right kind of 
settler, racial attitudes that impacted who these were deemed to be, and the desire 
to pursue settlement without detriment to existing inhabitants.  
Clearly then, in colonial settings, policy-makers were not presented with 
bilateral choices but rather multifaceted ones: the perceived needs of different 
races had to be considered; humanitarian action towards refugees (and its foreign 
policy consequences) had to be weighed against paternalism; and liberal tolerance, 
universalism and the belief in progress had to be squared with a firm belief in 
imperialism. Imperialism, like Allied inaction in the face of the Holocaust, offers us 
unsettling questions about Britain and the US, places generally conceptualised as 
‘liberal’, ‘democratic’ and ‘free’. To seek a fuller understanding of bystander 
inaction is not to condone or to excuse that inaction. Rather, seeking a thorough 
understanding of the reasoning behind the policies adopted or not adopted by 
bystanders – including a range of sometimes conflicting ideologies – reveals how 
events like the refugee crisis and the Holocaust challenged contemporaries’ 
perceptions of the world and forced them to prioritise and act based on these 
perceptions. 
Of course, these historically significant findings are also of particular relevance 
to the contemporary world. 2015 was in many ways the year of the refugee. 
Between 1 January and 7 December 2015, over 911,000 refugees and migrants 
arrived in Europe, with 3,550 people perishing as they made the journey.3 Headlines 
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were dominated first by the perilous movement of refugees via the Mediterranean 
Sea, then by the sheer scale of the refugee movement, and finally, by the end of the 
year, terrorist attacks that were linked to perpetrators who had found their way 
into Europe as refugees. The modern refugee question clearly remains unanswered. 
However, public opinion and social media as well as politicians all made deliberate 
references to the past when discussing the ways in which modern Europe, Britain 
and America should respond. As Richard Breitman explains in an introduction to a 
special ‘Refugee’ edition of the academic journal Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 
‘[w]e have no option but to use past events, since we lack sufficient knowledge or 
instincts to solve present problems without any frame of reference’. However, as 
Breitman suggests, there are similarities rather than direct parallels.4 
Therefore, it is my hope that rather than this thesis offering ‘lessons’, it adds 
to an ongoing dialogue between the past and the present, in which a careful 
consideration of both can help illuminate the world that was and the world which 
might be.
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